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ABSTRACT 
Sharing of Figurative Language Themes in Expert Therapy: Occurrence 
and Effect on Client Experiencing and Therapeutic Bond. (May 2004) 
Scott Ashley Cardin, B.A., University of Missouri;  
M.S., University of  Kansas 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Collie Conoley 
 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the use and effect of figurative 
language discourse in examples of expert therapy.  More specifically, one of the main 
reasons for conducting this study was to describe figurative language discourse, its 
production, use, and potential effects on the therapeutic relationship and client 
experiencing.  
Training videos were selected and transcribed using criteria for selection of 
examples of expert therapy. Fifty-six excerpts, each two-minutes in length, were taken 
from the transcribed therapy sessions and used for the analyses. One set of raters was 
trained to identify instances of figurative language and make ratings of shared theme. 
Another set of raters was trained to use the Experiencing Scales and the Working 
Alliance Inventory on the transcribed excerpts. Analyses were conducted to investigate 
the frequency of use and relationship between therapist and client figurative language 
dialogue.  
Results indicated that the majority of figurative language used in examples of 
expert therapy is metaphoric in nature. Additionally, it was found that the majority of 
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figures of speech were frozen in meaning or were commonly used. A small percentage 
of figures of speech were shared conceptually between the therapist and the client. 
Regarding the shared figurative language, a statistically significant difference between 
therapists and clients with regard to their production of shared figurative language was 
found and indicates that use of shared figurative language by expert therapists may be a 
subtle and indirect way in which therapeutic alliance is initially established as well as 
maintained. It may also represent how expert therapists follow content of the therapy 
session. In addition, a regression analysis conducted to determine if there is a 
relationship between shared figurative language and ratings of therapeutic alliance did 
not meet statistical significance. Overall, the results of this study provide preliminary 
findings with regard to what type of figures of speech expert therapists use and give a 
clear direction in terms of the next direction for research. Additionally, this experiment 
provides direction for the type of methodology that should be utilized in future research. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction to the Problem 
 For many years counseling and therapy researchers have been devoting 
considerable effort toward investigating the process of psychotherapy and counseling 
(Walborn, 1996). Besides the obvious benefits of obtaining a more thorough and 
accurate understanding of therapy, one major reason why such efforts continue to be 
employed rests in the attempt to improve efficacy of counseling and psychotherapy 
overall. With regard to efficacy, an ever-growing body of literature demonstrates 
evidence that process variables, thought to be common to most or all of the various 
theoretical forms of therapy, have significant influence on therapeutic outcome. One 
small segment of the corpus of research and theoretical literature focusing on therapy 
process centers on the linguistic interaction between the therapist and the client. A 
growing segment of that literature is specifically devoted to investigating the effects of 
figurative language use in therapy. 
Researchers have been interested in studying the use and effect of figurative 
language in therapy for several decades (Angus, 1992; Angus & Rennie, 1988, 1989; 
McMullen, 1989, 1996; Pollio & Barlow, 1975; Siegelman, 1990). Based on this 
research and on clinically supported evidence, client’s metaphors and figurative  
__________________ 
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expressions have been recognized by clinicians as being meaningful in attempting to 
identify the client’s understanding of his or her situation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, Kopp 
2001). Essentially, the figurative language that the client uses can be thought of as 
windows into client-offered solutions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). As such, therapists may 
miss important information when they do not pay attention to figurative language use by 
the client (Siegelman, 1990). Missing opportunities with clients with regard to figurative 
language is similar to missing other client-introduced information. This might be 
considered analogous to not paying attention. Often, missing client-introduced 
information leads to a decreased sense of therapeutic alliance and to breaches in the 
relationship (Kopp, 2001). Not enough information is known about the connection 
between missing or not using a client’s figurative language and subsequent changes in 
the quality of the therapeutic relationship between the client and the therapist. Therefore, 
research that investigates figurative language use in therapy and its possible effects on 
outcome or process of therapy is needed because it may enhance the efficacy of 
psychotherapy. 
 In many ways, the research to date has been equivocal and inconclusive 
concerning the importance of figurative language use and function in therapy. There are 
many possible reasons why the research to date may have failed to unanimously support 
the intuitively based, and clinically supported, hypotheses that have been posed. In 
general, those hypotheses suggest that figurative language use by both the therapist and 
the client, and more specifically the collaborative figurative language discourse or 
shared verbal interchange and conceptual understanding that is ongoing between the 
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client and therapist during the length of their relationship, is meaningful with regard to 
therapeutic alliance and good outcome therapy. Possible reasons include inadequate 
research methodology (McMullen, 1985; 1996), inadequate instruments or inventories, 
difficulties in operationalizing phenomena, difficulties in collaborative science due to 
varying definitions and terminology, and incorrectness of the hypothesis that figurative 
language is influential and important to the process of effective therapy.  
Based on the intuitive relationship between figurative language and therapy often 
described in testimonies from therapists and on the existence of equivocal research 
findings, future research is needed to clarify how figurative language use is related to the 
process of effective therapy. If, through future research, a stronger connection can be 
established between figurative language use and therapy results, then this information 
can be used to identify and develop new therapeutic skills designed to maximize the 
therapeutic benefits relating to figurative language use in therapy. It might also be used 
as a gauge from which therapy process can be measured. 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate what kinds of figurative language are 
used in expert therapy and to determine if there is a relationship between the kind of 
figurative language discourse that is used by experts and subsequent changes in observer 
ratings of the relationship between the client and the therapist. This information might be 
useful in furthering our understanding of phenomena of figurative language discourse in 
therapy, possibly shedding light on its utility and function with regard to therapy, 
therapeutic interventions, therapeutic alliance, and therapeutic outcome.  
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Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The research to date investigating the effects of figurative language in therapy 
has generally focused on examining three qualities or characteristics of figurative 
language: category of figure of speech, novelty, and whether or not the language is 
conceptually shared in discourse of the therapeutic dyad. As stated previously, the first 
purpose for conducting this research is to determine what figurative language is used in 
examples of expert therapy (figure of speech and novelty) and what kind of figurative 
language discourse (shared or not shared) typically occurs in examples of expert therapy. 
Clinicians and researchers have suggested that those characteristics listed above each 
might play a positive role in influencing therapy process (Angus & Rennie, 1988; 
McMullen, 1989, 1996). As such, investigating the kind of figurative language with 
regard to type of figure of speech, novelty of the figure of speech, and whether or not the 
figure of speech was conceptually shared by the members of the therapy dyad is 
important for describing this linguistic phenomenon as it occurs in therapy. One of those 
characteristics, whether or not figurative language is conceptually shared by the therapy 
dyad specifically, has been recently hypothesized to influence the therapy relationship 
(Angus & Rennie, 1988; McMullen, 1989, 1996) by enhancing the working relationship 
or bond between the therapist and the client. Gathering more information about the 
frequency of occurrence, type, novelty, and shared qualities of figures of speech 
occurring in therapy will further our understanding of the phenomena in general. Testing 
the hypothesis that shared figurative language positively influences the working 
relationship is an important step in attempting to better understand this phenomena. For 
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the purpose of this investigation this hypothesis is stated as follows: As shared figurative 
language occurs, there is gain in working alliance and subsequent positive changes in the 
quality of therapy dialogue.  
The research questions can be stated as follows:  
1. To what degree are the different figures of speech used in the therapy of 
experts as indicated by therapy training tapes? Are those figures of speech 
mostly novel or frozen? How frequently are those figures of speech 
conceptually shared by both members of the therapy dyad? 
2. How does using figures of speech that share an underlying conceptual 
meaning relate to subsequent ratings of the therapeutic bond and 
experiencing? 
This researcher does not hypothesize answers to the first question, but does offer 
the following hypothesis relating to the second question: There is a positive relationship 
between use of shared figurative speech between the therapist and the client and 
subsequent increases in the working relationship and client experiencing.  
Potential Benefits of Conducting Study 
There appear to be three main benefits for conducting this research. First, the 
findings of this research will added to the current knowledge on figurative language 
processes and their function in therapy, specifically providing descriptive information 
with regard to use of figurative language by experienced/expert therapists. Second, the 
findings might help clinicians by steering them in ways either to directly use figurative 
language discourse in therapy or in ways to use client produced figurative language to 
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supplement the way that the therapist has conceptualized the client. And third, the 
findings may lead to a new understanding of language and its influences on the 
processes of building therapeutic alliance. Lastly, the findings of this study might help in 
the development of future research questions and/or hypotheses relating to figurative 
language use in therapy. 
Limitations of the Study 
  Limitations of this study include sampling bias, generalizability, and 
measurement. One assumption of this study is that expert therapists developing therapy 
training videos are good therapists and that the taping of such videos does not lesson the 
quality of therapy or drastically alter the manner of therapy that said expert would 
normally provide. It is possible that the examples of figurative language use taken from 
excerpts of the selected training videos do not accurately represent expert therapy. In a 
related manner, sampling problems such as the ones described above would also make 
the findings not as generalizable. While the above limitation may be true, the assumption 
of this study is that the training examples of expert therapists are ideal examples of the 
work of very effective psychotherapists. 
Certain measurements can pose limitations to a study, such as the use of a scale 
too large to accurately indicate small changes. This limitation invariably affects all 
research, but it is important to note when investigating phenomena with anticipated 
smaller effect sizes. The concern is that expert therapists may do many behaviors during 
a segment of tape that might influence the therapeutic bond more than the influence of 
figurative language discourse. This would either cancel out or inflate findings.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
As the focus of this dissertation is pinpointed on attempting to better understand 
the mechanism behind, and subsequent therapeutic product of figurative language 
discourse in therapy, the primary purpose of this literature review is to provide an 
overview of the theoretical and empirical articles centered on figurative language and its 
role in therapy. It will provide historical background and perspectives with regard to the 
study of figurative language across various scientific fields in general, and more 
specifically across the fields of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology. It will include 
a discussion of key issues and significant debates that possibly have shaped the extent to 
which figurative language has been researched. Second, it will focus on a more detailed 
outline of the literature generated from the applied psychology fields by providing 
definitions of figurative language, theories and models of figurative language, research 
design and strategies, and a review of research findings. Lastly, it will summarize the 
important issues of the previous sections. 
Historical Background 
A substantial amount of scholarly attention has been directed toward the topic of 
figurative language (Billow, 1977, 1987; Shibles, 1971; Van Noppen & Hols, 1990). 
Considering this, the volume of literature focused on this topic should be expected to be 
large. In attempting to collect resources for this dissertation, an electronic search of the 
psychology literature in the Psych Info search engine using the terms, “figurative 
language” and “metaphor” yielded 527 and 4371 articles respectively. Similarly, using 
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an analogous linguistics search engine, the term “metaphor” produced 2554 results and 
the term “figurative language” produced 252 results. These findings offer a simple 
demonstration of the relatively large corpus of literature on the topic of figurative 
language. Based on this expanse of literature directly focusing on figurative language as 
well as the assumed even greater quantity of literature that at minimum refers to 
figurative language, it is safe to suggest that there is a significantly long and expansive 
history of interest in figurative language.  
The interest has been wide ranging, originating from fields as diverse as 
Philosophy, Linguistics, Psychology, Psycholinguistics, and Cognitive Science 
(Glucksberg, 2001). Initially, scholarly writing devoted to this subject had been sporadic 
with periodic bursts of publication coming from those various fields, although much of 
the earliest writings on figurative language predate formal creation of several of those 
fields. More recently, theorists and researchers spanning the aforementioned fields have 
been much more prolific. As a result, there are vast amounts of literature on this topic, a 
large percentage of which was produced in the last thirty or so years. Tongue in cheek, 
Booth (1979) suggested, based on the volume of literature produced on the topic of 
figurative language alone in the year of 1977, that by the year 2039 there would be more 
people studying metaphor than the actual population of the world. Humorous predictions 
aside, it seems that this topic has relevance across the academic board.  
Although having relevance in many fields of study, the interest in researching 
figurative language primarily has its roots in three general academic areas: Philosophy, 
Linguistics, and Psychology. Each of these fields continues to uniquely contribute to the 
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growing body of work reviewed here. It is because of their individual history of 
contributions, stemming from not only their varying research approaches and subsequent 
findings, but also from their unique vantage point from which they are motivated to 
conduct research, that each field’s historical background relevant to figurative language 
will be briefly outlined below.  
Philosophy and Figurative Language 
The field of Philosophy has a long history of reference to figurative language. 
One of the earliest recorded writings on figurative language, dating to the 4th century 
B.C., was Aristotle’s The Poetics (McKeon, 1947). Specifically, Aristotle did not just 
speak of figurative language per se, but rather focused his discussion on what he 
described as four categories of metaphor.  
Aristotle’s use of the term, “metaphor” has been the focus of some debate. 
Glucksberg (2001) notes that the second and third of Aristotle’s metaphor categories are, 
strictly speaking, actually examples of metonymy. Others have suggested (Ricoeur, 
1977) that Aristotle used the term metaphor to describe every kind of figurative 
language. This loose terminology and corresponding definition has proven to be one 
criticism, not only of Aristotle’s discussion, but also of the formal study of figurative 
language in general.  
Regardless of Aristotle’s terminology, his focus and propositions regarding 
figurative language have helped to both generate and shape the interest that researchers 
have had in studying figurative language. Of note, Aristotle stated that use of metaphor 
marks genius. He also suggested, according to the following quotation that metaphor 
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serves the function of helping people to acquire knowledge: “Midway between the 
unintelligible and the commonplace, it is a metaphor most which produces knowledge.” 
(McKeon, 1947).  
Since the time of Aristotle, the field of Philosophy has focused on figurative 
language periodically. Vico (1688-1744) was a philosopher who proposed that at the 
heart of creativity was the ability to create metaphor, which he believed was responsible 
for human creativity (Danesi, 1986). For an in-depth review of how the field of 
Philosophy has approached the study of figurative language, please see Soskice (1985). 
Of historical note, much of the work in the area of figurative language coming from the 
field of Philosophy has been focused on one central debate, figurativeness vs. literalness 
(Eco, 1984). In brief, the literal side of this debate was supported by philosophers who 
believed that literal language was superior to figurative language, the latter of which was 
thought to be a lesser, devalued, and inexact decorative form of the first. Much of the 
devaluing of figurative language appears to have rested on the premise that the purpose 
of figurative language was to lend decoration to the exact literal language and meaning. 
Thus, figurative language was not necessary and at times helped to create confusion or 
inexact language, both of which were highly devalued.  
On the other hand, the philosophers supporting the figurative side of this debate 
believed that figurative language was not inferior to literal language at all. Rather, those 
supporting the figurative side argued that at times figurative language could even 
possess emergent qualities that were beyond the scope of the capabilities of literal 
expressions alone. In essence, those philosophers believed that figurative language 
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contributed to the hearer’s or reader’s understanding in a way or in ways that literal 
language would fall short in attempting.  
Historically, this debate contributed to the limited degree of import that scientists 
for many years would place on figurative language research (Eco, 1984). According to 
this period’s scientific paradigm, time spent investigating figurative language was time 
actually misspent. Not only has this primary philosophical paradigm probably reduced 
the potential quantity of research in this area, but generally, such philosophical views on 
figurative language most likely shaped and/or limited the way researchers in other fields 
approached this topic for many years. Further, this attitude toward conducting research 
on figurative language might have influenced how researchers subsequently formulated 
researchable questions.  
Linguistics and Figurative Language 
Surprisingly, the field of linguistics has not always embraced the study of 
figurative language. According to Parmegiani (1988), early definitions of the range and 
scope of this field were restricted by authors who reportedly suggested that the field of 
linguistics should study only word and language etiology and morphology as opposed to 
how language is used in context both socially and psychologically. This sort of 
restriction on what was appropriate to study would have excluded research on figurative 
language.  
Despite early limitations, Linguists have contributed a large body of work 
concerning figurative language. Primarily they have focused their research on figurative 
language from the perspective of how metaphors operate and function. Chomsky (2000) 
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notably argued that there was an innate language structure. Recently, Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) proposed a conceptual model of figurative language that not only has 
had a large impact in the field of Linguistics, but also has sent rather large ripples 
throughout the fields of applied psychology.  
Psychology and Figurative Language 
Psychology as a field, like Linguistics, has not always embraced the study of 
figurative language either. During its infancy, there were opposing views on what the 
general topic of study should be for the field as a whole—observable conscious 
phenomena vs. unobservable processes (Watson & Greenberg, 1994). In the early days, 
the direction the field of psychology seemed to take focused research on observable 
conscious phenomena. As the field matured, more and more researchers have found it 
acceptable and even appropriate to pursue research as abstract as attempting to 
understand the influences and mechanisms of figurative language. As a consequence of 
this shift, interest in figurative language research appears to be growing exponentially as 
demonstrated by the increasing volume of published articles on figurative language 
within journals of psychology.  
The field of psychology, including researchers from almost all of its many 
specializations, have focused on conducting figurative language research in what might 
be described as two distinct but related areas: how figurative language works (is created 
and understood), and for what purposes we utilize it. Within the field of psychology, 
Cognitive Scientists and Psycholinguists typically have focused their research interests 
on the first area. They have done so by attempting to find evidence concerning: the 
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figural vs. literal debate, how figurative language is created and interpreted, why it is 
used at times and not at other times, why specific forms of figurative language are used 
when alternative options are available, what is its relationship to creativity and genius, 
can computers utilize human figurative language as a model for processing and decision 
making, and what influences does figurative language have in communication in general.  
On the other hand, researchers typically from the applied fields of psychology 
have tended to focus their efforts on investigating the second area, answering for what 
purpose we utilize figurative language. Generally, research questions directed toward 
this area of interest tend to ask questions such as: does figurative language influence the 
processes involved in therapy, and if so, in what fashion, does novel figurative language 
use by a client mark instances when he or she is gaining insight, and can client-used self-
imagery in the form of figurative language be used to track client improvement.  
The interest in figurative language from scientists in the fields of applied 
psychology have not been characterized by opposing viewpoints to the same degree as in 
the other fields. Rather, this interest seems to be one that is guided by exploration of a 
therapeutic phenomena not fully understood and one that is thought to be potentially 
therapeutic. 
Summary 
Each of these fields have uniquely contributed to the study of figurative language 
well beyond the contribution outlined in the previous paragraphs. However, there are 
many commonalities among the three fields with regard to interest and research of 
figurative language. For instance, they each have periodically focused on the issue of 
  14
figurative vs. literal debate, each has as a whole had difficulty in supplying definitions 
that were agreed to unanimously, and each field also has had in its history a reluctance or 
questioning of the importance of figurative language research. Besides this common 
ground, probably the most significant similarity among the fields is that most of the 
work spanning the disciplines has been spent attempting to better understand what 
figurative language is and for what purpose or purposes it possibly serves. When stated 
in this manner, it appears that the fields in which figurative language has been studied 
have a shared theme. Despite this shared theme, it is somewhat surprising that unified 
efforts across the fields have not been more commonplace. Instead, the work being 
conducted appears to be existing independently without input from researchers in other 
fields. As such, each field has developed its own terminology as well as lines of 
investigation and even theories of why figurative language is important. For that reason, 
it is important to define terminology when discussing theories, models, and research 
findings on this topic.  
Before moving ahead to the discussion of the specific figurative language 
research in applied psychology and more specifically to the various definitions and 
terminology, it first may be beneficial to outline a general or simple answer to the 
following question: what is figurative language and how should one define it? Based on 
the wide ranging literature, this question appears quite difficult to answer definitively. 
As alluded to in the previous paragraphs, it seems that to some extent the definition one 
chooses for figurative language depends on the field of study to which that person 
belongs. Philosophers to Linguists to Psychologists all seem to focus on varied 
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characteristics when defining figurative language. Further, researchers from the various 
fields studying figurative language also seem to vary in the importance they attach to a 
definition for figurative language. Some psychologists might even go so far as to suggest 
that a definition is unimportant.  
A review of the definitions and terminology assigned to the fields other than 
Psychology is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However for a more generic 
approach to defining figurative language and in attempting to answer the question posed, 
a common English dictionary can be consulted. The 10th edition of Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary (2001) does not include the term, figurative language, but does 
define the intuitively related terms, figurative, figure of speech, and metaphor. For the 
term, figurative, the most relevant definition provided was: “expressing one thing in 
terms normally denoting another with which it may be regarded as analogous.” For 
figure of speech, the definition was, “a form of expression (as a simile or metaphor) used 
to convey meaning or heighten effect often by comparing or identifying one thing with 
another that has a meaning or connotation familiar to the reader or listener.” Merriam-
Webster defined metaphor as, “a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally 
denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or 
analogy between them (as in drowning in money).” It is safe to suggest that these 
definitions are somewhat basic, probably at best only articulating features of figurative 
language that are commonly provided across all the fields so inclined to formulate 
definitions of figurative language. More relevant to the topic of this study, definitions 
used in the field of Psychology will be reviewed later in this chapter.  
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As is found with attempts to define almost any phenomenon, there are difficulties 
in providing an agreed upon definition across fields and within fields. This is a 
substantial understatement with regard to attempts at defining figurative language. 
Similarly, definitions of terms falling under the umbrella of figurative language also vary 
in how researchers define them.  
Applied Psychology Research on Figurative Language 
The main purpose of this chapter is to outline the literature relevant to Applied 
Psychology. As with the literature focused on figurative language in general, this 
segment of literature, although manageable, is also expansive and requires that particular 
subtopics be covered. These necessary subtopics can be summarized and grouped 
according to the following questions: 1) How do the fields comprising applied 
Psychology typically define figurative language?, 2) What are the theories and models of 
figurative language?, 3) What research designs and strategies have been used and what 
are their respective limitations?, 4) What are the findings of research focused on 
figurative language in therapy? As such, the subsequent segments of this chapter will be 
devoted toward providing information relevant to answering the four questions outlined 
above.  
Definitions 
This section, as its title suggests, serves the purpose of providing an outline of 
how the applied fields of psychology define figurative language both in practice and in 
research. Earlier in this chapter, issues relating to difficulties in defining figurative 
language as well as a general background of how various fields generally have defined 
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figurative language was provided. In contrast, this section will specifically address 
definitions of figurative language provided from the collective fields of applied 
psychology, in essence, providing definitions of figurative language that have been used 
in studying figurative language use in therapy.  
Overall, there have been two general approaches that researchers in applied 
psychology have used in defining figurative language in therapy. The first approach is 
flexible, typically not using a standardized method for identification or verification of 
words or phrases as being figures of speech. Researchers using this approach also appear 
not to distinguish between types of figurative language. One example of a flexible 
definition is Lankton and Lankton’s (1986). Building on Ericksonian views of therapy, 
they define metaphor as “a story with dramatic devices that captures attention and 
provides an altered framework through which the clients can entertain novel 
experience.” The other approach is more rigid in nature. An example of a more rigid 
definition used by researchers is taken from Barlow, Kerlin, and Pollio’s (1970) manual 
for the definition of figurative language: “…or trope, is any non-literal use of a word, 
phrase, sentence or sentences in which there is a deviation from the usual or principal 
sense of a particular language unity.” Researchers and/or theoreticians using this 
approach typically will make use of some standard definition, although often varying 
from investigator to investigator.  
Each approach to defining figurative language for research purposes has its 
potential strengths and weaknesses. For example, a potential strength of using a flexible 
definition is that it provides for significant lessoning of training requirements for 
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experimental raters/coders. Another strength is that it might allow for faster production 
of figurative language data. On the other hand, using a more rigid definition also could 
be beneficial because, by definition, it would provide greater sensitivity. At the same 
time, it may also allow for accruing a more detailed understanding of the phenomenon. 
Further, using a more rigid definition allows for greater chances of experimental 
replication and improvements.  
In criticism of using a flexible definition, many have suggested that there are 
functional differences as well as differences in potential effect of the various types of 
figurative language (McMullen, 1985; Cameron & Low, 1999). Some research findings 
lend support to the argument that different kinds of figurative language should be 
examined separately, finding for example that irony is processed differently than 
metaphor (Gibbs, 1998). If such differences in function and/or effect exist, then research 
findings using a flexible definition of figurative language could risk being muted. For 
example, if one kind of figure produces the opposite results as another kind and if both 
kinds are not differentiated in a study, then their respective effects could be cancelled out 
and subsequently overlooked. On the other hand, using a more rigid approach to defining 
figurative language also has its criticisms. A potential weakness of using a more rigid 
definition is that it would require a significantly greater degree of training requirements 
for experimental raters/coders. Another weakness is that it might not allow for faster turn 
around of figurative language data as making finer distinctions might take more time and 
energy.  
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By far, the majority of theoreticians and researchers in the fields of applied 
psychology focusing on figurative language in therapy have used a flexible definition of 
figurative language (McCurry & Hayes, 1992). Typically, most have used the term, 
“metaphor” to describe almost any of the various forms and mechanisms of figurative 
language including metaphor, simile, metonymy, analogy, irony, etc. (McMullen, 1996). 
Use of various terminologies creates difficulties when attempting to research and review 
this topic. Not only does it create problems when attempting to compare studies, but it 
also makes reviewing the literature difficult because readers would have to be familiar 
with all terms and definitions. As the overarching theme of the literature on figurative 
language in therapy tends to use the term, “metaphor” to describe figurative language in 
general rather than a specific kind of figurative language, to reduce confusion, reference 
to “metaphor” in this text can be understood as referring to figurative language in 
general unless otherwise specified.   
Theories and Models 
 There are a number of categories of theories and/or models that attempt to 
explain the phenomena of figurative language. For the purpose of this literature review, 
theories and models that focus on figurative language in general, and not on figurative 
language effects in therapy, will be termed as General Theories. Of the General 
Theories, the most well known and publicized are the comparison theories, substitution 
theories, interactional models, conceptual models, three-stage models, and combined 
models. Simply stated, these theories primarily differ in proposed mechanism for how 
figurative language is understood and for what proposed function figurative language is 
  20
used. On the other hand, the theories and models that examine specifically figurative 
language effects in therapy will be termed Therapy Theories. The Therapy Theories are 
best understood as formal or informal. 
General Theories 
Comparison. Theories and models that are categorized as being from the 
Comparison camp can be described as being based on the premise that figurative 
language acts by making a comparison between two things. For example, in the 
figurative expression, “She’s a sour grape,” the speaker is comparing a characteristic of 
the woman to a similar characteristic of a sour grape. Aristotle’s views on metaphor and 
the function of metaphor appear to be from this camp.  
Aristotle viewed figurative language, more precisely metaphor, as a decorative 
tool used by orators and writers as a way to provide comparison between two objects or 
functions, in essence to provide one “thing a name that belongs to something else.” He 
enumerated four categories of metaphor that were based on substitution of one concept 
for another (Glucksberg, 2001) and were divided into levels he termed, genus and 
species respectively. Accordingly, concepts belong to the same genus if their meanings 
are related. Conversely, if two concepts are not related in meaning, then each would 
belong to its own respective genus. Another way to understand the term genus might be 
to think of it as referring to generic, overarching groups. For example, “things-that-fly” 
would make up one genus whereas “things-that-cannot-fly” would make up another. 
Within each genus, there are species, or examples of particular things belonging to that 
genus. For example, in the genus of “things that fly” there are the respective species of 
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birds, bats, insects, etc. Similarly, the term species may be thought of as referring to 
specific examples.  
Aristotle’s first category included metaphors in which genus was compared to 
genus as in the phrase, “the trees were soldiers standing at attention.” In that phrase, the 
concept of trees is being compared to the concept of soldiers. These concepts are not 
related therefore they are not sub-species of the same genus. He described the second 
category as those metaphors in which a genus is replaced by a species. An example of 
this kind of metaphor might be, “all yuppies drive around in Volvos,” where the specific 
kind of car (species) is replacing the bigger category (genus) of expensive vehicles. The 
third category Aristotle described is the opposite of the second category—species 
replaced by genus as in the phrase, “the Champ walked in confidently.” In that phrase, 
the species or particular name of a champion is replaced by the genus terminology of 
Champ. Aristotle’s fourth category of metaphors consisted of analogies, involving four 
objects of comparison such as in the phrase, “shoelace is to shoe as belt buckle is to 
belt.” 
Substitution. The substitution theory, although not a single theory but rather a 
grouping of theories based on the same premise, is built on the belief that metaphor is a 
figurative expression that has a meaning-equivalent literal expression and that a speaker 
or author can replace one with the other without loss of meaning. Two contributors to 
this way of thinking were Quintilian and Chomsky (Soskice, 1985). 
Marcus Quintilian, a renowned Roman rhetorician studied and delved into the 
intricacies of argument and rhetoric through his most noted work, Institutio Oritoria. 
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Much like Aristotle, Quintilian’s philosophical contributions to the study of metaphor 
plague contemporary researchers today (Soskice, 1985). But unlike Aristotle, the 
Quintilian view of metaphor defines it as a kind of substitution. More precisely, this 
view suggested that a figurative expression was a substitution of a literal one and that all 
figurative speech could be recoded as literal. Quintillian’s work is at the heart of all 
substitution theories. 
Noam Chomsky, a modern linguist and professor of language, was intrigued by 
the native tongue’s ability to continually and unrelentingly create distinct, yet 
comprehensible sentences. He proposed that this innate form of creative and original 
language was a pattern, an expression snowflake, unique, yet amazingly similar in its 
representation (Chomsky, 2000; Soskice, 1985). As such, Chomsky contributed to 
substitution theory by addressing how the human mind can create metaphorical language 
that can take the place of literal language. 
Interaction. The interaction model was proposed by Max Black, an American 
analytical philosopher (1962). In essence, the interaction model is based on the belief 
that a metaphor works because of the interaction of associations that the hearer or reader 
has for two parts of any metaphor. For example, in the metaphorical phrase, “neck of the 
bottle,” one part of the metaphor is the neck of a person and the other part is the actual 
narrowed section of the top of a bottle. To continue with that example, let’s assume that 
the hearer or reader has never been exposed to the phrase, “neck of the bottle” but that 
he or she has everyday common knowledge of what a human neck is and what a typical 
bottle looks like. Based on the interaction theory, the hearer would understand that 
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qualities or characteristics of the human neck were being shifted onto the part of the 
bottle that narrows toward the top.  
More precisely this model has seven parts. First, there are two subjects of a 
metaphor, the main subject and a “subsidiary” subject. From the example above, the 
main subject would be the narrowed part of the bottle and the “subsidiary” subject would 
be a neck. Second, instead of each of the subjects representing a single thing or entity, 
each subject actually represents a distinct class or category of things. So, actually the 
main subject would be all bottles that have that particular shape and the “subsidiary” 
subject might be all necks. Third, the metaphor functions by taking “associated 
implications” from the “subsidiary” subject and placing those associations onto the main 
subject. Continuing with the example, the implied associations might be place of subject 
(both necks) as compared proportionally to the “body” of the animal or the “body” of the 
bottle. Fourth, the associations that the speaker or author intend for the hearer or reader 
to comprehend may be readily available or might even require the speaker or author to 
provide additional information. Fifth, the metaphor functions by making implications 
about the main subject; highlighting some associations while downplaying others not 
related to what the speaker or author intended by the metaphor. Those implications are 
ones that would typically be understood or used in reference to the “subsidiary” subject. 
With the above example, the implied associations were related to proportion (highlighted 
association) and were not related to the similarity of both the neck of a bottle and the 
neck of an animal having a passage where liquid can move through it (not highlighted 
association). Sixth, as each of the subjects is to be considered a category (rule 2 above), 
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the event of having the reader or hearer understand the implied associations occurs as the 
result of “shifts in meaning of words belonging to the same system” as the two subjects 
of the metaphor. Last, the seventh rule states that an explanation or reason for how those 
meaning shifts occur does not exist.  
Conceptual. In their seminal work titled, “Metaphors We Live By,” Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) proposed and outlined what they referred to as a conceptual system that 
is based on metaphors. They suggested that this conceptual system, based on 
unconscious metaphorical reasoning, is used by us not only in decision making but in all 
thought processes. In essence, they proposed that we use metaphors to conceptualize our 
world. For example, they suggested that we frequently use metaphorical expressions 
related to war when discussing arguments because we, as a whole, conceptualize arguing 
as being kin to war. To illustrate their point, they provided the following phrases: “your 
claims are indefensible, he attacked every weak point in my argument, his criticisms 
were right on target…” They suggested that we could figure out the underlying concepts 
behind our figurative language by grouping our conceptual-related figurative expressions 
together. In this way, we could find out how our figurative expressions are related to 
underlying concepts. One example that they provided to demonstrate this system 
pertains to how we think and speak about arguing. As in the example above they 
suggested that the underlying concept of arguing can be stated as “argument is war”.  
Kovesces (1986; 1990) has conducted numerous studies investigating the 
concepts underlying human emotions, such as those associated with anger, pride, and 
love. He has found that not only do we utilize an underlying conceptual system for those 
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emotions, but that this phenomena is cross cultural and can be found in many languages. 
His work has focused on the identification of the underlying concepts via analyses of our 
spoken language, including metaphor and figurative language in general. His findings 
support the overarching conceptual model proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). 
 Giambattista Vico, whose view of metaphor perhaps laid the foundation for the 
conceptual model, regarded language as the molder of thought, rather than thought 
molding language. Metaphors, according to Vico, represent and symbolize our views 
quite literally. Contrary to the belief that metaphors are merely fancy embellishments of 
the literal, Vico argued that metaphors actually come before the literal, deliberately 
setting the stage for the literal to manifest. 
Three Stage Model. A three-stage model for how language is comprehended has 
been proposed in Linguistics, Philosophy, and in Psychology (Glucksberg, 2001). 
Glucksberg outlined this model, stating that a reader or listener would: 1) find the literal 
meaning of the phrase, 2) examine if the literal meaning “works” within the context of 
the phrase, and 3) accept literal meaning if it “works” within the context and if it does 
not “work”, then begin search for non-literal meaning until one is found that makes 
sense in the context. Researchers have examined this model with mixed results 
(Glucksberg, 2001). 
 Combined Theories. Parmegiani (1988) suggested that although intuitively the 
research findings do not support one figurative language theory over another, “one 
should not throw out the baby with the bathwater.” In this way, she proposed that each 
of the theories can add some component that will provide further insight as to the whole 
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of the phenomenon of figurative language. This way of thinking is reminiscent of how 
the phenomenon of light is explained—on one hand, it is a particle and on the other it is 
a wave. Individually, neither viewpoint is sufficient to explain what light is; whereas 
taken as a whole, they each contribute uniquely to our understanding of light. Moore 
(1982) proposed the coexistence of literal and figurative language stating that metaphor 
is “not so much a change of meaning as an evocative exploitation of given 
meanings…that [the] audience is made to think of, to explore, to recreate or to create, a 
range of similarities not encoded in our first-order language…this creative work is made 
possible just because we inevitably…take metaphor literally.” 
Summary 
According to this review, there are five major groupings of general 
theories/models of figurative language. Most differ in how the mechanism of figurative 
language is defined and outlined. That is, they either describe figurative language as 
working by making comparisons, substitutions, or interactions between two objects or 
figures. To return to the example, “neck of a bottle,” each kind of theory/model would 
suggest something different about the function of that metaphor. A comparison theory 
would suggest that the top of the bottle is being compared to the neck. A substitution 
theory would suggest that there is a literal expression, possibly “the narrow part of the 
upper half of a bottle that is above the thicker, body-like section of the glass and is 
below the top of the bottle,” that could be substituted for the figurative expression. An 
interaction theory would suggest that qualities of the neck would be shifted onto a 
person’s understanding of that part of a bottle carrying that name. Unique among the five 
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groupings is the conceptual model, as proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). It would 
suggest that the reason why that expression was used is because of some shared 
conceptual understanding, possibly that physical objects are like our bodies. Another 
way of stating this is that users of that expression understand or hold on to the a priori 
belief that parts of objects can be analogous to parts of the human body. This model, 
rather than describing just mechanism, also describes process.  
Theories in Therapy 
Whereas the previous section reviewed general theories and models of figurative 
language, this section is devoted to outlining theories and models addressing the 
potential role of figurative language specific to therapy. Despite the existence of 
numerous references to figurative language in some form or fashion as it relates to 
therapy in general, there surprisingly are only a handful of full-fledged theories that are 
specifically focused on figurative language in therapy (Kopp, 2001; Siegelman, 1990; 
Barker, 1985). In contrast, much of the published literature referring to figurative 
language in therapy targets its function in only a specific, rather than global, manner. For 
instance, it has been proposed that use of figurative language by a client serves to 
distance him or herself from emotionally difficult material (Lenrow, 1966). This is an 
example of specific rather than global proposed function of figurative language because 
it can be assumed that the clinicians that proposed this function would also propose that 
a client can use figurative language other than as a way to avoid. An example of global 
functioning would be one of the few figurative language theories of therapy (Kopp, 
2001). For clarity in this review, the few specific theories have been grouped together in 
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what is referred to as the formal therapy theories and the other literature that does not 
belong to a theory, but rather only proposes functions for metaphor in therapy, have been 
grouped in what is referred to as the informal therapy theories. As such, each category 
will be discussed in turn.  
Informal Models. There is a considerably large volume of literature outlining 
how the metaphor that people use, rather than being merely colorful and decorative 
language, is the metaphor they in fact “live by” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). That is, 
metaphor theoretically acts as a tool for reasoning and as such if changed (altered, 
expanded, or replaced), shifts the way a person thinks, feels, and acts. Similarly, another 
segment of the literature focuses on how metaphor is used to describe, categorize, and 
understand emotions. Still another segment is focused on how metaphor is used to 
describe the self. All of which come under the umbrella of literature suggesting that 
metaphor can be changed and/or used to help a client gain insight into their reasoning, 
emotions, belief structure, self identity, and presenting concerns. Another segment of 
this literature focuses on reasons why a client or therapist might choose to use a figure of 
speech rather than a more direct and literal articulation, suggesting that there may be 
times when figurative language is used to avoid discussing a difficult topic directly. This 
last segment is not mutually exclusive with the others. Another segment of literature 
discusses how use of figurative language may enhance or deteriorate communication 
between client and therapist. Still another segment of literature focuses on how 
figurative language use in therapy may help to promote client insight, empathy, and 
recontextualization of memories. In sum, clinicians and theoreticians have suggested that 
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figurative language use in therapy can be used/is used for: promoting insight and 
understanding, enhancing the therapeutic relationship, changing the process of therapy, 
and stimulation of memory.  
The first grouping of informal therapy theories contains hypotheses and 
suggestions that figurative language use in therapy promotes client attainment of insight 
and a deepened understanding of their concerns and self and their emotions. 
Traditionally, heightened levels of insight with greater understanding by clients have 
been thought of as fundamentally important for client change to occur, if not directly 
responsible for all change. Considering this proposed relationship, there are numerous 
examples of hypotheses linking figurative language use with increased client insight into 
their problems, personal issues, proposed solutions, and self-identity.  
Over the past forty years, clinicians have been proposing a relationship between 
figurative language use and subsequent client gains in insight (Angus, 1992; Lenrow, 
1966; Voth, 1970; Fine et al., 1973). Others have also suggested possible mechanisms 
for that relationship. For example, Apter (1982), not only proposed a therapeutic 
relationship between client use of metaphor, but also suggested that its use in therapy 
creates a synergy of two concepts being brought together. In a way, he suggested that 
bringing the two concepts together allowed for clients to see their issues in a newer 
fashion, newer because of the combination of the two previously known concepts. 
Ferrara (1994) suggested that metaphor can be therapeutic through its use as a way of 
“summing up and generalizing global insights.” Similarly, Arlow (1979) posited that 
figurative language discourse occurring between the therapist and the client is “an 
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enterprise of mutual metaphoric stimulation…in which the analyst…supplies the 
appropriate metaphors upon which the essential reconstructions and insights may be 
built (p. 381).”  
Brooks (1985) and Stantostefano (1984) proposed that exploration of figurative 
language in therapy may promote insight by helping clients to symbolize meanings and 
thus, be able to articulate and manipulate the meanings more readily. Angus and Rennie 
(1989), found in their study investigating good-outcome therapy sessions, that a shared 
understanding of figurative language between the client and the therapist seems to help 
stimulate an insight “discovery” process via the use of a linguistic “shorthand.” On the 
other hand, Mitchell (1988) suggested that use of figurative language in therapy helps 
clients to generate real life meanings by helping them to better see and examine an issue 
through a metaphoric lens. Hymer (1997) stated that metaphor use in therapy, “widens 
the horizons of meaning for the patient, opening up greater possibilities for exploration, 
“freeing “ free associations as well as amplifying the patient’s way of communicating.”  
Mair (1977) noted that, “the imaginative use of metaphor can create vibrancy, 
immediacy and vigor in both the making and expression of meaning. So metaphors give 
‘life’ to our discourse.” Barker (1985) proposed that metaphor helps clients who 
normally “intellectualize conventional interpretations” to gain insight and be open to 
another way of thinking by presenting alternative interpretations in such a way that the 
client is more likely to “hear” them.  
All of these suggested links between metaphor use and the attainment of greater 
insight by the client either propose the change mechanism as caused by an increased 
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ability to talk about issues and/or due to the gain in emergent or new ways of thinking 
about current concerns. In addition to the attainment of general insight, a significant 
amount of the theoretical literature focused on metaphor and therapy also describes how 
metaphors and other figures of speech are used to describe the self and gain insight into 
the self. 
Hoskins and Leseho (1996) provide an outline of metaphors of self, metaphors 
people use to describe internal processes and their personality. They propose that it is 
important for therapists to attend to the imagery and figures of speech used to self 
describe suggesting that, “how counselors perceive the organization for the self, and the 
metaphors they use, is reflected in the approaches they take when engaging with clients.” 
Based on their review, they categorized figurative expressions relating to the self into six 
themes or types: 1) unitary self, 2) integrated self, 3) narrative self, 4) possible selves, 5) 
empty self, and 6) internalized selves.  
They define the unitary self-metaphors as those consisting of figurative language 
describing characteristics of the self that are “core” and that “remain the same 
throughout life.” They add that this imagery of the self is akin to the imagery described 
by theories of therapy prescribing removal of the outside layers and gradual 
strengthening of the deeper layers. The authors define the integrated self-metaphors as 
those that paint the picture of the self as having undesirable parts that many clients tend 
to want to remove. They suggest that in therapy the goal of therapy is to facilitate 
acceptance of the undesirable parts or to have them integrated. The third category, 
metaphors of the narrative self, was described by the authors as being comprised of 
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metaphors that associate the self with characteristics such as fluidity and adaptability, 
seeing the self as potentially evolving.   
The fourth category of metaphors of the self, possible selves, is temporal in 
nature. These metaphors have the general theme of allowing the current self to change 
into a future self. The authors suggest that therapists and clients work together in 
identifying and defining what a possible future self would look like. Metaphors of the 
self placed in the category of Empty Self by the authors are those characterized by our 
attempts to fill up or grow into or somehow mature our selves until we are satisfied with 
them. The sixth category, according to the authors, was given the name, Internalized 
selves. It is made up of the metaphors of the self that describe having multiple separate 
selves or a “community” of selves. Therapists utilizing this understanding of self might 
encourage clients to accept the various members of the community as all being equal and 
equally important and valued. Also, therapists might make use of a group approach 
having each member of the self be a member of the group; therapy would consist of the 
group members talking to each other.  
Cirillo and Crider (1995) suggest that one function of figurative language in 
therapy is to help in accommodating different viewpoints such as from members of a 
family, or regarding different but analogous situations, or even intrapsychological views. 
They stated that there could be various goals obtained through this secondary function of 
metaphor. For example, they suggested that at times cohesion would be a goal for 
therapy. As such, they suggest that a well-suited therapeutic metaphor would be one that 
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allows for multiple meanings to be condensed. In this manner, therapeutic material may 
be addressed indirectly.  
Cirillo and Crider (1995) suggested that one therapeutically beneficial function 
of “changing perspective on a topic with borrowed terminology” is that it helps the 
therapist to use the client’s own language and experiences to produce a metaphor that 
aides in the shift in perspective from the previous problematic way to a new and less 
problematic viewpoint. They suggested that one function of “using a novel combination 
to create or reveal something new” is thought to benefit the client therapeutically 
because it can help the client to not just shift perspective but to completely redefine the 
presenting problems and consequently create new possible solutions. 
Another area in which it has been proposed that clients gain insight via the 
examination of figurative language in therapy regards their understanding of their 
emotions and emotional reactions. Averill (1990) described six metaphors that people 
use to describe their emotions. Kovesces (1986, 1990, 1991, 1995) demonstrated that 
affective states are commonly understood in figurative terms. He also found that this is 
true for several languages and cultures, thus providing evidence for the container theory, 
which suggests that metaphors hold information muc like a container that is then passed 
along to the hearer or reader. Fainsilber and Ortony (1987) also discussed how emotions 
can be expressed via the use of figurative language. Apter (1982) posited that “the study 
of metaphor tells us something not only about the way in which people think and 
communicate their ideas, but also something about the nature of emotional experience.” 
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 Many of the references to function of metaphor in therapy postulate that its use 
influences the process of therapy. For instance, some propositions outline how use of 
metaphoric language is an indirect way of speaking about issues. Other suggestions have 
related to how use of figurative language in a shared manner in therapy contributes to a 
deeper therapeutic relationship experienced between the therapist and client.  
A relatively early proposition regarding figurative language and therapy was 
provided by Caruth and Ekstein (1966). They suggested that use of figurative language 
in therapy by the therapist can result in helping to maintain focused contact with client 
without turning the client off to therapy or overwhelming him or her. They suggested 
this phenomenon occurs because use of figurative language, rather than literal language, 
effectively distances the client from the actual meaning of his or her difficulty. In 
essence, they suggested that use of figurative expressions allows the client to indirectly 
focus without withdrawing from thinking about painful material. Similarly, Reider 
(1972) proposed that the impersonal qualities of figurative language effectively allow 
client and therapist to discuss relevant issues in a non-threatening manner. The proposed 
outcome of such use of figurative language would be continued positive direction in 
therapy due to avoidance or sidestepping of defenses. Others (Hymer, 1997; Sledge, 
1977) have suggested that therapists might use figurative language in an effort to bypass 
defenses, particularly with clients that often meet other’s suggestions with negations.  
Martin, Cummings, and Hallberg (1992) suggested that therapists and 
psychologists have been interested in studying metaphor because therapists such as 
Freud (1965) and Jung (1961) postulated that metaphors could be used in therapy 
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sessions as a way for clients to be able to have access to processes and phenomena that 
were primarily unconscious. On the other hand, Apter (1982) suggested that utilization 
of figurative language in therapy is beneficial because it has “a propensity for 
heightening arousal and the intensity of experience when they are perceived.” In her 
book entitled, “Meaning-making: Therapeutic Processes in Adult Development,” 
Carlsen (1988) describes cognitive developmental therapy and use of figurative language 
in “reframing feelings as barometers of meaning, as indicators of change, and as the 
natural energy and fuel for the change process.” 
Brooks (1985) in an article focusing on the beginning sessions of therapy with 
children posited that figurative language could be used as a way to therapeutically focus 
on issues that are important in the beginning sessions of therapy. Specifically, he 
outlined five such issues: 1) description of problem, 2) reinforcement of image of 
therapist as a capable helper, 3) belief and hopefulness that difficulty can be resolved, 4) 
description of possible ways that the difficulty could be resolved, and 5) verbal 
acknowledgement that the process of confronting difficulties is laborious and hard. 
Brooks also suggested that it is important to take up and use the figures produced by the 
client, but also noted that at times it is more beneficial and even necessary for the 
therapist to introduce figurative language.  
Ferrara (1994) in her book entitled, “Therapeutic Ways With Words,” reviewed 
relevant literature and described her therapeutic discourse research focusing on the 
process of negotiating the meaning of figurative phrases. She outlined ways that 
metaphor can be therapeutically used in therapy. One way is using metaphor as an 
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indirect way of talking about difficult topics. Ferrara also suggested that the process of 
therapy can be shaped through helping to establish and maintain a strong therapeutic 
relationship. Regarding this last suggestion, she writes, “Listeners cannot be passive if 
they are to “get” the point of a metaphor, and perhaps it is this pricking of 
consciousness, this external stimulation to assume a more active than usual role in 
listenership, that fosters an increased participation by hearers (p. 131).”  
She also reviews how metaphors may be “received” in therapy suggesting that 
there are four ways. There may be understanding without overt verbal communication of 
the understanding. On the flip side, the meaning may be entirely missed. The third way 
may be demonstrated by the metaphor being “received” or picked up and used, repeated, 
or discussed by the hearer. The fourth way may be that the two participants openly use, 
repeat, and in a collaborative fashion work toward a deeper understanding and 
application of the metaphor.  
Another grouping of the informal hypotheses relating to therapeutic function of 
figurative language in therapy relates to the proposal that its use aids clients by 
providing an easily remembered therapy “capsule” that they can retrieve and use at a 
later date, helping the client to remember significant details about their past emotional 
responses, in a way helping them to “relive” those experiences they are attempting to 
remember, and helping them to stay true to their memories and to not create false 
memories. 
Martin, Cummings, and Hallberg (1992) found four different functions of 
intentional use of metaphor in therapy. Their experiment consisted of having therapists 
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intentionally introduce metaphors to their clients during therapy. After each session, 
each client was asked a serious of questions regarding the sessions. They were asked to 
recall the session and produce “specific phrases or sentences” that were spoken during 
the session. They were also asked to identify the “most memorable event” and provide a 
rationale for why it happened to be the most memorable. Finally, the clients were asked 
to rate the helpfulness of the session. Martin, Cumings, and Hallberg (1992) reported 
that the three therapists reported producing metaphor intentionally, as required for the 
study, in 29 of the 41 total therapy sessions. They reported that in 19 of the 29 sessions, 
clients recalled phrases and wording from the sessions that corresponded to the 
therapists self-reported intentional metaphor production. They further stated that of the 
19 sessions in which correspondence occurred between the therapist intentional use of 
metaphor and subsequent recall of metaphor from the sessions, 17 of those cases 
involved collaborative efforts between the therapist and client in developing the 
metaphor while in session. In their comparison of ratings of helpfulness for the sessions 
with intentionally introduced metaphors that were also remembered by the client and 
those sessions in which the clients did not report remembering any metaphors, Martin, 
Cumings, and Hallberg (1992) reported finding statistical significance. They also 
analyzed the reasons that the clients reported a statement or event in therapy had been 
memorable. They reported finding four overarching reasons: “enhanced emotional 
awareness and understanding,” “conceptual ‘bridging,’” “enhanced relationship with 
therapist,” and “goal clarification.” Based on their findings, Martin, Cumings, and 
Hallberg (1992) suggested that, “therapists can make intentional use of metaphor during 
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psychotherapy to enhance clients’ encoding and recall of therapist-judged-significant 
therapeutic events and that such encoding and recall may be associated with clients’ 
evaluations of individual therapy sessions as helpful.” 
Cirillo and Crider (1995) suggested that the one function of figurative language 
in therapy is that it allows the therapist to both identify and to focus on a topic while 
simultaneously making that topic more memorable. They point to the findings of Martin, 
Cumings, and Hallberg (1992) as providing support for this therapeutic function of 
metaphor.  
Arbuthnott, Arthbuthnott, & Rossiter (1996), based on the results of a study 
investigating the creation of false memories via guided imagery, suggested that 
clinicians should utilize a client’s figurative expressions and corresponding imagery 
rather than providing imagery through guided imagery to avoid the creation of false 
memories. 
Summary 
As outlined in the previous paragraphs, numerous references have been made 
concerning a hypothesized positive relationship between figurative language use and 
therapeutic change. It is important to note, however, that despite all the hypotheses 
proposing that use of figurative language in therapy is therapeutic, some have argued 
that at times its use could be counterproductive (Arlow, 1979; Carveth, 1984; Hymer, 
1997; Nash, 1962; Sledge, 1977). Specifically, Thomas (1969) warned that not only do 
we benefit from using metaphor in the ways mentioned above, but that we also set 
boundaries around our understanding. Hymer (1997) proposed that therapist produced 
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metaphors can be helpful if they correspond to the client’s understanding and way of 
thinking about his or her presenting concerns, but that they also have the potential to be 
harmful or at least not productive to the client if they only are projections of the 
therapist’s way of thinking or culture. Hymer (1997) stated, “Beginning with Freud, 
analysts have chosen a wide range of metaphors to elucidate psychoanalytic theory and 
practice. Provided that clinicians avoid the pitfalls of reification, metaphors chosen by 
the analyst can facilitate understanding when they reflect the nature of the patient’s 
experience.”  
Generally, such contraindications for use of figurative language related to the 
issues of aptness and misunderstanding. Many clinicians suggest caution when 
contemplating use of therapist generated imagery or metaphor. Rennie (1998) stated, 
“Appropriate use of images and metaphors arising in us thus requires appraisal. We need 
to detach momentarily from attending to the client in order to get a sense of whether they 
have to do with our experience of the client’s experience or with our experience of 
ourselves independent of the client.” (p45) Rennie (1998) stated, “verbal metaphors 
work best if they are pithy and apt so that they do not derail the client. Like symbolic 
images, apt metaphors recruit and integrate many strands of meaning. Both forms, if 
pertinent, thereafter enable the client and counselor to refer to complex meaning in a 
word or two, thus economizing the communication between them.” 
From reviewing therapist and client stated recall of meaning associated with 
shared metaphors, Angus and Rennie (1988, 1989) found that at times in a session the 
therapist and client may think that they are “on the same page,” when actually they were 
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talking about two different meanings or subjects. They recommend that therapists ask 
client for fit of metaphor in order to check in and avoid miscommunication.  
Formal Models. Although there have been several well known clinicians that 
have touted the value of using metaphorical interventions in therapy, for example Milton 
Erickson and Sigmund Freud, specific models or theories of therapy focusing on 
figurative language are few and far between. Of significance, three models stand out as 
clear-cut attempts toward establishing figurative language use in therapy as important 
and therapeutically valuable. Dr. Philip Barker, in his 1985 book entitled, “Using 
Metaphors in Psychotherapy,” outlined a rationale for why a therapist would and would 
not use metaphorical interventions. In doing so, he also provided wonderful examples of 
metaphorical interventions that have been used in actual therapy. In her book entitled, 
“Metaphor and Meaning in Psychotherapy,” Dr. Ellen Siegelman builds a theory that 
outlines the significance of metaphor use and function in therapy. Rather than describing 
a process that occurs in therapy such as how the two aforementioned models were 
written, the last major contribution appearing as a chapter titled, “Metaphor Therapy” 
written by Dr. Kopp outlines a program for therapy based on metaphorical interventions.  
In his book, Barker (1985) provides an overview of metaphor use outside of 
therapy and by doing so suggests why metaphor can be effectively used in therapy. After 
providing arguments for why metaphor is important in therapy, he describes the function 
of metaphor, kinds of metaphor, and provides therapeutic metaphors with examples of 
their use for developmental problems, behavioral problems, emotional problems, family 
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problems, problems in general. Last, he provides an overview of how to implement 
metaphors in practice.  
Barker (1985) starts off his book in the first chapter by suggesting that metaphor 
is “a time honored way of communicating” as illustrated by its traditional and pervasive 
use in religious parables, folklore, myths, poetry, novels, and fairy tales as well as its 
newer use in music, movies, and sitcoms. Barker deduces that because metaphors have 
been used so broadly and to such great extent historically and across mediums, there 
must be some advantage in using them as compared to using a literal alternative. He 
states that all forms of metaphor must have those advantages, but that for his purposes of 
outlining use of metaphor in therapy, the storytelling form of therapeutic metaphor best 
illustrates the advantages. He outlines eight advantages specific to use of storytelling in 
therapy, but that can be generally applied to use of all metaphor. He suggests that one 
advantage is that they are more interesting, often capturing one’s imagination, inspiring 
change through action or by giving hope, providing options not yet considered, and by 
making possible choices okay to make. Another advantage, according to Barker, of using 
metaphor in therapy is that it can carry with it “varying degrees” of meaning that can be 
“veiled” and are subsequently less threatening to the listener.  
Barker’s third suggested advantage is that the listener can “use stories in their 
own way and for their own purposes.” That is, with the introduction of the metaphor, the 
client then can choose to take it’s meaning at what ever level of interpretation he or she 
feels comfortable with, or even consciously identifies. Barker’s fourth advantage is that 
exposure to a metaphor can “directly affect a person’s unconscious mind and attitudes.” 
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He adds that this advantage is even that much better when chances of rejection of the 
underlying or surface meanings of the metaphor are ruled out.  
Barker points out that a fifth advantage is that they are flexible as in being able to 
not only suggest solutions to problems, but also in being able to provide options, 
information, instructions, suggestions for action, or even to provide a different vantage 
point from which the listener can view both him or herself as well as the problem. 
Barker suggests that this advantage is often referred to as “reframing.” He suggests that a 
sixth advantage is that they allow for the listener to be addressed vicariously through 
quotes of the characters in the story. Again, he suggests that this is advantageous 
because it does not directly threaten the listener, as he or she, although identifying with 
the character in the story, does not view the quote as being addressed to them. He 
provides the example of one character in the story saying, “That was a foolish decision.” 
In this way, the listener does not feel that the therapist is saying he or she made a foolish 
decision. The seventh advantage that Barker outlined is that they help build rapport. He 
states, “Effecting major changes in clients’ psychological states is seldom easy and 
usually taxes the therapeutic relationship to the fullest.” (p. 20). Barker’s last stated 
advantage for use of metaphor and storytelling is that therapist’s use offers a model for 
communication.  
The eighth benefit is provided in abbreviated form by Barker (p24): “They can 
entertain as well as inform. They can suggest things without confronting those to whom 
they are addressed. They are indirect and often ambiguous and so can have various 
meanings at different levels. They are flexible and can be used to embed messages. They 
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often assist in the establishment of rapport. They tend to be much used by effective 
communicators and can be useful in therapy.” 
Specifically with respect to therapy, he states that the underlying assumption 
behind why metaphor and figurative language can be used therapeutically is that 
metaphor can be taken literally by the conscious while at the same time being 
understood figuratively by the unconscious. He states, “Fairy tales, like many proverbs 
and biblical parables, usually make rather specific points and aim to teach specific 
lessons: therapeutic metaphors, on the other hand, offer new choices, especially new 
ways of looking at things, and can tap a variety of experiences, beliefs, and ideas that 
have been dormant in the listener’s mind” (p. 13). He cites Bettelheim (1977) as 
suggesting that the repetition involved in fairy tales and children’s stories is another 
important factor in teaching any underlying principles or morals. Barker, drawing an 
analogy, suggests that repetition may also be important for the effectiveness of 
therapeutic metaphor. Barker adds “it can often be helpful to offer the same message 
repeatedly in a series of metaphors.”  
In speaking about how metaphoric interventions can be used as a method for 
indirect language when a client is perceived to be defensive, Barker (1985) stated: 
“All these points could, of course, be made directly, but in metaphorical form they have 
more force and interest than would a series of injunctions about what one should and 
should not do. Made indirectly, moreover, the points are less likely to be resisted, and 
the chances of the storyteller being seen as moralistic are much reduced.” 
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In the section of his book outlining therapy metaphor implementation, he 
suggests that metaphor is typically used as part of a strategic intervention plan and that 
as such, the strength of the rapport between the therapist and the client is pivotal. He 
suggests that indirect forms of therapy, such as when metaphors are employed, require 
trust between the therapist and client due to the indirect connection between topics 
discussed in therapy (metaphors, indirectly related homework assignments, etc.) so that 
the client will believe that the therapist is competent and that what he or she is asking the 
client to talk about or do is related and will eventually be productive for the client.  
Barker (1985) in referring to research on metaphor use in therapy being scarce, 
stated: “[it] scarcely exists at all, presumably because a controlled study of the use of 
metaphors would be exceedingly difficult to do.” Despite limited research, he reported 
that use of stories, anecdotes, and metaphorical interventions are widespread among 
therapists. Barker (1985) stated that the most recognized therapist who has used 
metaphor extensively was Milton Erickson and subsequently reviewed Erickson’s 
purposeful use of anecdotes and stories. In a review of Erickson’s teaching seminar 
where uses of metaphorical interventions was outlined, Barker listed the uses of 
metaphorical interventions. He including the following uses: to make or illustrate a 
point, offer potential solutions, help people to recognize themselves, seed ideas and 
increase motivation, control the relationship between therapist and client, embed 
directives, decrease resistance, reframe and redefine problems, build up the client’s ego, 
model a way of communicating, remind subjects of their own resources, and desensitize 
people from their fears.  
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Barker (1985) also outlined how the appropriateness of using metaphorical 
interventions in therapy could be determined by using criteria related to each of the 
following issues: type of therapy, the clinical situation, the responsiveness of clients to 
direct communication, and therapists’ preferences and experiences. With respect to type 
of therapy, Barker suggested that metaphorical interventions probably are best suited for 
those kinds of therapy in which the therapists are more active in providing their clients 
with information such as “ideas, instructions, solutions to consider, reframings, or other 
inputs which may or may not be immediately acceptable.” He adds that that type of 
therapy typically is more strategic and/or systemic in nature and has, at its basis, a 
trusting therapeutic relationship. On the other hand, Barker suggested that therapies in 
which the therapist is not active or in which his or her role is rigidly constructed, such as 
in behavior therapy or more traditional psychoanalysis, may not be suited well for use of 
metaphorical interventions.  
With respect to criteria for use of metaphorical interventions according to clinical 
situations, Barker (1985) outlined clinical situations in which he proposed metaphorical 
interventions to be of particular effectiveness. First, he suggested that they can be useful 
with unmotivated or dispirited clients by helping them to be able to find another method 
for being motivated again. Second, he suggested that they may help in getting clients 
that have not been accepting the therapists ideas or interpretations to consider them. 
Third, Barker (1985) suggests that when clients may become too upset with more direct 
interventions, use of metaphor can help to indirectly introduce information. Fourth, in 
clinical situations in which the client may be stagnated and/or bored, use of metaphorical 
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interventions may help to stimulate interest in therapy. Barker’s fifth criteria for use of 
metaphorical interventions is when the client is in the “utilization” phase of 
hypnotherapy as this time, as well as moments of trance during therapy, which he 
proposes allows for the unconscious to better receive the metaphor and for the 
ambiguous nature of the metaphorical intervention to allow for a wider range of choices.  
Concerning observations of how clients respond to direct communication can be 
used as a gauge for effective use of metaphorical interventions, Barker (1985) suggested 
that initial observation of a client’s style, either more direct or more indirect, as well as 
an observation of the degree to which he or she intellectualizes can be used as a guide. 
He stated that if a client tends to speak indirectly or if he or she is direct, yet tends to 
intellectualize, then use of metaphorical intervention is warranted. Of note, he cited 
Hammond (1984) as finding that even Erickson used 80 percent direct and 20 percent 
indirect communication with his clients. Barker (1985) suggests that keeping those 
figures in mind helps us to understand that metaphorical techniques “should probably 
play an adjunct role” in therapy.  
Barker (1985) suggested that therapists’ comfort and ease at which they tell 
stories or use linguistic devices falling under the realm of figurativeness should be used 
to guide an individual therapist’s use of this type of intervention. He adds that 
confidence can be built through practice in settings other than therapy. Baker also 
pointed out that use of metaphorical interventions can be helpful when discussing the 
process of therapy with clients.  
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Siegelman (1990) also addressed the use of metaphor therapeutically in her book 
entitled, “Metaphor and meaning in psychotherapy.” She suggested in the preface of her 
book that, “metaphor making—the imaginative act of comparing dissimilar things on the 
basis of some underlying principle that unites them—is one of the ways we construct a 
new reality. By its very nature, metaphor combines what is already known in a new way 
to produce a new thing not yet fully understood.”  
In her model for using figurative language in therapy, she proposed that the 
metaphors client use innately possess varying degrees of import. A therapist, through 
experience and practice, can learn to differentiate the important uses from those that are 
not as important. Siegelman (1990) labeled the important metaphor uses, those carrying 
potential positive therapeutic qualities, as being salient and “key.” Contrary to what 
might be expected, she proposed that even metaphors that are seemingly unimportant, 
can be “key” metaphors and potentially therapeutic if utilized.  
Siegelman (1990) asserted that there are three important features of what she 
referred to as salient metaphors, or those metaphors that are of particular significance to 
a client’s presenting problem: 1) they are often unconscious wishes or fantasies, 2) they 
are a combination of abstract thoughts and feelings and concrete imagery, and 3) and one 
of their results is insight. Far more than just proposing that metaphor can be an effective 
therapeutic tool, she argues that, “It is through metaphor that we come to understand the 
world and through metaphor that language itself develops (p. 3).” Throughout her book 
describing a model for using metaphor in therapy, she provided clinical examples and 
interpretations. She also addressed many of the informal hypotheses outlined in the 
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previous section, and as such to some extent, provided a “unified” theory or model for 
how to conduct therapy while therapeutically utilizing metaphoric content.  
Kopp (1995, 2001) proposed an integrated theory and methodology; he coined 
“Metaphor Therapy.” According to his definition, metaphor is a “powerful source of 
insight and change in psychotherapy.” He reported (2001) that a significant step in the 
creation of his model came after becoming familiar with Lakoff and Johnson’s 
conceptual metaphor theories, stating, “it occurred to me that their hypothesis may hold 
true for psychological reality as well. If so, then an individual’s metaphoric language 
could be a direct expression and indicator of their metaphoric structure of personal 
identity.” He added that the premise behind the focus of Metaphor Therapy is that 
“individuals, families, social groups, cultures, and humanity as a whole structure reality 
metaphorically.”  
Kopp (2001) suggested that at the individual level, which is of primary 
importance with regard to therapy, there are six metaphoric structures of meaning. He 
claims that those six structures of meaning are represented by the individual’s 
understanding of: the self, others, life, self-in-relation-to-self, self-in-relation-to-others, 
and self-in-relation-to-life. He draws a parallel to other forms of therapy by indicating 
that other forms of therapy also target those underlying structures as being important for 
therapy.  
Kopp (2001) outlined a systematic method for using both client-generated 
metaphors and therapist-generated metaphors in a therapeutic manner. In the first step, 
the therapist notices client-generated metaphors. In the second step, the therapist 
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addresses the metaphor and asks for the client to describe his or her image of the 
metaphor. The third step requires the therapist to ask the client to explore his or her 
image of the metaphor. The fourth step involves asking the client to associate feelings 
and reactions to the metaphor and imagery. In step five, the therapist helps the client 
“transform” the metaphor by asking how he or she would change it if possible. Next, in 
step six the therapist helps the client to make associations and connections between the 
metaphor and its imagery and a problem the client is experiencing. The final step, step 
seven, involves discussing how the client had wished to change the metaphoric imagery 
and examining if those changes would be possible in his or her real life situation.   
In addition, he reviews the process that therapists typically progress through 
when learning how to conduct Metaphor Therapy. He reported that therapists usually 
begin by “missing” the metaphors that are produced in therapy, but that over time they 
begin to “pick up on” metaphors occasionally, but then experience difficulties in 
following both the verbal and metaphorical content of the therapy simultaneously. He 
suggested that at this point, they are not yet using metaphorical content to help 
conceptualize or interpret clinical material. However, he reported that with practice and 
experience, the therapists eventually begin to be able to attend to metaphorical content 
and use it to explore one of the six metaphorical structures of meaning.  
Of note, others have proposed abbreviated manuals, outlining instructions, on 
how to make use of metaphorical content in therapy (Brink, 1982; Hoskins & Leseho, 
1996; Wichman, Daniels, White, & Fesmire, 1999), but none have formulated an 
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overarching and global prescription for using figurative language to the same extent as 
Barker (1985), Siegelman (1990), and Kopp (1995, 2001).  
 
Research Strategies, Findings, and Limitations 
This section, devoted to research design issues for investigations of figurative 
language in therapy, covers three general topics: 1) research design and strategies that 
have been implemented, 2) limitations of the research to date, and 3) recommended 
research design and strategies not yet used.   
Implemented Design and Strategies 
 Although when studying the general phenomena of metaphor, such as regarding 
the comprehension time of metaphor, psychologists have used numerous research 
strategies, few research strategies have been utilized when investigating the effects of 
figurative language use in therapy. Most have utilized natural observation strategies such 
as in case studies or single case research designs (Angus & Rennie, 1988; McMullen & 
Conway, 1994). As such, a large percentage of the studies have focused on single 
sessions or several sessions of therapy (Angus & Rennie, 1989; Rasmussen, 1995; 
Angus & Rasmussen, 1996; McMullen, 1989). With regard to analyses conducted on the 
data, most studies were restricted to providing descriptive findings for frequency of 
figurative language occurrence. Others offered visual analysis, such as by comparing 
figurative language use between good-outcome cases and poor-outcome cases.  
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Research Limitations 
As one might anticipate based solely on the divided nature of the various fields in 
which figurative language is at times studied, the issues that are debated in those fields 
are also the foundation for some of the limitations in conducting research on figurative 
language. For example, many of the researchers actively pursuing a line of study in 
figurative language must decide what definition of figurative language to use and how to 
operationalize their chosen definition. To choose one definition over another definition 
at times will mean that the researcher’s study will not be comparable to other 
investigations that have made use of a different definition. Other practical limitations to 
the investigation of figurative language use and function in therapy include: difficulty 
with measuring, lack of control, if controlled—loss of meaning and usefulness of 
findings, differences in spoken language—dialects, variation of use among people, 
difficulty interpreting and understanding findings, time, labor intensity, and general 
limitations associated with process research. Besides practical limitations such as the 
ones mentioned above, some investigators have suggested that the research designs used 
thus far generally have not allowed for an understanding of process of figurative 
language across and throughout therapy (Angus, 2000; McMullen, 1989). 
Recommended Strategies  
To some extent, the recognized limitations of this area of research allows 
investigators to readily identify how future research could be conducted to alleviate said 
limitations. For instance, many researchers have called for the use of qualitative analyses 
of figurative language expression (McMullen, 1985, 1989; Angus & Lawrence, 1993; 
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Angus & Rennie, 1988, 1989; Rasmussen & Angus, 1996, 1997). Others have argued for 
a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, such as might be offered from 
a Grounded Theory approach (Rennie, 2000). 
Research of Figurative Language in Therapy  
 Research on figurative language in therapy, despite a long history of interest, has 
been sparse. Much of the dearth of research activity on this topic can be attributed to 
difficulties in measurement and research design. In addition, with limited findings, the 
progress of hypothesis testing and regeneration of testable hypotheses appears to have 
become stagnant. As such, not only the amount of known information regarding 
figurative language in therapy, but also the technology of how to investigate the 
phenomena have remained almost unchanged for years (McMullen, 1985).  
Historically, researchers investigating the therapeutic influences of figurative 
language have shifted focus with regard to what variables they have chosen to examine. 
Over time, rather than discarding the previously investigated variables, they kept their 
initial focus while adding the newer variables to their studies. This means that recent 
research in this area not only reports results pertaining to recent hypotheses, but 
additionally reports results pertaining to older hypotheses. McMullen (1989) suggests 
that this cumulative feature of research in this area may be caused by a lack of definitive 
findings. That is, more recent researchers continue to include those initial variables in 
their study because their influence has never been truly understood. Given the paucity of 
research and the cumulative nature of how research in this area has developed over time, 
a chronological review is outlined below.  
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Initial hypotheses pertaining to the potential therapeutic influence of figurative 
language in therapy linked quantity of figurative language production to outcome in 
therapy. Additionally, many of the earlier empirical studies designed to investigate 
figurative language in therapy investigated the use of novel tropes or figures which were 
believed to be used when clients were either being creative or viewing the therapeutic 
issues in a new and different light (McMullen, 1989). These early studies made a 
distinction between what were thought of as “frozen” metaphors and what were deemed 
novel metaphors.  
Frozen metaphors, at times referred to as “dead metaphors,” were defined as 
clichéd expressions or idioms such as the phrases, “head of the table” or “mouth of the 
river,” which according to the view of the time have lost the novelty that they had when 
originally used. As the name suggests, novel metaphors were ones that had not been 
used commonly in everyday speech, if at all. In many of the early studies, novel 
metaphors were hypothesized to be more important in therapy (Pollio & Barlow, 1975, 
1977). The view basically was that being able to think about a concept in a new way 
leads to insight. One early study by Pollio and Barlow (1975) found that clients 
produced proportionally more of both frozen and novel metaphors than the therapist. 
They also found that over a single session the ratio of novel metaphors to all spoken 
words increased for both the client and therapist toward the middle section of the 
session. As such, they suggested that novel production, occurring in “bursts” of activity, 
tended to coincide with moments in therapy when the client appeared to be gaining 
insight.  
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McMullen (1985), when comparing figurative language usage in sessions 
resulting in good-outcome and sessions resulting in poor-outcome, found that therapists 
had a higher ratio of novel metaphors to all words than did the clients. Further, 
McMullen in this same study found that the client in the good-outcome therapy 
continued the production of novel metaphors over the sessions while the client in the 
poor-outcome therapy decreased novel metaphor production after the second session. On 
the other hand, in an unpublished dissertation, Amira (1982; as cited in McMullen, 
1996) found in a case-by-case analysis that there was not a discriminating difference 
between figurative language production in good-outcome vs. poor-outcome therapy.  
Despite a lack of definitive research findings, clinicians and researchers continue 
to suggest a relationship between novel figurative language use and subsequent therapy 
gain. Siegelman (1990) has suggested that there are times when frozen metaphors 
produced in therapy are important points of focus. Similarly, McMullen (1985; 1989) 
suggested that some frozen metaphors are significant and meaningful. Given this 
continued interest, McMullen (1996) stated that “most researchers have now abandoned 
the novel-frozen distinction and tend to report overall use of all instances of figurative 
language.”  
As stated above, one initial focus of figurative language research was on the 
quantity of figures produced in therapy, as it was suggested that the amount of figures 
would change as therapy progressed and might mark significant instances of therapy 
process. In addition to the Pollio and Barlow (1975) study mentioned above, Pollio, 
Barlow, Fine, and Pollio (1977) also investigated the quantity of figurative language 
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production in several cases of psychotherapy. They found that on average, about five 
percent of spoken language is figurative. They also found that in therapy, clients tended 
to use 1.5 novel and 3.4 frozen or “clichéd” figures per 100 words. Hill and Reagan 
(1991), also investigating this variable, reported that on average clients produced more 
metaphors than therapists. Further, in the good-outcome case on which they focused 
their analysis, the client used more metaphors than the therapist. Similarly, McMullen 
(1989) reported that clients produced more “theme related” metaphors than therapists. 
She also found that metaphor production did not discriminate good-outcome from poor-
outcome therapy cases. Further, McMullen and Conway (1994) in an analysis of 21 
cases of therapy found that clients produced an average of 18.46 instances of figurative 
language in therapy. In a follow up analysis, they found that production of figurative 
language with the theme of interpersonal actions of self, others, or both was not a 
variable that distinguished good-outcome therapy from poor-outcome therapy and as a 
whole was not related to outcome. 
Still, another general focus for figurative language research has consisted of 
studies investigating themes underlying the figures of speech used in therapy. As 
reported above, in Pollio and Barlow’s (1975) study, they found that novel figures were 
produced in bursts and suggested that those bursts might be somewhat similar to a spurt 
of creative energy being unleashed. They also suggested that these spurts of figurative 
language production constituted metaphor themes.  
Similarly, McMullen (1985), with regard to client/counselor sharing of 
metaphoric themes, found that there was a difference between a good-outcome therapy 
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case as compared to a poor-outcome therapy case. That is, in the poor-outcome case the 
client did not frequently repeat the metaphors introduced by the therapist. In contrast, the 
client in the good-outcome case not only used his or her own metaphor themes, but also 
would repeat the metaphors that had been originally introduced by the therapist. 
McMullen suggested from these findings in good-outcome therapy cases, there is more 
“sharing of figures between the client and therapist.”  
In a following study, McMullen (1989) found that there was not a difference or 
discrimination between the degree of “sharing” metaphoric themes in the good-outcome 
vs. poor-outcome therapy sessions. Hill and Reagan (1991) found that “sharing” did 
occur with 3% of therapist-generated metaphors being repeated by the client and 13 % of 
client-generated metaphors being repeated by the therapist. McMullen (1996) reports 
that in her studies, she found that this “sharing” occurred more frequently in good-
outcome therapy cases than in poor-outcome therapy cases. The concept of “sharing” 
figurative language can be further complicated by the distinction that Angus and Rennie 
(1988) suggested. They labeled two patterns of metaphor elaboration. The first, called 
“meaning conjunction,” is when the therapist and client share and elaborate the meaning 
of figurative language in much the same manner as what the before mentioned 
researchers had done. The second pattern, labeled “meaning disjunction,” happens when 
a misunderstanding of the produced metaphoric language seems to have occurred. The 
research by Angus (1992) and by Angus and Rennie (1988; 1989) have not conclusively 
linked either one of these patterns to outcome measures of therapy. 
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Process variables and their relationship to figurative language use in therapy has 
also been investigated. Research to date has found six process variables that relate to 
figurative language production in therapy: insight, interventions, helpfulness, 
involvement or experiencing, themes, and metaphoric identity. Of these six, the first four 
seem conceptually linked due to the fact that interventions are typically designed to 
guide the client in finding insight and to be helpful. Also, being able to wisely use an 
intervention necessitates that the therapist has some understanding of the “experience” of 
the client.   
With regard to the process variable of insight, Barlow, Pollio, and Fine (1977) 
found two patterns of figurative language use in a one-hour taped session and in five 
separate sessions from a particular client/therapist dyad. These researchers suggested the 
first pattern was that metaphoric language occurred during times that independent judges 
rated the client as illustrating insight. The second pattern suggested is that spurts of 
figurative language production alternated with spurts of literal language that the judges 
coded as expressing insight. Measuring the variable “interventions,” Hill and Regan 
(1991) found that therapist’s reported intentions with regard to production of figurative 
language were to: 1) encourage insight, and 2) express support and understanding. They 
also found that both clients and therapists rated metaphoric utterances as more helpful 
than utterances without metaphor. Similarly, Martin, Cummings, and Hallberg (1992), 
looking at the variable of “helpfulness,” found that client’s tended to rate sessions in 
which metaphor had been explicitly used as more helpful than the sessions without 
metaphor use. With regard to experiencing metaphor use in therapy, Hill and Regan 
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(1991) reported that raters coded clients who were producing metaphors as not 
experiencing as much feeling as clients who were not using metaphoric language. This 
finding is supported by the theory that metaphors are safe ways for people to express 
deeper emotions. Rasmussen and Angus (1996) in a qualitative analysis also found 
evidence to support a distancing of emotions for some metaphor use by clients.  
With regard to figurative language being characterized by themes in therapy, 
there have been a large number of studies (Angus & Rennie, 1988, 1989; McMullen, 
1996; Kovesces, 1986, 1991; Pollio & Barlow, 1975, 1977) that have found that client 
shifts in metaphor use can be used to mark the different topics and content of each 
session. Rasmussen and Angus (1996) found that figurative language use often 
illuminated clinical issues and that therapists tended to use figurative language as a way 
to move the client toward a deeper engagement in therapy.  
In summary, research focused on the therapeutic influence of figurative language 
began with simple investigations examining quantity of figurative language production 
and over the past thirty years has shifted focus to new variables for examination. Current 
research continues to pay tribute, in a way, to the early hypotheses while gradually 
shifting focus toward hypotheses of greater sophistication. That is, while early studies 
proposed simply tallying figures per sessions or comparing good-outcome to poor-out 
come sessions, more recent investigations have focused on the interaction of themes and 
have considered issues of timing. As a whole the research findings have been somewhat 
equivocal with regard to therapeutic impact of frequency of overall figurative language 
production. There has been much more support for the link between figurative language 
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themes and concurrent positive changes in the client, either as gains in immediate insight 
or ultimately as indicators of good outcome for therapy. One of the major thrusts of 
recent research has been in examining the link between therapy process and the shared 
themes in figurative language.  
Summary 
  Spanning across academic and professional fields, there has been a long history 
of interest in figurative language. Over the years that philosophers, linguists, and 
psychologists have devoted time and energy in its investigation, it has been the source of 
much debate. That debate can be described as ranging in issues from suggestions that it 
is a fundamental building block of language to suggestions that it does not hold any 
linguistic or psychological value. During times when it was considered at least of some 
importance, examination of figurative language could be summed up as having two 
general points of interest. With those points of interests in mind, the question of what is 
figurative language and, secondly, of what function it serves were examined. Those 
questions continue to be at the heart of almost all figurative language research.  
 More recently, clinicians and researchers in applied psychology have shown 
interest into possible therapeutic influences of figurative language spoken in therapy. 
Research in this area has been sparse, especially when considering the magnitude of 
theoretical literature espousing some implied therapeutic properties of figurative 
language. The research examining the effects of figurative language in therapy to date 
has been limited in scope. Some have suggested that despite clinical suggestions that 
figurative language does enact a positive influence on the process of therapy, the 
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limitations relating to research design and measurement have made it close to impossible 
for interpretable studies to have been conducted. Further, research findings to date have 
been equivocal with regard to many of the targeted characteristics of figurative language. 
Of note, researchers have found that figurative language in therapy tends to be theme 
oriented, have therapeutically meaningful spurts of use associated with themes, and that 
those spurts of theme related figures are shared between the client and the therapist. 
Given the history of clinical judgment pointing toward figurative language as 
therapeutically meaningful as well as the limited research findings to date that support 
that general hypothesis, it is not surprising that research will continue in this area.  
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 The following research questions will be addressed in this study:  
1. To what degree are the different figures of speech used in the therapy of experts 
as indicated by therapy training tapes? Are those figures of speech mostly novel 
or frozen? How frequently are those figures of speech conceptually shared by 
both members of the therapy dyad? 
2. How does using figures of speech that share an underlying conceptual meaning 
relate to subsequent ratings of the therapeutic bond and experiencing? 
The following hypothesis is being examined: There is a positive relationship 
between use of shared figurative speech between the therapist and the client and 
subsequent increases in the working relationship and client experiencing. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of the 
methodology and procedures used in this study. As such, this chapter is divided into the 
following sections: research design, operational definitions, sample, measures, variables, 
manuals, procedure, judges, and plan for statistical analyses.  
Research Design 
This study utilized a correlational design and examined within subject changes 
after exposure/participation in two conditions. The first condition was made up of 
instances when the therapist and client used shared conceptual figurative language. The 
second condition was made up of instances when the therapeutic dyad used figurative 
language that did not belong to the same conceptual grouping. Of note, initial plans for 
the study included a third condition of instances when neither member of the therapeutic 
dyad used figurative language, acting as a control, but after examination of the 
transcripts no data existed that did not fit the first or second condition. 
Operational Definitions 
 In order to complete this study, it was necessary to operationally define concepts 
such as figurative language, shared figurative language, therapeutic relationship, and 
excerpt. As described in the literature, figurative language has three qualities or 
characteristics: figure of speech, novelty, and shared qualities. It is necessary to 
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operationalize each of those characteristics of figurative language. Figure of speech and 
novelty were both operationalized according to the Barlow et al. (1970) manual for 
identifying figurative language. Specifically, the manual instructed judges on how to 
identify fourteen distinct figures of speech (see Appendix B), such as metaphor and 
simile, and rate specific uses of figures of speech as either being novel or frozen.  
 Novelty with regard to figures of speech was operationalized as a measure of the 
extent to which a figure of speech has been utilized in everyday literature or 
communication. When a specific figure of speech, such as “the head of the table,” has 
been used in the past, then it was rated as being frozen (also referred to in the literature 
as being clichéd or dead). On the other hand, when a figure of speech was identified as 
being new or not having been used in the past, it was coded as novel.  
An operational definition for the shared characteristic of figurative language was 
based on work by Angus and Rennie (1988; 1989). By examining therapy dyads and 
identifying and sorting themes of figurative language, they determined that one of two 
global categories of figures of speech in therapy could be described according to how the 
therapist and client verbally interact with figures of speech. They called that process 
Metaphoric Communication Interaction and defined it as having two parts, either 
meaning Conjunction or meaning Disjunction, which are measurements of the degree to 
which the therapist and client share the same or similar underlying meaning of a figure 
of speech. Based on that definition, shared figurative language was operationally defined 
for this study on two levels: the figure of speech level and the excerpt level. With regard 
to the figure of speech level, shared figurative language was defined as figures of speech 
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that had an underlying concept similar to another figure of speech used by the other 
member of the therapy dyad during an excerpt of therapy. Using this operational 
definition, each figure of speech was rated as being shared (conjunctive) or not shared 
(disjunctive). The second level of shared figurative language, the excerpt level, is 
operationally defined by whether or not any figure of speech occurring during an excerpt 
is rated as shared (conjunctive). If at least one figure of speech in a two-minute excerpt 
is shared (conjunctive), then the whole excerpt is rated as shared (conjunctive).  
 For this study, the therapeutic relationship was defined by two characteristics: 
bond between the therapist and client and the client’s depth of experiencing. Therapeutic 
bond was operationally defined as scores on the Bond scale of the Working Alliance 
Inventory (WAI, Horvath et Greenberg, 1986). Depth of experiencing was operationally 
defined by Depth of Experiencing ratings (EXP; Klein et al., 1969).  
Sample 
 The sample for this investigation consisted of examples of expert practice in 
therapy as demonstrated in video taped therapy sessions by seven well-known 
psychologists (see Appendix A). These therapy videos had been originally produced for 
the purpose of training or demonstrating how to conduct specific methods, techniques, 
and/or types of therapy. The process of selecting the experts and their training videos 
began by determining a rule for identifying who qualified as “expert.” The investigator 
determined that an expert for this study is operationally defined as having at least one of 
the two following qualifications. The first qualification was the presence of significant 
section/chapter devoted to his or her work in two popular theories of counseling and 
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therapy texts (Corsini’s, 1995 text or Corey’s 1996 text). The second qualification was 
that this expert had to be featured in a training video produced by the American 
Psychological Association.  
 Seven training video therapy sessions ranging in time of production across the 
past four decades were used in this study. Therapeutic styles among the therapists 
represented in the training videos varied including client centered, rational emotive, 
cognitive-behavioral, BASIC-ID, etc. (for details, see Appendix A). The therapy 
sessions contained in those videos were primarily initial sessions and ranged in length 
from 42 to 46 minutes. The purpose of many of the training videos was to illustrate 
differences in theory and practice of specific styles of therapy and to provide examples 
of how specific types of therapy are performed. Several of the sessions were filmed with 
the same client but participating in therapy with another therapist. After transcriptions of 
the sessions were completed, examination of the sessions yielded fifty-six smaller 
excerpts to be statistically and qualitatively examined. 
Measures 
The Experiencing Scales 
The Experiencing Scales (Klein et al., 1969) are instruments designed to measure 
a client’s level of emotional involvement in therapy and a therapist’s role in helping a 
client to become emotionally involved in therapy, respectively. As such, there is a 
Patient Experiencing Scale and a Therapist Experiencing Scale. In addition to a full 
version of these scales, short-form versions of these scales have also been developed. As 
defined by the authors of the Experiencing Scales, the concept of experiencing is defined 
  65
as “the extent to which inner referents become the felt data of attention, and the degree 
to which efforts are made to focus on, expand, and probe those data” (Klein et al., 1986, 
p. 21). These scales were designed based on two theories: Gendlin’s experiential theory 
and Roger’s client-centered theory (for a detailed review, see Rice & Greenberg, 1984). 
According to Klein, Mathieu-Coughlan, and Kiesler (1986), the Experiencing 
scales were developed for the purpose of examining segments of therapy sessions from 2 
to 8 minutes long. The Experiencing Scales were one of the first widely used therapeutic 
process instruments (Hill & Corbett, 1993). 
The two versions of this instrument have seven levels or stages that correspond to 
a seven-point ordinal rating system or Likert scale. Raters are trained to produce 
“running ratings” of the client and therapist dialogue. Raters are also trained to 
summarize the “running ratings” into two scores, the mode ratings and the peak ratings. 
As the names suggest, the mode ratings are the most frequent level or stage that the 
client or therapist dialogue remained in during the segment of session that was coded. 
The peak rating is the highest level reached during that same segment of discourse.  
Only the Patient Experiencing Scale was used in this study. The stages or levels 
of the Patient Experiencing Scale measures client verbal behavior. The first stage in this 
scale is characterized by the client describing external events and having a somewhat 
apprehensive verbal stance with regard to full participation in therapy. In the second 
stage, the client continues to describe external events, but has also added descriptions of 
his or her behavior and/or thoughts. The client demonstrates lack of involvement 
emotionally or what might be considered superficial involvement. The third stage is 
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characterized by the client providing his or her behavioral and emotional reactions to 
external events, using some self-description, and describing some behavioral indicators 
of his or her feelings. In the fourth stage or level, he or she begins to openly describe 
feelings and more personal kinds of experiences to a greater extent than he or she did in 
the previous stages. In this way, the client is describing self-referents. The fifth stage is 
characterized by the client sharing and elaborating on thoughts and difficulties about his 
or her feelings and experiences. In the sixth stage or level, the client demonstrates that he 
or she is beginning to sense and describe his or her self-referents differently. Klein et al, 
(1986) describe this stage by suggesting that the client begins to have a “felt sense of 
potentially more than can be immediately thought or named.” The final level is 
comprised of the client speaking of his or her greater awareness of feelings and referents 
and demonstrating a greater ability to explore for deeper meanings.  
The Therapist Experiencing Scale is divided into two parts, the referent and the 
manner. Klein et al., (1986) suggested that Referent denotes the content of what the 
therapist is addressing in his or her comments and that Manner refers to the way in 
which the therapist makes those comments. There are seven corresponding levels for 
Referent and for Manner. In this way, the Therapist Experiencing Scale is ordinal with a 
seven-point scale similar to the Patient Experiencing Scale, but it has the addition of 
having each comment coded as both a Referent and as a Manner. Thus, the Patient 
Experiencing Scale produces one rating per patient comment, whereas the Therapist 
Experiencing Scale produces two ratings.  
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The stages or levels of the Therapist Experiencing Scale describe not only the 
verbal behaviors of the client, but also the therapist’s ideal corresponding responses. For 
example, in the first stage or level the therapist typically responds to the client’s 
describing external events that really do not involve the client by being somewhat 
detached. In the second level or stage, when the client begins to describe external events 
in which he or she is involved and when he or she begins elaborating on his or her 
thoughts and feelings, the therapist responds by demonstrating interest and by making 
non-feeling-based references to self. When in the third stage the client shares his or her 
reactions and behavioral indicators of his or her feelings, the therapist responds by also 
expressing his or her reactions and feelings. In the fourth level, the client provides a 
description of his or her feelings along with corresponding details of personal 
experiences. The therapist then becomes empathic by helping the client to identify the 
underlying feelings, intensify his or her reactions, and by forming relevant associations. 
The fifth level is characterized by the client discussing his her thoughts regarding his or 
her feelings and experiences and the therapist responding by sharing the therapist’s 
feelings in such a way to promote further exploration from the client. This exploration is 
thought to help the client become aware of deeper emotional feelings or to help the client 
identify emerging emotional reactions. In the sixth level or stage, the client focuses on 
that new awareness. The therapist responds by affirming the client via expression of his 
or her uncovered or emergent feelings. In the final level can be characterized by the 
client gaining the ability to address his or her feelings and thoughts concerning self and 
to do so fluidly by being able to move from one self reference to another easily. The 
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therapist response in this stage parallels the client’s new found ability to integrate and 
discuss new self awareness. Accordingly, he or she easily integrates and discusses all of 
the previous reactions and experiences.  
Klein et al. (1986), although stating that any point in therapy can be analyzed 
using the Experiencing scales, suggested that particular events may be chosen because 
they are, “(1) moments thought to relate to events that are personally important for either 
the patient or the therapist (e.g., the therapist’s absence, a family crisis); or (2) 
theoretically relevant points where the experiencing level of the patient might be thought 
to change or to reach a specified level as a function of a particular therapeutic technique 
or intervention (i.e., the incorporation of family members in the session”).  
Rice and Greenberg (1984) outlined four key events with regard to these scales. 
First, they suggested that in stages three and four, the client begins to refer to him or 
herself experientially. This is important according to experiential theory because it sets 
up the groundwork for further exploration of self referents. Second, they suggested that 
in stages four and five, the client begins to demonstrate greater and greater capacity to 
stay focused on a problem. The third key event as outlined by Rice and Greenberg 
occurs in stages five and six when the client gains greater and greater capacity to self-
reflect. The final key event, taking place in stages six and seven, is the product of the 
client’s new found greater capacity to self-reflect that emerges as the obtainment of new 
feelings of positive referent.  
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Reliability 
According to Klein et al. (1969), the method for training raters is sufficient to 
allow people other than therapists to reliably code client verbal behaviors. Kiesler (1970) 
found no statistically significant difference between naive raters vs. clinical professional 
raters. 
Klein et al. (1969) reported that an average interrater reliability found in nine 
studies was .75. Klein et al. (1986) provided a summary of reliability findings from 
studies in which the full form of the scale was used by raters trained via the training 
manual. They reported reliability indices for both the mode and peak Experience ratings 
for various kinds of studies. For example, for fifteen studies examining segments of 
therapy, they reported reliability findings ranging from .76 to .93 for the modal rating 
and from .61 to 93 for the peak ratings. For three single-case studies of therapy, they 
reported reliability findings ranging from .61 to .83 for the modal ratings and .64 to .87 
for the peak ratings. Klein et al. (1986) also reported findings from studies that did not 
use therapy interviews. From the seven non-therapy studies, they reported reliability 
scores ranging from .62 to .87 for the modal ratings and .64 to .96 for the peak ratings. 
They also reported reliability ratings for non-therapy assessments and for studies that 
used the shortened form of the Experience Scales (see, Klein et al., 1986).  
Validity  
The Experience Scales were constructed based on two theories of psychotherapy 
that point toward a client’s increasing ability to identify and discuss self referents as 
being pivotal for change and psychological development. Rogers et al. (1967) reported 
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findings that offer support for construct validity, finding that the stages of the 
Experiencing Scales correlated with other process variables such as expressiveness and 
level of distress, variables also thought to change over the course of therapy or 
psychological adjustment.  
Klein et al. (1986) reported research findings offering evidence of validity. They 
divided this research into four sections: personality or mental health, facilitation or 
teaching deepening of experience, therapist conditions, and therapy outcome. They 
suggested that according to the theoretical base for the Experiencing Scales, scores are 
thought to reflect a person’s mental health and degree of involvement in therapy. 
Research examining these constructs were placed in the section labeled, personality. 
With respect to the studies they included in the personality section, they reported 
equivocal findings.  
Klein et al. (1986) suggested that according to the theoretical base for the 
Experiencing Scales, experiencing can be facilitated or encouraged. They placed 
research examining outcomes for teaching or facilitating deepening of experiences in the 
facilitation section. Klein et al. (1986) reported the research to date supported the 
hypothesis that the ability to deepen experiences can be facilitated. 
Concerning therapist conditions and treatments, Klein et al. (1986) reported that 
high experiencing ratings have been found to be associated with therapist interventions 
rated to be of high quality, but that the degree of relationship has been found to be 
stronger in studies using finer-grained analysis or single case studies. Klein et al. (1986) 
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also listed research findings demonstrating that increasing scores on the experiencing 
scales is associated with positive outcome in therapy.  
The Working Alliance Inventory 
The Working Alliance Inventory-Observer Form (WAI-O; Horvath & 
Greenberg, 1989; Tichenor & Hill, 1989) was used in this study to measure the quality 
of the relationship between the therapist and the client. The observer version of the WAI 
instrument was developed after the Client and Counselor versions.  
Item Selection/Test Development 
 Horvath and Greenberg (1989) reported that their approach when developing this 
instrument was twofold: to maximize outcome variance and to do so based on a specific 
theory. Concerning the issue of having a specific theoretical basis, the authors state that 
this instrument is based on Bordin’s (1980) definition of working alliance: “what makes 
it possible for the patient to accept and follow treatment faithfully” (Bordin, 1980, p. 2, 
as cited in Horvath & Greenberg, 1989). As Bordin’s theory suggested three components 
of the therapeutic relationship, the authors of the WAI created a total of 91 items divided 
among the three proposed components (35, 33, and 23 original items for their respective 
components titled, Bond, Goal, and Task.)  
The authors reported (Horvath & Greenberg, 1989) that once the initial items had 
been created, seven experts in the field of working alliance rated each of the items on a 
5-point Likert scale measuring relevancy to working alliance (1 = no relation, and 5 = 
very related) and also categorized the items according to the three components of Bond, 
Goal, and Task. Items with averages of 4 or less on the Likert scale were eliminated 
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from the item pool. With each of the items coded as fitting into one of the three 
categories or components, low percentage agreement (defined as 70% or less) between 
the working alliance experts served as another condition for item elimination. After this 
process was completed, a total of twenty-one items were removed from the list of 
possible items and another 11 items were edited. The authors did not provide 
information as to what categories those changed/deleted items had originated.  
Next, the authors took the remaining 70 items and asked 21 local psychologists 
to perform the same rating steps as were given to the working alliance experts. From this 
process, the authors report that there were another 15 items taken out of the item pool. 
Fifty-five items remained and were divided by component or category. Each category 
was then sorted by meaning with meaning clusters being reduced in size by removing 
those items with low ratings. The authors state that this process continued until 12 items 
remained in each of the categories, thirty-six items in all.  
Reliability 
 Horvath and Greenberg (1989) state that reliability estimates were calculated 
based on data from pilot testing. Using the pilot test data, they report that item 
homogeneity indices for each of the scales ranged from .85 to .88 on the Client version 
of the WAI and from .68 to .87 for the counselor version. They report that Cronbach’s 
Alpha procedure produced reliability estimates of .93 and .87 for the client and the 
counselor versions respectively. Horvath and Greenberg (1994) report that reliability 
estimates for the subscales, as compared to the estimates for the overall instrument, are 
lower, ranging from .68 to .92. Plotnicov (1990) calculated test-retest reliability for the 
  73
whole instrument across three weeks to be .80 and ranging from .66 to .74 for the 
subscales/components.  
Validity 
 Horvath and Greenberg (1994) report that the WAI’s validity is mostly based on 
the accuracy of the content rating process described earlier in which two different 
groups, first seven working alliance experts and then twenty-one local psychologists, 
rated the original items based on content and fit with Bordin’s components of alliance.  
 Correlations between WAI scores and scores on other working alliance 
instruments have also been reported, providing possible evidence for both convergent 
and discriminant validity. Horvath and Greenberg (1994) suggest that because the WAI 
is based on a specific theory of alliance that scores on the WAI should generally be 
positively correlated with other measure of alliance. Tichenor and Hill (1989) compared 
six measures of working alliance, including the WAI-O, and found that the WAI-O was 
highly intercorrelated (.71, .82, and .84 respectively) with the Vanderbilt Therapeutic 
Alliance Scale (VTAS, Hartley & Strupp, 1983), The California Psychotherapy Alliance 
Scales (CALPAS, Marmar et al., 1987), and The Penn Helping Alliance Rating Scale 
(Penn; Alexander & Luborsky, 1986; Luborsky et al., 1983).  
 Horvath and Greenberg (1994) also suggest that possible evidence of 
discriminant validity might be offered if the WAI is not highly correlated with measures 
of working alliance that are distinct in some manner, possibly theoretically. According to 
Horvath and Greenberg (1994), some studies (Adler, 1988; Horvath & Greenberg, 1989; 
Moseley, 1983) have demonstrated that the WAI has a significantly lower degree of 
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correlation to measures of alliance that are distinct theoretically, such as the Counselor 
Rating Form (CRF; LaCrosse, 1980).  
Variables  
 
 The independent variable for this study was the category of shared figurative 
language dialogue between the therapist and his or her client. There were two levels of 
this variable: conceptually shared figurative language termed conjunctive figurative 
language (Angus & Rennie, 1989), conceptually not shared figurative language termed 
disjunctive figurative language (Angus & Rennie, 1989). Categorization of data into 
levels was made by the figurative language judges using the conceptual rating system 
described later in the measures section of this chapter. The dependent variables for this 
study were scores on the WAI and on the EXP scales provided by the counseling process 
judges. Specifically, the Bond scale of the WAI and both the Peak and Mode scores of 
the EXP. Other variables that were examined for the purpose of describing the 
phenomenon of figurative language in therapy include: count of figurative language, 
number of Exp changes, and the Task and Goal scales of the WAI.  
Manuals 
Training Manual for Identifying Figurative Language 
The Training Manual for Identifying Figurative Language (Barlow, Kerlin, & 
Pollio, 1970) was used to train the figurative language discourse coders. This coding 
system contained definitions of varying kinds of figurative language, examples of the 
different kinds of figurative language, and a method to identify and code each kind of 
figurative language used in text or spoken speech. Additionally, it outlined how to make 
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distinctions between novel and frozen instances of figurative language. Example text 
was provided for training as well as expert ratings of that text for comparison.  
Training Procedure 
 The step-by-step training procedure outlined in the manual was divided into four 
sections, each composed of what the authors classified as a distinct major grouping of 
figurative language. For each grouping of figurative language, the training consisted of 
the provision of specific kinds of figurative language comprising the grouping, their 
respective definitions as well as examples of each kind (see Appendix B). The manual 
reported that the trainees were to identify the kind of figurative language for selected 
problems. And finally, the manual provided a text, specifically four sample training 
stimuli, in which the raters were to identify the kinds of figurative language. They were 
then to compare their ratings to each other and come to a consensus for their overall 
rating.  
Interrater Reliability Evaluation 
 The training manual outlines a system for coding responses across all raters and 
provides an Agreement and Judgment Table in which the researcher should keep track of 
the judges’ agreements for the training ratings. Using this table, the manual states that 
the researcher can determine the percentage of agreement between raters. Past research 
(Pollio & Barlow, 1975; McMullen, 1985) using this agreement table have reported 
percentages of pre discussion agreement ranging from as low as 71 % to as high as 92 % 
with the lowest agreement percentage raising to 80 % with recorded post discussion. For 
the purpose of this investigation, rater judgments were tracked throughout the training 
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procedure. In addition, a sample therapy transcript was provided for additional practice 
and the raters’ judgments were recorded and tabulated as well.  
 
Shared Figurative Language Discourse Coding System 
A three category coding system was developed in planning the study. The 
categories consisted of conjunctive, disjunctive, and neutral language. The definition of 
conjunctive and disjunctive figurative language first used by Angus and Rennie (1988) 
was used. That is, figurative language was categorized as conjunctive if it was matching 
the figurative language concept expressed by the other speaker at any time during the 
session or segment of session. An example of matching or conjunctive language use by a 
therapist might be a therapist using the expression “drifting with the current of the river” 
after the client had used the expression “slowly floating down the river.” In this 
example, both expressions appear to be based on the same concept, making them 
conceptually conjunctive with one another. If, on the other hand, the second utterance 
had referred to “being lost in the woods,” then it could be said that each expression was 
based on a different concept and thus are conceptually disjunctive. After an expression 
was identified as figurative language by the figurative language judges, the judges then 
determined if the utterance was conjunctive or disjunctive using this system. This task 
was made easier by tracking the “themes” or “concepts” of the figurative language used 
(for example of themes found in data, see Appendix C).  
Training Procedure 
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 Training of judges to make ratings of shared figurative language was 
incorporated into the standardized training for identification of figurative language. Once 
judges became proficient at identifying instances of figurative language, they were asked 
to identify themes or concepts underlying each of the instances of figurative language. 
Using the training materials provided in Training Manual for Identifying Figurative 
Language (Barlow, et al., 1970) as well as similar training procedures to those outlined 
in that manual, the investigator instructed the judges to individually identify themes, but 
later cooperatively discuss and agree on identified themes. Similar to the method 
(Barlow et al., 1970) for coming to agreement between raters for judgments of novel vs. 
frozen figurative language, a majority vote among the ratings of the judges determined 
theme of figurative language. For example, suppose a phrase such as, “one more puff 
and its going to blow up” spoken by a client in reference to a balloon being similar to his 
anger is selected by the judges as being a novel case of figurative language, specifically 
metaphor. Each of the judges rating this phrase would then describe on his or her rating 
template using one word or a simple phrase their understanding of the underlying 
concept or theme. Staying with the example, suppose that three judges wrote the 
following for concepts: judge 1: emotion held in container; judge 2, anger not contained 
any longer; and judge 3, emotion in container. Once the judges complete the rest of the 
training text, they then compare underlying concepts or themes for each instance of 
figurative language. In the case of the example, majority rule would suggest that the 
concept to be used when comparing to other figurative language would be that “emotion 
is held in a container.”  
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The Experiencing Scale 
The Experiencing Scale training manual (Klein, Mathieu, Gendlin, & Kiesler, 1969) was 
used to train the counseling process judges in use of the Experiencing Scale. The 
manualized training for this scale contained stage/level definitions for therapeutic 
process, examples of the expert Experiencing Scale ratings of actual therapy sessions, a 
method to identify and code each stage of therapy process, a method for determining 
interrater reliability, the Short Form of the Experiencing Scale to be available for 
replication with author consent, definitions of mode and peak ratings, and an overview 
of each of the training sessions with curriculum.  
Training Procedure 
 The manual for the Experiencing Scale consists of training curriculum and 
coding exercises. In brief, judges in training read text explaining concepts related to 
therapy process, familiarize themselves with a seven level rating system, and then 
practice using that system on sample therapy dialogue. After completing ratings, each 
judge then compares his or her ratings to the provided expert ratings and notes the expert 
justifications for each of his or her ratings. This process is continued until the judges are 
able to make judgments similar to the expert examples. According to the manual, this 
procedure may be completed individually or while in a group. For this experiment, 
training took place individually. The authors of the manual note that training while 
alone, rather than as part of a group, has been tested to be as effective as when training 
in a group. However, the authors strongly encourage that if judges are training alone, 
they should frequently check with other judges or with the coordinating trainer. As such, 
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judges were required to review expert examples at midpoint of their data coding and to 
check in with the coordinating trainer. 
 The manual suggests that the Experiencing Scale judges be required to listen to 
training tapes of therapy and follow along with the provided transcripts of those 
sessions. Because the judges in this experiment did not use taped sessions to make their 
ratings, but instead only used transcriptions, the judges were trained without the 
audiotapes.  
Interrater Reliability Evaluation 
 Interrater reliability will be examined for the measures used in this study. It will 
be evaluated for the figurative language judgments using three procedures. First it will 
be examined via the manner the manual outlines—agreement tables. Next it will be 
examined using a probability calculation (Markus et al., 1996). The final manner it will 
be evaluated is via calculation of Kappa and Kappa Max. With regard to the 
Experiencing scale, the manual states that interrater reliability between two or more 
judges may be evaluated via Ebel’s (1951, see Guilford (1954) for details) intraclass 
method. The authors suggest that this method provides an estimate of interrater 
reliability based on the means of ratings for the respective judges and that it compares 
variance in ratings among the judges. Although Ebel’s method for estimating interrater 
reliability was suggested, Cohen’s Kappa statistic (1960) was deemed a more 
appropriate statistic to use. However, the needed ratings to perform that statistic were not 
collected. Interrater reliability for the judges who rated the Working Alliance Inventory 
will be evaluated using Kappa and Kappa Max statistics. 
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Procedure 
Therapy training videos were reviewed for acceptability of use in the study. 
Criteria for determining if a therapy training video would be used included the following 
requirements: videos had to contain actual clients as opposed to actors, and videos had to 
be designed to demonstrate expert therapy as conducted by expert therapists. Once 
selected, each video was transcribed in full in order to allow for examination of 
figurative language discourse and to aid in dividing the example therapy session into 
smaller segments for further examination, coding, and statistical analyses. 
Second, three coders were trained using a figurative language manual (Barlow, 
Kerlin, & Pollio, 1970). As outlined in the training manual, interrater reliability was 
calculated by use of the supplied agreement table procedure. This procedure and the 
results are outlined later in this and the next chapter. After meeting minimum 
requirements for interrater reliability based on research articles using this manual, the 
judges were then trained to code themes or conceptual framework of figurative language, 
determine if sequential figurative language events were conceptually related, and to 
make ratings of how important they believed the concept/main point of a particular 
instance of figurative language was for overall outcome in therapy.   
Third, two-minute excerpts of the therapy sessions were taken out or separated 
from the training videos transcriptions for detailed analyses. The method for selecting 
those segments had three steps. First, each transcribed therapy session was visually 
examined from start to finish with segments being selected in sequential order. Initially, 
this analysis was intended to result in segments consisting of the three figurative 
  81
language conditions with the identification of any of those three conditions serving as 
criterion for selection of particular segments. However, the neutral condition was not 
represented in the data at all and, consequently, the design changed to only include the 
first two conditions, shared figurative language and not shared figurative language. By 
using this segmenting method, segments were selected and were later judged by raters to 
determine if they represented shared or not shared figurative language. It should be 
noted that the majority of segments immediately followed a segment and, additionally, 
were immediately preceded by a segment. This review of the data resulted in fifty-six, 
two-minute long segments chosen for further examination. These excerpts of actual 
therapy were then given identification numbers and were randomly assigned to be coded 
by the figurative language judges. 
Fourth, other judges were trained by manual to complete measurements of 
therapy process, the Depth of Experience scale (Exp) and the Working Alliance 
Inventory (WAI). Upon reaching criteria for agreement as outlined in the Exp training 
manual, the judges rated the transcripts of the two-minute segments for depth of 
experience and working alliance (see outline on materials and manuals later in this 
chapter for more details on the Depth of Experiencing Scale and the Working Alliance 
Inventory). And last, statistical analyses of coded information were conducted. 
Judges 
To maintain internal validity, separate judges were needed for determining/rating 
figurative language and for completing the two counseling process inventories. In 
addition, all judges were unaware of the fact that variables were being examined in the 
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study other than the ones that they were trained to rate/judge. Further, the judges knew 
that the purpose of the study was to examine therapy process, but were blind to the 
hypothesized relationship examined in the study. The first set of judges were trained via 
a manual to identify figurative language and make ratings based on conceptual grouping 
of figurative language. The second set of judges were trained to make counseling 
process ratings by using two inventories, the Working Alliance Inventory, Observer 
Form (WAI-O, Horvath & Greenberg, 1986) and the Depth of Experience Scale, Client 
Version (Klein, Mathieu, Gendlin, & Kiesler, 1969). The following paragraphs provide 
additional information on each of the respective kinds of judges who participated in this 
study.  
Figurative Language Judges 
The manual for categorizing figurative language (Barlow, Kerlin, and Pollio, 
1970) required three judges to be used in coding figurative language. Consequently, 
three volunteer judges were trained to identify figurative language. Additionally, these 
judges were trained to determine conceptual category ratings of the figurative language 
they found in the therapy dialogue. All of the figurative language judges were female 
and ranged in age from 25 to 30. Each, at minimum had a masters level degree in 
counseling psychology from a large Southwestern University. None of the figurative 
language raters reported having previous knowledge of how to identify figurative 
language.   
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Counseling Process Judges 
The participants who volunteered to be counseling process judges for the two 
inventories consisted of Masters and Doctoral students in Counseling Psychology at a 
large Southwestern university. There were three judges trained to code therapy process. 
Of those, all were female ranging in age from 27 to 30 years. None reported having 
previous experience with either of the instruments that they used.  
Plan for Statistical Analyses 
Interrater reliability calculations for both the figurative language ratings and the 
therapy process ratings will be conducted. The interrater reliability statistic used for the 
figurative language ratings and therapy process ratings Cohen’s Kappa.  
Descriptive statistics were calculated to provide descriptive information about the 
excerpts and count of figurative language. A correlation between the therapy process 
measures was performed. Finally, a regression analysis was conducted. All statistics 
were calculated using the SPSS statistical software package (SPSS Inc., 2002). 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide the results of the statistical analyses that 
were conducted for this study. As such, it is divided into two primary sections. The first 
section outlines the analyses conducted for the purpose of providing sample 
characteristics whereas the second reports analyses conducted for the purpose of 
addressing the stated research questions.  
Sample Characteristics  
 This section outlines the results of the analyses conducted for the purpose of 
describing the sample. The sample is described by examining the excerpts, the interrater 
reliability, the correlations between dependent variables, and measures of central 
tendency for the therapy process variables. The results from examining the sample by 
each of those ways are outlined separately below. 
Excerpts 
 The first way to describe the sample used in this study is to examine the excerpts. 
The excerpts are the two-minute segments of transcribed therapy that must contain one 
of the three figurative language conditions used as data in this study. There were a total 
of 56 excerpts produced from the seven expert-therapy training videos. Each excerpt was 
judged by the figurative language raters, yielding information on the following variables:  
1) count of figures of speech per excerpt, 2) type of figure speech and conceptual theme 
of each instance of figurative language, and 3) whether or not a particular figure of 
speech was novel or frozen and conjunctive or disjunctive. 
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 Each excerpt was also examined by the therapy process raters using the Depth of 
Experiencing Scale (EXP) and the Working Alliance Inventory (WAI). As such, 
dividing the transcribed videos into 56 excerpts allowed for multiple ratings of each 
excerpt using the variables mentioned above.  
Therapists Represented by the Excerpts 
One way of describing the excerpts is by examining from which therapists the 
excerpts were taken. Frequency statistics were calculated to determine the number of 2-
minute excerpts that came from therapy sessions conducted by specific expert therapists. 
Another way of stating this is that frequency statistics were calculated to determine the 
number of excerpts that represent therapy dialogue or discourse from each of the seven 
expert therapists (see Table 1). According to the frequency distribution, the number of 
excerpts taken from a particular therapist ranged from as few as 1 excerpt to as many as 
15 excerpts. The average number of excerpts taken from a therapist is 8, but if the 
therapist with only one excerpt is not considered, then the average increases to 9.1 
excerpts per therapist. Table 1 also illustrates that approximately 64.3 percent of the 
excerpts were taken from only three therapists, whereas the other four therapists were 
represented by 35.7 percent of the excerpts. Although this data is reported for the 
purpose of providing a description of the sample, it is not used in the analyses conducted 
for this study.  
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Table 1 
 
Number of Excerpts Taken from the Therapy Sessions Conducted by Specific Experts 
 
Therapist   Number    Percent of Total 
  
Rogers    11     19.6   
Perls    5     8.9   
Lazarus   15     26.8   
Shostrum   10     17.9   
Meichenbaum   8     14.3   
Beck    6     10.7   
Strupp    1     1.8  
       
 
(N = 56) 
 
 
 
Number of Figures of Speech Used per Excerpt 
 
The sample can be described according to the total number of occurrences of 
figurative language used. Counting instances of figurative language for the entire 
sample, there were 611 figures of speech found. Looking at figurative language use 
across the 56 excerpts, the count of figures of speech ranged from as few as four per 
excerpt to as many as 20 per excerpt, with the average number of figures used per 
excerpt being 10.9 (SD = 4.18). Table 2 presents the frequency distribution of figure of 
speech use across the excerpts. From Table 2, the mode of figurative language use (8 
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excerpts) had 9 instances of figurative language and the lowest occurrence (only 1 
excerpt) had twenty instances of figurative language. While this data is not used in the 
analyses of the research questions and hypothesis, it is presented for the purpose of 
providing a description of the sample.  
 
 
Table 2 
 
Frequency Distribution of Figurative Language Counts Per Excerpt 
 
Figure of Speech Count* Frequency of Excerpts  Percent of Excerpts
  
 4   2     3.6  
 5   4     7.1  
 6   4     7.1  
 7   3     5.4  
 8   2     3.6  
 9   8     14.3  
 10   5     8.9  
 11   4     7.1  
 12   7     12.5  
 13   3     5.4  
 14   2     3.6  
 15   3     5.4  
 16   3     5.4  
 18   3     5.4  
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Table 2 Continued 
 
Figure of Speech Count* Frequency of Excerpts  Percent of Excerpts 
 
19   2     3.6  
 20   1     1.8  
       
 
(N = 56) * Count = Number of Figures of Speech occurring in a 2-minute excerpt. The 
Frequency and Percentage listed above represent the frequency and percentage of 
excerpts having those specific figure of speech counts.  
 
 
Type of Figure of Speech  
 The frequency and percentage of each category of figure of speech was 
calculated for excerpts. First, a count of the total number of figures of speech produced 
across the entire sample yielded 611 phrases identified as a figure of speech (see Table 
3). A frequency breakdown of the figures of speech illustrating how often each figure of 
speech was found in the data (see Table 3) indicates that the majority of figures, a total 
of 565 out of 611, were coded as metaphor. The second and third most prominent figures 
of speech were simile and hyperbole, with 13 and 14 instances each. No instances of 
apostrophe, anthimeria, or onomatopoeia were coded.  
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Table 3 
 
Frequency of Type of Figurative Language Across All Excerpts Combined 
 
Type of Figurative Lang   Frequency  Percent 
  
Metaphor               565          92.5   
Simile         13            2.1   
Oxymoron          1   .2   
Personification         3   .5   
Metonymy          4   .7   
Periphrasis          1   .2   
Pun           3   .5   
Hyperbole          14            2.3   
Litotes           1   .2   
Irony           2   .3   
Rhetorical Question         4   .7              
       
 
(N = 611) 
 
 
 
Whereas Table 3 provides the overall frequency of the fourteen different types of 
figures of speech examined in this study, Table 4 illustrates the frequency of type of 
figurative language used in therapy sessions conducted by specific expert therapists. 
Again, omitted from the table are the three types of figurative language that were not 
found: apostrophe, anthimeria, and onomatopoeia. As can be seen from Table 4, the 
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number of metaphors used in the excerpts taken from the respective therapists range 
from as few as 12 to as many as 133. However, each therapist’s percent use of metaphor 
out of the total figures of speech range from 80 to 96.  
 
 
Table 4 
 
Frequency of Figure of Speech Used in Therapy Conducted by Experts 
Expert Therapists 
     
 Rogers Perls Lazurus Shostrum Meichenbaum Beck Strupp 
Figure of 
Speech          
       
         
 
Metaphor 126 71 133 77 78 68 12 
Simile 2 1 4 1 4 1 0 
Oxymoron 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Personification 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Metonymy 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Periphrasis 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Pun 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 
Hyperbole 0 1 7 0 3 1 2 
Litotes 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Irony 10 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Rhetorical  
Question 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Total  131 75 148 81 88 73 15 
 
 
 
 
 
Novel vs. Frozen 
 Frequencies and percentages were calculated for the novelty category of all the 
figurative expressions. The majority of the entire sample’s figurative language was 
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found to be frozen, 581 instances out of 611 total (see Table 5). This left only 30 
instances of figurative language judged as being novel. The frequency of this variable 
across the specific expert therapists can be seen in Table 5. As in the entire sample, the 
majority of occurrences for each of the experts also are frozen. With regard to frozen 
figures uttered by the therapists, the percent total ranges from 94 to 100. 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Novel and Frozen Figures of Speech Used in Therapy Conducted by Experts 
 
Type of Figurative Language 
 
Expert 
Therapist’s 
Session         
Novel      % Frozen %                  Total   
        
 
Rogers 5 .04 126 .96 131  
Perls 8 .11 67 .89 75  
Lazarus 6 .04 142 .96 148  
Shostrum 4 .05 77 .95 81  
Meichenbaum 5 .06 83 .94 88  
Beck 2 .03 71 .97 73  
Strupp 0 0 15 1.0 15  
Total 30 4.9 581 95.1 611  
 
 
(N = 611) Each figure of speech identified within the excerpts was included in this 
sample of 611. 
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Conjunctive vs. Disjunctive 
 Frequencies were calculated for the conjunctive status of each figure of speech in 
all of the excerpts. The figure of speech is counted as conjunctive if it is congruent in 
meaning with the underlying conceptual foundation of the figurative language used by 
the other member of the therapy dyad. Table 6 illustrates that 86.7 percent of the figures 
of speech were disjunctive or had a unique/different underlying concept than the other 
figurative expressions used by the other therapy dyad member in the excerpt from which 
dialogue was taken.  
 
 
Table 6 
Frequency of Conjunctive and Disjunctive Figures of Speech for Entire Sample 
   
Type of FL 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
 
Conjunctive  81 13.3 
Disjunctive  530 86.7 
Total  611 100 
     
 
(N = 611) 
 
 
 
 An additional variable was created using the initial ratings of conjunctive vs. 
disjunctive figurative language in order to focus on the excerpt level rather than just on 
the individual level of each figurative expression. For the new variable, if any one 
instance of an excerpt’s uses of figurative language was found to be conjunctive, then 
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the entire excerpt was coded as conjunctive. To investigate the characteristics of this 
new variable, frequency and sum calculations were conducted. Table 7 illustrates that 
57.1 percent of the 56 excerpts were judged to be conjunctive and 42.9 percent were 
judged as disjunctive.  
 Using that variable, Table 7 provides the frequency of the conjunctive vs. 
disjunctive excerpts derived from therapy by the respective seven experts. As can be 
seen from the table, 100% of the five excerpts taken from Dr. Perls’ training sessions 
might be described as having conjunctive figurative language. On the other extreme, the 
one excerpt taken from Dr. Strupp’s training session was coded as having all disjunctive 
instances of figurative language. With respect to the other therapists’ excerpts, 
percentages of conjunctive excerpts ranged from 30 to 83 whereas percentages of 
disjunctive excerpts ranged from 17 to 70.  
 
 
Table 7 
 
Conjunctive vs. Disjunctive Figures of Speech Used in Therapy Conducted by Experts 
         
 
Conjunctive       Disjunctive 
 
   
 
    Therapist   count  % 
 
count % 
  
Total 
Count 
         
 
Rogers 5 45   6 55  11 
Perls 5 100   0 -  5 
Lazurus 9 60   6 40  15 
Shostrum 3 30   7 70  10 
Meichenbaum 5 63   3 37  8 
Beck 5 83   1 17  6 
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Table 7 Continued 
         
  
Conjunctive       Disjunctive 
 
   
 
    Therapist   count  % 
 
count % 
  
Total 
Count 
         
 
Strupp 
 
0 
 
- 
   
1 
 
100 
  
1 
Total 32 57.1   24 42.9  56 
                       
 
(N = 56) Note: Conjunctive and disjunctive ratings are calculated by a determination of 
whether any figure of speech uttered by a dyad was conjunctive with any other utterance 
by that same dyad.  
 
 
 
 
Interrater Reliability 
 
  In this section, interrater reliability calculations will be presented. The steps used 
to check the level of interrater reliability for the figurative language raters culminated in 
figurative language agreement tables that illustrate the interrater reliability of the judges 
when conducting practice exercises on sample stimuli. Estimates of interrater reliability 
between the figurative language judges were also provided via statistical calculation of 
Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960; Fleiss, 1981). With regard to the Working Alliance 
Inventory, estimates of interrater reliability were calculated by comparing separate 
judges’ ratings on multiple excerpts. Estimates of interrater reliability were provided by 
calculation of Cohen’s Kappa statistic. 
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Establishing Interrater Reliability for the Figurative Language Judges 
 This section reports the results of the training for establishing interrater reliability 
among the judges when coding figurative language. It also reports the results of 
statistical procedures calculated to measure interrater reliability. The manual for coding 
figurative language (Barlow et al., 1970) provided a training method for increasing rater 
agreement. In brief, raters were independently trained via the manual and example 
stimuli. The example stimuli were passages of text and transcripts of dialogue much akin 
to the excerpts used later in this study. The raters were then given five training stimuli to 
rate independently, all four original training stimuli from the Barlow et al. (1970) 
training manual plus one additional segment taken from the data set used later for this 
study. Once they were finished rating, they then met together as a group to process and 
discuss their ratings. At this gathering, rater agreement data were collected.  
The manual provided a coding scheme for rater agreement consisting of the 
number of raters who initially identified a figure “plus” or “minus” the number of coders 
who disagreed with that initial rating. For this rating system, the raters as a group either 
ended up agreeing to accept or reject an expression or word as being a figure of speech. 
A coding scheme, described below, represents how the raters came to their agreement. 
This coding scheme ranged from (3+0), (2+1), (1+2), (1-2), or (2-1) with the first three 
codes representing times when all three judges accepted a rating and the last two codes 
representing times when the judges as a unit rejected a rating. That is, the codes (3+0), 
(2+1), and (1+2) are all in agreement that an expression is a figure of speech and codes 
(1-2) and (2-1) are in agreement that an expression is not a figure of speech. For 
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example, if during the training meeting as the judges were collectively reading over the 
stimuli, one judge had selected a phrase as figurative, then the he or she announced it to 
the other judges and provided his or her rationale for doing so. Then the judges would 
discuss the phrase and come to a decision as to whether or not the phrase was figurative. 
If all three judges decided it was figurative, then the coding for that instance of 
figurative language was (1+2); If the other judges were not swayed by his or her 
argument, then that instance of figurative language was given (1-2) as the code.  
The manual also outlined a method for calculating agreement between raters. 
That method, used in previous investigations utilizing the Barlow, Kerlin, and Pollio 
(1970) manual (Pollio & Barlow, 1975; McMullen, 1985), involved tracking rater 
agreement throughout the training process using the codes outlined above. Table 8 
presents the data on agreements and disagreements of figurative language ratings 
aggregated over the five training stimuli (Appendix D provides them separately). It 
should be noted that targeted rater agreement in the previous studies using this figurative 
language rating system was set at 80 % agreement. According to that criterion, the 
agreement found between raters in this study was considered good because the 
percentage surpassed the targeted rater agreement established in previous studies. 
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Table 8 
Results of Training Procedure: Totaled Across Training Stimuli and All Raters 
    
Novel      Frozen 
    _______________________________________________ 
Rating Category  N  %  N  % 
 
Accepted     
3+0 17 15 56 50 
2+1 3 3 22 20 
1+2 1 1 12 11 
Subtotal 
 
21  90  
Rejected     
2-1 - - - - 
1-2 - - - - 
Subtotal 
 
- - - - 
Total 
 
21 19 90 81 
Judgments     
% Accepted 100 
% Rejected 0 
 
 
 When the Figurative Language Judges examined the therapy excerpts, they only 
coded language they identified as being figurative and did not note all the language that 
was not figurative. An analogous situation would be when a coder would be assigned to 
identify arrhythmia by listening to a data stream of heartbeats. The positive instance of 
identifying arrhythmia would only happen occasionally and the rest of the time the coder 
would not probably mark down a series of “no’s” for the times when it was not present. 
Similarly, the word or combinations of words that were not identified as being instances 
of figurative language were not tracked. Further, doing so would be extremely tedious 
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considering that every word and combination of words had to be considered. This is 
important to note due to its implications when calculating interrater reliability. When 
ratings are only made for the positive instances of a phenomenon, the negative instances 
are not coded. Traditionally, Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) would be calculated to 
provide estimates of interrater reliability. However, Markus, Bland, Rose, and Siebler 
(1996) argued that use of that statistic is inappropriate when negative instances of a 
phenomenon are not recorded, as with the figurative language data in this study. They 
proposed an alternative procedure whereby the probability that if one judge identifies a 
phenomenon, another judge will also identify those same phenomena. The authors of the 
figurative language training manual (Barlow et al., 1970) published their exercises in 
training on the sample stimuli. As such, their data can be compared to the data produced 
during the training for this study. Using this procedure, each of the four original training 
stimuli and their corresponding figurative language ratings produced by both the authors 
and the judges in this study were compared. For the first stimulus, the calculated 
probability that when one rater identified a figure of speech another would also was .907 
(See Appendix E for those agreement probability calculations). This suggests that 90 
percent of the time when a figure of speech was identified, at least two raters identified 
it. The results for the second, third, and fourth stimuli were .855, .945, and .832, 
respectively (Appendix E). These probabilities are considered high (Markus et al., 1996) 
and suggest that the judges used in this study were identifying figurative language 
similarly to the author’s of the figurative language manual (Barlow et al, 1970).  
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Fleiss (1981) described a statistical procedure for calculating Kappa for multiple raters. 
This statistic was used on the ratings that the figurative language raters made initially, 
prior to their group discussion and processing of ratings. That statistic was calculated 
and is reported in Table 9 below. Kappa coefficients for all raters overall varied from -
.566 (S.E. = .077) to -.747 (S.E. = .094) across all four passages. Kappa Max and 
Kappa/Kappa Max were also calculated and are provided in Table 10. The Kappa/Kappa 
Max statistic is used to indicate the proportion of agreement found amount the raters 
when the maximum Kappa value that is possible is taken into account.  
 
 
 
Table 9 
 
Multirater Kappa for Figurative Language Training Judgments 
Training  Overall Kappa Individual Kappa 
Passages K S E est. Z  K S E est. Z 
1 -.594 .102 -5.82 Rater 1 .91 .14 6.28 
(N = 16)    Rater 2 1.0 .14 6.93 
    Rater 3 
 
.71 .14 6.28 
2 -.628 .075 -8.42 Rater 1 .95 .11 9.01 
(N = 30)    Rater 2 1.0 .11 9.49 
    Rater 3 
 
1.0 .11 9.49 
3 -.572 .096 -5.94 Rater 1 1.0 .14 7.35 
(N = 18)    Rater 2 .92 .14 6.75 
    Rater 3 
 
.92 .14 6.75 
4 -.566 .077 -7.33 Rater 1 .95 .11 8.69 
(N =  28)    Rater 2 .94 .11 8.66 
    Rater 3 
 
.95 .11 8.67 
5 -.747 .094 -7.95 Rater 1 .92 .13 6.97 
(N = 19)    Rater 2 .92 .13 6.97 
    Rater 3 .91 .13 6.90 
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Table 10 
Kappa and Kappa Max Statistics for Figurative Language Ratings 
 Statistics Rater Combinations 
Passages  1 & 2 1 & 3 2 & 3 
Kappa .429 -.14 -.14 
Kappa Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Kappa/Kappa Max .429 -.143 -.143 
Observer 
Agreement 
.875 .750 .750 
1 
Chance Agreement .781 .781 .781 
Kappa -.03 -.14 .302 
Kappa Max .793 .714 .535 
Kappa/Kappa Max -.043 -.200 .565 
Observer 
Agreement 
.667 .733 .800 
2 
Chance Agreement .678 .767 .713 
Kappa -.09 -.09 -.06 
Kappa Max .455 .455 1.000 
Kappa/Kappa Max -.09 -.09 -.059 
Observer 
Agreement 
.778 .778 .889 
3 
Chance Agreement .796 .796 .895 
Kappa -.06 -.06 -.06 
Kappa Max .472 .472 .472 
Kappa/Kappa Max -.120 -.120 -.120 
Observer 
Agreement 
.857 .857 .857 
4 
Chance Agreement .865 .865 .865 
Kappa -.09 .204 -.02 
Kappa Max 1.000 .659 .659 
Kappa/Kappa Max -.086 .309 -.036 
Observer 
Agreement 
.579 .632 .526 
5 
Chance Agreement .612 .537 .537 
 
 
 
Calculating Kappa for the post-discussion ratings, those that are reported in the 
agreement table (Table 8) above, was not performed due to the nature of the data without 
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any examples of the raters disagreeing or rejecting a phrase once it was identified by one 
of the judges and subsequently agreed to by the remaining judges. In addition, the “built-
in” discussion session required by the training manual, by its very nature, means that the 
subsequent ratings would be related and biased. It should be noted that the pre-
discussion ratings and the exercise from which they were obtained were used for the 
purpose of training, and as such, represent the raters while still developing their rating 
skills via the feedback acquired during the discussion component of training.  
 Interrater reliability was also calculated for the WAI. During data collection, the 
judges were each given three of the same excerpts so that ratings could be collected on 
the same stimulus by all three judges. Cohen’s Kappa statistic was calculated, comparing 
two raters at a time for each of the three excerpts. Table 11 illustrates the nine Kappa 
results in one table. It was found that Kappa ranged from as low as .28 to as high as .62, 
with this statistic representing stronger interrater agreement the closer it approaches 1. 
All the Kappa statistics reached statistical significance, indicating that the ratings were 
similar and were not due to chance alone. There is debate as to whether or not to use 
ranges for Kappa (Uebersax, 1987), however, ranges have been suggested (Cohen, 1960; 
Landis & Koch, 1977). Landis and Koch (1977) suggested that Kappas below .4 are 
poor, from .4 to .75 are fair, and above .75 are good. Based on those ranges, two of the 
Kappa statistics fall in the poor range, with the others falling in the fair range. It should 
be noted that Kappa statistics can be low despite having high levels of agreement 
between raters (Landis & Koch, 1977), suggesting that interpretation of Kappa should be 
made with caution. Fleiss (1981) argued that the calculation of Kappa Max aids in 
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interpretation of straight Kappa. As such Kappa Max was calculated and is presented 
along with Kappa. Fleiss (1981) described a statistical procedure for calculating Kappa 
for multiple raters and the results of that statistical procedure are presented in Table 12. 
 
 
Table 11 
 
Kappa Statistics for Three WAI Ratings by Three Judges 
 
Judges   Kappa Statistic   Significance   
Excerpt 1 
   Raters 1 and 2  .62     0.00   
   Raters 1 and 3  .49     0.00 
   Raters 2 and 3  .62     0.00 
Excerpt 28 
   Raters 1 and 2  .37     0.00  
   Raters 1 and 3  .49     0.00 
   Raters 2 and 3  .42     0.00  
Excerpt 50 
   Raters 1 and 2  .42     0.00  
   Raters 1 and 3  .53     0.00 
   Raters 2 and 3  .28     0.00 
       
 
(N = 36 items) 
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Table 12  
Multirater Kappa for WAI Judgments 
 
Process Variables 
 The sample can also be described by examining the process variables. In this 
study, the process variables consisted of the three WAI scale scores and three scores 
derived from the EXP scale ratings. Descriptive statistics were calculated for the process 
variables in order to provide a general description of the overall sample. Simply stated, 
measures of central tendency were calculated and are reported below. Interrater 
reliability statistics were calculated and reported for both of the process variables. 
Additionally, Pearson r correlation statistics were calculated to determine the relatedness 
of the two process variables.  
 
 
 Overall Kappa Individual Kappa 
Excerpts K S E est. Z  K S E est. Z 
1 12.43 .068 182.73 Rater 1 1.0 .10 10.39 
(N = 36)    Rater 2 .96 .10 9.95 
    Rater 3 
 
1.57 .10 16.36 
28 15.79 .068 232.07 Rater 1 1.57 .10 16.31 
(N = 36)    Rater 2 .96 .10 9.95 
    Rater 3 
 
1.38 .10 14.31 
50 7.60 .068 111.57 Rater 1 .96 .10 9.94 
(N = 36)    Rater 2 .96 .10 9.95 
    Rater 3 
 
.96 .10 9.98 
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Working Alliance Inventory Description 
The sample can be described according to overall scores obtained on the three 
WAI scales of Task, Bond, and Goal. Accordingly, the Task scale, measuring whether 
the therapy dyad had established and worked together on collaborative tasks ranged in 
scores from 33 to 64. The mean was 50.04 (SD = 6.85; N = 56). The Bond scale, 
measured the degree to which the therapy dyad had established a felt relationship, 
ranged from 31 to 63. The average Bond scale rating was 47.98 (SD = 7.97; N = 56). 
Additionally, the Goal scale, measured the degree to which the therapy dyad had 
collaboratively established a goal, of the WAI ranged from 45 to 73 with a mean of 
55.80 (SD = 7.79; N = 56). These descriptive calculations of the WAI and its three 
scales are limited in how they can be compared to findings in previous studies due to the 
novelty of using two-minute excerpts for WAI measures. However, it should be noted 
that scores for each of the WAI scales can range from a low of 12 to a high of 84. The 
range of scores found in this study for the three WAI scales intuitively makes sense 
because the ratings are of expert therapist sessions, where it would be expected that the 
expert therapists are actively attempting to establish/build rapport and working alliance, 
and thus higher scores should be found. 
Description of the Depth of Experiencing Scale 
The Depth of Experiencing Scale (EXP, Klein et al., 1969) is a rating system 
designed to measure the quality of language spoken between a therapist and client. 
Because each of the excerpts were rated using this scale, the sample can also be 
described by the EXP ratings. The EXP ratings include the EXP modal ratings, and EXP 
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peak ratings, and the count of EXP level changes per excerpt. Each variable is addressed 
below. 
EXP Mode. The EXP Mode scale provides an estimate of the average EXP 
ratings over the course of an excerpt. The sample can be described by examining EXP 
Mode ratings (Table 13). Based on the frequency distribution, the EXP Mode rating that 
was most commonly used was Level 3, followed closely by Level 5. Table 13 also 
provides the percentages for the EXP Mode levels.  
 
Table 13 
 
Frequency of Exp Mode Scores  
 
Mode Scores  Frequency  Percent   
 1  1   .02   
 2  6   .11   
 3  20   .36    
 4  10   .18   
 5  17   .30    
 6  2   .04   
       
 
(N = 56) 
 
 
EXP Peak. The EXP Peak scale provides an estimate of the highest level of EXP 
ratings per excerpt. The sample can be described according to the highest or peak level 
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of EXP across excerpts. This measure is different than modal ratings of EXP because it 
might only represent one statement by the client, whereas modal ratings of EXP provide 
a measure of the majority of EXP ratings for an entire excerpt. According to the overall 
ratings, Exp Peak levels 4, 5, and 6 are all close in their percentage of occurrence in the 
sample (see Table 14). It is important to recall that all the EXP ratings, including EXP 
Peak, range from a shallow level of communication identified by lower EXP ratings to a 
deeper level of communication, thought to be more therapeutic, identified by higher 
EXP ratings. As such, EXP Peak ratings may be viewed as comprising language that is 
thought to be the most therapeutic during a particular excerpt. An interpretation of the 
high frequency of EXP Peak ratings occurring in the upper range indicates that the 
excerpts and overall sample had a deep level of quality therapeutic communication.  
 
 
Table 14 
 
Frequency of Exp Peak Scores 
 
Peak Scores  Frequency  Percent   
 2  1   .02    
 3  8   .14   
4  17   .30  
5  16   .29    
 6  14   .25   
 
(N = 56)  
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EXP Level Change. Unlike the other two EXP scales discussed above, the EXP 
Level Change variable has not been examined in published research to date. One of the 
reasons for this is that the EXP scale has not been utilized to examine temporal process 
changes. Examining the EXP Level Change that occurs in a single excerpt can provide 
information on the changing quality of the language spoken between the therapist and 
the client. As a whole, the majority of excerpts were judged to have two or fewer 
changes in EXP level with 39.3% having only one change and 28.6% having two 
changes (Table 15). Additionally, only 7.1% of the excerpts were judged not to have any 
changes in EXP level at all. Cumulatively, the range from 0-2 changes in EXP level 
represented 75% of the excerpts in the sample. In addition, Table 15 provides a listing of 
percentages for level changes found. 
 
Table 15 
 
Frequency of Changes in Exp Levels  
 
Changes  Frequency  Percent   
 1  4   .07    
 2  22   .39    
 3  16   .29   
 4  7   .13   
 5  6   .11   
 6  1   .02    
       
 
(N = 56) 
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Correlations Between Process Variables 
 The sample can also be described by examining the relationship between the 
process variables. Both the Working Alliance Inventory (WAI) and the Experiencing 
Scale (EXP) are instruments designed to measure processes of therapy that correlate 
with change. Specifically, the WAI is a measure of the therapeutic relationship between 
the therapist and the client; the EXP is a measure of the emotional level of the linguistic 
content of the client’s verbalizations. Both of these instruments measure processes that 
are thought to fluctuate throughout and across therapy sessions. As instruments designed 
to measure processes that are hypothesized to be individually linked to positive change 
in therapy, high scores on each measure would be correlated according to counseling 
theory. For this investigation, both measures were used to better understand the 
influences of figurative language on their targeted therapy processes.  
To examine correlation of these measures, Pearson r correlations were calculated 
and are presented in Table 16. As can be seen in Table 16, there are several correlations 
that reached statistical significance at both the .01 and .05 alpha levels. R squared, a 
measure of effect size, ranged from .01 to .589. R squared can be interpreted as a 
percentage of one variable accounting for or explaining the variability in another 
variable. Two variables having r = .1 and R squared equal .01, means that each variable 
explains approximately 1 % of the variability of the other. This is considered a small 
effect size. On the other hand, the larger the R squared, the more variability is explained. 
Using the Pearson r correlations and subsequent R squared values, there appears to be 
two general clusters of variables that are highly correlated among each other.  
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The first cluster of highly intercorrelated variables consists of the three variables 
comprising the WAI. In this study, each of those variables is highly correlated to each of 
the other WAI variables. This corresponds to past research findings in which the WAI 
scales have been intercorrelated (Horvath, 1991). It suggests that there is some degree of 
overlap in measurement between the scales, or that the scales are loading on the same 
underlying concept. Examination of the R squared values for each of the three 
intercorrelated WAI scales, suggests that the amount of variance explained between any 
two of the scales ranged from .19 to.58, indicating that from 20 % to almost 60% of 
variance of one scale was explained by variance in the corresponding scale. This is not 
surprising given that that the development of each of the scales of the instrument was 
based on similar theoretical underpinnings. The high intercorrelation suggests that it 
might be possible to examine the scales together, rather than separately. It also suggests 
that the WAI scales are conceptually linked. 
The second cluster of correlations that can be grouped together are associated 
with Exp Change variable. Exp Change, a measure of the count of Exp level changes per 
excerpt is likely to have a limited range of possible scores given that each excerpt is two-
minutes in length and one would expect a normal distribution.  
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Table 16 
 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Dependent Variables 
 
Scale        1           2    3       4         5            6
      
 
1. WAI-Task              1.0 
2. WAI-Bond       .525**   1.0 
3. WAI-Goal       .768**    .471**       1.0  
4. Exp Change       -.285*         -.135         -.305*       1.0 
5. Exp Mode     .065             .113           .165       .106       1.0 
6. Exp Peak        .091            .243         .180       .356**     .1      1.0 
       
 
N = 56; ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level; * Correlation is significant at the 
.05 level. 
 
 
 
Research Question One  
The first question posed in this investigation was: To what degree are the 
different figures of speech used in the therapy of experts as indicated by therapy training 
tapes? Are those figures of speech mostly novel or frozen? How frequently are those 
figures of speech conceptually shared by both members of the therapy dyad? 
For this investigation, figurative language was coded according to the Barlow, 
Kerlin, and Pollio (1970) manual, supplying a code for one of fourteen types of figures 
of speech, along with a judgment of whether a particular figure of speech was novel or 
frozen. In addition, the judges were trained to identify underlying conceptual themes and 
  111
determine if particular figures of speech share their underlying meaning with figures of 
speech previously uttered by the other member of the therapy dyad. Descriptive statistics 
were calculated focusing on the aforementioned fourteen categories of figures of speech, 
the novel vs. frozen variable, and conjunctive vs. disjunctive variable. Those results 
provide a breakdown of the categories of figurative language used by the expert 
therapists. As research question one has three distinct foci, three corresponding sections 
follow: Figures of Speech Used by Therapists, Novel vs. Frozen, and Conjunctive vs. 
Disjunctive.  
Figures of Speech Used by Expert Therapists 
Descriptive statistics were calculated to determine the number and percentage of 
figures of speech that were used by the therapists. Table 17 shows that 306 of the 611 
figures of speech found in the data were spoken the therapists while 305 figures of 
speech were uttered by the clients.   
 
 
Table 17 
 
Number of Figures of Speech Uttered by Therapists and Clients 
 
Speaker   Number    Percent of Total 
  
Therapist   306     50   
Client    305     50 
 
(N = 611) Represents all occurrences using all excerpts.  
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Table 18 below shows the breakdown of the type of figure of speech uttered by 
the therapists. Therapists did not use five of the types of figures of speech: oxymoron, 
litotes, apostrophe, anthimeria, and onomatopoeia. It should be noted that the last three 
of those types of figures of speech were not used by any of the clients either. Of the 
figures of speech used by therapists, 94.1% were judged to be metaphor. Hyperbole was 
found 2% of the time and simile 1.3%.   
 
 
Table 18 
 
Frequency of Figure of Speech Used by All Therapists 
 
Type    Frequency     Percent 
  
Metaphor            288             94.1   
Simile      4                1.3  
Personification    1        .3   
Metonymy     1        .3   
Periphrasis     1        .3   
Pun      1        .3   
Hyperbole     6      2.0   
Irony      2                  .7  
Rhetorical Question    2        .7   
       
 
(N = 306) Represents all occurrences using all excerpts. 
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The question of which expert therapist used what type of figure of speech and 
how often was also examined. Descriptive statistics were calculated to determine the 
number and frequency of each kind of figure of speech used by each of the seven expert 
therapists. Table 19 presents those results. Again, the most commonly used figure of 
speech used by all of the therapists was found to be metaphor. Hyperbole and simile 
were the next two most found figures of speech. Lazurus uttered 9 out of 10 of those two 
figures of speech. Strupp was the only therapist that was not found to use figurative 
language. Of the therapists who were found to use figures of speech, the percentage of 
metaphor to overall figure of speech used ranged from Meichenbaum with 36 figures 
(100%) to Lazurus with 87 (88%).   
 
Table 19 
 
Frequency of Figurative Language Type by Specific Expert Therapist 
Expert Therapists 
Type      Rogers Perls Lazurus Shostrum Meichenbaum Beck 
     
 
Metaphor 42 43 87 35 36 45 
Simile 1 0 3 0 0 0 
Personification 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Metonymy 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Periphrasis 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Pun 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Hyperbole 0 0 6 0 0 0 
Irony 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Rhet. Question  0 1 0 1 0 0 
Total  43 45 99 37 36 46 
 
 
(N=306) None of Strupp’s phrases were judged to be figures of speech. 
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In order to provide a comparison to figures of speech used by therapists, 
descriptive statistics were also calculated to determine the frequency distribution for 
figures of speech uttered by the clients (Table 20). The figurative language that clients 
uttered consisted of all but five types of figures of speech: periphrasis, irony, apostrophe, 
anthimeria, and onomatopoeia. Again, the last three types listed above were not found to 
be uttered by either therapists or clients. It was found that out of the 305 total figures of 
speech uttered by the clients, 277 (90.8%) were judged to be metaphor with simile, 
hyperbole, and metonymy occurring 9 (3%), 8 (2.6%), and 3 (1%), respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 20 
 
Frequency of Figure of Speech Used by All Clients 
 
Type    Frequency     Percent 
  
Metaphor            277              90.8   
Simile      9                3.0   
Oxymoron     1        .3 
Personification    1        .7   
Metonymy     1       1.0   
Pun      1        .7   
Hyperbole     6       2.6   
Litotes      2                  .3  
Rhetorical Question    2        .7   
       
 
(N = 305) 
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In order to examine in detail the ratio of specific figures of speech for therapy 
dyads, each expert therapist with his or her client, the breakdown of the specific figures 
of speech uttered by their clients is presented in Table 21. The judges found that clients 
used mostly metaphor with simile and hyperbole the second and third most used figure 
of speech. The percentage of metaphor to total figure of speech used by client ranged 
from 84 and 42 (both 95%) by Roger’s and Shostrum’s clients respectively to 12 (80%) 
for Strupp’s client. 
 
 
Table 21 
 
Frequency of Figures of Speech Used by Each Therapists’ Client 
Therapy Conducted by  
     
 Rogers Perls Lazurus Shostrum Meichenbaum Beck Strupp 
Type                
         
 
Metaphor 84 28 46 42 42 23 12 
Simile 1 1 1 1 4 1 0 
Oxymoron 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Personification 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Metonymy 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Pun 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Hyperbole 0 1 1 0 3 1 2 
Litotes 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rhet. Question  
        
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Total  88 30 49 44 52 27 15 
 
 
(N=305) 
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Another point from which to examine what type of figure of speech therapists 
use is to study in greater detail the figure of speech more prevalent in the data. Table 22 
below presents the frequency of metaphor use for both the expert therapist and his 
corresponding client. From this data, it can be seen that percentage of metaphor use was 
high for both therapist and client. In addition, it can be seen that Perls, Lazurus, and 
Beck all used more figures of speech than did their clients. In contrast, the clients of 
Rogers, Shostrum, Meichenbaum, and Strupp all used a larger number of figures of 
speech than did their respective expert therapists. Roger’s client used almost twice as 
many figures of speech as did Rogers.  
 
 
Table 22  
Ratio of Metaphors to Total Figures of Speech Used by Therapy Dyads 
 Dyads       Ratio          Percentage of Total  
Rogers 42:43 .9767 
     Rogers’ Client 
 
84:88 .9545 
Perls 43:45 .9555 
     Perls’ Client 
 
28:30 .9333 
Lazarus 87:99 .8787 
     Lazarus Client 
 
46:49 .9387 
Shostrum 35:37 .9459 
     Shostrum’s Client 
 
42:44 .9545 
Meichenbaum 36:36 1 
     Meichenbaum’s Client 
 
42:55 .8076 
Beck 45:46 .9782 
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Table 22 Continued 
 
    Beck’s Client 
 
23:27 .8518 
Strupp 0:0 0 
     Strupp’s Client 12:15 .80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Novelty  
Descriptive statistics were calculated to determine the frequency of novel and 
frozen figures of speech used by the expert therapists. From Table 5 in the previous 
section, it was shown that of the 611 figures of speech uttered in the sample, 581 were 
judged to be frozen and 30 to be novel. Table 23 below presents the frequency of use of 
novel and frozen figures of speech by only the expert therapists. It can be seen from that 
table that of the 306 figures of speech uttered by the experts as a whole, 287 were judged 
to be frozen and 19 to be novel. 
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Table 23 
Frequency of Novel vs. Frozen Figurative Language by Therapists 
         
  
 Type of FL 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
         
 
Novel  19 6.2 
Frozen  287 93.7 
Total  306 100 
 
 
 
 
 Descriptive statistics were calculated to determine the frequency of novel and 
frozen figures of speech used by specific therapists. As with the entire sample, the 
majority of figures of speech uttered by the therapists were frozen. The range of figures 
that were novel spanned from as few as zero to as many as six. Frozen figures of speech 
ranged from as few as 34 to as many as 94. Table 24 below present the breakdown of 
novel and frozen figures of speech uttered by specific expert therapists. 
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Table 24 
 
Frequency of Novel and Frozen Figurative Language by Specific Therapist 
 
     
Type of Figurative Language 
Expert 
Therapist         
Novel    % Frozen        
% 
              Total   
         
 
Rogers 3 6 40 93 43  
Perls 6 13 39 86 45  
Lazarus 5 5 94 94 99  
Shostrum 3 8 34 91 37  
Meichenbaum 2 5 34 94 36  
Beck 0 0 46 100 46  
 
 
(N = 306) 
 
 
In order to provide a comparison from which to view the information provided 
above, descriptive statistics were calculated to determine the frequency of novel and 
frozen figures of speech spoken by the clients. Table 25 below presents the breakdown 
of novel vs. frozen figures of speech uttered by the clients across the entire sample. From 
this table it can be seen that of the 305 figures of speech used by the clients throughout 
their therapy sessions, 294 of those were judged to be frozen and 11 were judged to be 
novel. 
When visually comparing the rate of use of novel figures of speech by therapists 
and clients, therapists use almost twice as many novel figures of speech. To determine if 
that difference was statistically significant, a Chi Square test was used (Appendix F). 
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Statistical significance was not met for differences between therapist and client use of 
novel figurative language (Clients: 11 novel and 294 frozen; Therapists: 19 novel and 
287 frozen; χ2 (1, N=611) = 2.21 or 1.69 with Continuity Correction, ns,).  
 
 
Table 25 
Frequency of Novel vs. Frozen Figurative Language by Clients 
         
  Type of FL  Frequency Percent 
         
 
Novel  11 3.6 
Frozen  294 96.3 
Total  305 100 
     
 
 
 
 
 To examine the distribution of the novel vs. frozen variable further, statistics 
were calculated to determine the frequency of novel and frozen figure of speech use by 
each of the clients. As the clients are only tracked according to their corresponding 
therapist, this information is grouped according to the therapists who conducted the 
therapy. Table 26 below presents that distribution.  
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Table 26 
 
Frequency of Novel and Frozen Figurative Language by Specific Clients 
 
    Clients’ Type of Figurative Language 
 
Conducted by 
Therapist         
Novel      % Frozen %    Total   
         
 
Rogers 2 2 86 97 88  
Perls 2 6 28 93 30  
Lazarus 1 2 48 97 49  
Shostrum 1 2 43 97 44  
Meichenbaum 3 5 49 94 52  
Beck 2 7 25 92 27  
Strupp 0 0 15 100 15  
 
 
(N = 305) 
 
 
Conjunctive 
Descriptive statistics were calculated to determine the number and percentage of 
figures of speech that were conceptually related to previously spoken figures of speech 
by the other member of the therapeutic dyad (conjunctive). Of the 611 figures of speech 
found in the data, 81 figures of speech were judged to be conceptually related to other 
figures of speech within the same excerpt (conjunctive) and 530 were judged to not be 
conceptually related (disjunctive). Of the 56 excerpts, 32 were judged to be excerpts 
containing shared figurative language and 24 were judged to not have shared figurative 
language.  
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To examine use of conjunctive figures of speech by the specific therapists, 
further descriptive statistics were calculated. Table 27 below illustrates the breakdown of 
conjunctive and disjunctive figures of speech for all the therapists combined. Of the 306 
figures spoken by therapists, 244 were judged to be disjunctive, or not conceptually 
related to figures previously spoken by their client and 62 were judged to be 
conceptually related.  
 
 
Table 27 
Frequency of Conjunctive and Disjunctive Figurative Language by Therapists 
         
  Type of FL  Frequency Percent 
         
 
Conjunctive  62 20.3 
Disjunctive  244 79.7 
Total  306 100 
     
 
 
 
 
To further examine the therapists’ use of conjunctive or shared figurative 
language, additional descriptive statistics were calculated to find out the frequency of 
conjunctive figurative language use for each of the expert therapists specifically. Table 
28 below presents those results.   
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Table 28 
 
Frequency of Conjunctive and Disjunctive Figurative Language by Specific Therapists 
     
 
Type of Figurative Language 
 
Conducted by 
Therapist         
Conjunctive      % Disjunctive  %                Total   
         
 
Rogers 4 9 39 90 43  
Perls 19 42 26 57 45  
Lazarus 17 17 82 82 99  
Shostrum 4 10 33 89 37  
Meichenbaum 9 25 27 75 36  
Beck 9 19 37 80 46  
Strupp 0 0 0 0 0  
 
 
(N = 305) 
 
 
 
 In order to provide a comparison, descriptive statistics were calculated to 
determine the use of shared figurative language by the clients. Table 29 below provides a 
count of the number of figures uttered by the clients in the entire sample that were 
judged to be either conjunctive or disjunctive. From this table it can be seen that 93.8% 
of the figures of speech uttered by clients were conceptually unique and not related to 
the therapist-used utterances in their respective 2-minute excerpts.  
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Table 29 
Frequency of Conjunctive and Disjunctive Figurative Language by Clients 
         
   
Type of FL 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
         
 
Conjunctive  19 6.2 
Disjunctive  286 93.8 
Total  305 100 
     
 
When visually comparing the rate of use of conjunctive figures of speech by 
therapists and clients, therapists appear to use more instances of conjunctive or shared 
figurative language. To determine if that difference was statistically significant, a Chi 
Square test was used (Appendix F). Statistical significance was met for differences 
between therapist and client use of conjunctive figurative language (Clients: 19 
conjunctive and 286 disjunctive; Therapists: 62 conjunctive and 244 disjunctive; χ2 (1, 
N=611) = 26.154 or 24.948 with Continuity Correction, both statistically significant). 
The results of this statistic indicate that therapists and clients used conjunctive language 
at a different frequency or rate of occurrence from one another.  
 
Research Question Two 
The second research question posed in this study was: How does using figures of 
speech that share an underlying conceptual meaning relate to the subsequent ratings of 
the therapeutic bond and experiencing? 
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To shed light on this question, a multiple regression statistic was calculated. The 
conjunctive vs. disjunctive variable measuring conjunctive language for each excerpt *1 
was used for the independent variable. Thus, instead of the 611 instances of individual 
figures of speech, the variable used here corresponds to the total number of the excerpts, 
56. The WAI Bond Scale and the EXP Modal and Peak scores for each excerpt were 
used as the dependent variables. There were also 56 instances of each of these variables. 
The conjunctive vs. disjunctive ratings were found to have a .19 correlation with the 
Bond scale of the WAI and to be negatively correlated to both the Modal and Peak 
scales of the Exp.  
Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was conducted and was not 
statistically significant (Box’s M = 2.724, F = .426, p = .862) indicating that the 
covariance matrices were not different for the dependent variables. Table 30 below 
presents the results of the multiple regression calculation. Statistical significance was not 
reached at the .05 level (F = .882, p = .456).  
Tables 30 and 31 present the results of the regression analysis. The results of that 
analysis were not statistically significant. Consequently, no further analyses were 
conducted. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Each excerpt was coded as conjunctive if it contained one or more figures of speech rated as conjunctive. 
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Table 30 
Multivariate Regression Statistics 
  
  Value F (df)  Significance Eta 
Squared 
Power 
Pillai’s Trace 
Wilks’ Lambda 
Hotelling’s Trace 
Roy’s Largest Root 
.048 
.952 
.051 
.051 
.882 
.882 
.882 
.882 
3 
3 
3 
3 
.456 
.456 
.456 
.456 
.048 
.048 
.048 
.048 
.229 
.229 
.229 
.229 
(N = 56, alpha = .05) 
 
 
 
Table 31 
Between Subject Effects of Conjunctive Figures of Speech on Process Variables 
  
Model  SS (df)  MS F Significance 
Regression 131.26 1 131.26 2.1  .153 
Residual 3365.72 54 62.33   
Total 3496.98 55    
 
 
(N = 56) 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, the results of this study will be summarized and discussed.  
First, a summary of the results for each research question, along with possible 
explanations, will be provided. Next, a discussion of the validity of the data will be 
outlined. The third section will outline limitations of the study and a fourth section will 
provide implications and suggestions for future research. Finally, this chapter will 
conclude with a summary of the previous sections. 
Summary of Results for the Research Questions 
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to discuss the results of the statistical 
analyses conducted in order to answer the stated research questions. In addition, 
supportive and contradictory evidence for the stated hypothesis will be discussed. As 
such, it is divided into two subsections, each respectively corresponding to the two 
research questions with a discussion of the hypothesis subsumed within the discussion of 
the second research question. 
Research Question One 
The first general question posed in this investigation was stated as:  To what 
degree are the different figures of speech used in the therapy of experts as indicated by 
therapy training tapes? Are those figures of speech mostly novel or frozen? How 
frequently are those figures of speech conceptually shared by both members of the 
therapy dyad?  
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Type of Figure of Speech 
 Type of figure of speech was measured using the ratings of the figurative 
language judges. As a whole, they found 611 figures of speech, 306 of which were 
spoken by the therapists with the other 305 were spoken by the clients. Each instance of 
figurative language was coded as belonging to one of 14 different types of figures of 
speech (see Appendix B). The approach taken in attempting to answer the questions 
regarding type of figure of speech used by expert therapists was to calculate descriptive 
analyses of those variables. In order to adequately interpret the distribution of the 
variables with regard to expert therapists, it was also necessary to find out how the 
variables were distributed across the sample as a whole, among the therapy dyads, and 
with regard to each the therapists and clients separately. As such, there are separate 
findings relating to each of the before-mentioned layers and consequently each are 
outlined and discussed separately in the following sections.  
Entire Sample. With regard to the types of figurative language used in the entire 
sample, there were two findings. First, most figures of speech produced in the therapy 
sessions were metaphors, with hyperbole and simile being the second and third most 
used type of figure of speech for the overall sample. Second, neither therapists nor 
clients used three types of figures of speech: apostrophe, anthimeria, and onomatopoeia. 
Each of those findings will be discussed below. 
The first finding was that the majority (565/611 or 92.5 %) of figurative language 
for the entire sample was coded as metaphor. Simile and hyperbole, both having around 
14 counts over the 56 excerpts, represented approximately only two percent of overall 
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figures respectively. This lends support to previous research findings that metaphor is 
common in therapy (Angus & Rennie, 1988, 1989). It can be interpreted as suggesting 
that figurative language in therapy is primarily metaphoric. According to the definition 
used for identifying the various types of figurative language (Appendix B), a metaphor 
is a direct comparison of two things. Based on that definition as well as the definition of 
a simile, which is an explicit comparison, by far the majority of occurrences of figurative 
language in therapy functions for the purpose of comparing two things. Additionally, 
given that metaphors dominate the majority of figurative language, future studies can be 
streamlined by focusing solely on metaphors rather than exhaustively including other 
rarely used figures of speech.  
The second finding was that three kinds of figures of speech were not exhibited 
for any of the therapy dyads: apostrophe, anthimeria, and onomatopoeia. This also can 
be interpreted by examination of the function of those figures of speech (Appendix B). 
Conceptually, anthimeria and onomatopoeia both serve as puns or play-on-words. 
Apostrophe, in contrast, is a type of personification when the object or person is not 
present. All three of these types of figures of speech intuitively manifest rarely in spoken 
language. Further, when comparing the function of metaphor, simile, and even hyperbole 
to the functions for apostrophe, anthimeria, and onomatopoeia, presumably, making 
comparisons, or highlighting a relationship is a more common linguistic task than 
making a pun or a play-on-words. This probably explains the reason why the latter were 
not used in the therapy sessions.  
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Therapy Dyads. With regard to type of figure of speech used among the therapy 
dyads, there were two findings. First, it was found that each dyad produced metaphor 
more frequently than other types of figures of speech. It was also found that all the 
therapy dyads had a similar proportion of metaphor to overall figure of speech produced.  
The finding that each therapy dyad produced metaphor more frequently than 
other types of figures of speech can be interpreted as additional support for the argument 
that figurative language in therapy is primarily metaphoric. However, this finding is not 
surprising given that metaphor occurred at a higher rate of production across the entire 
sample.  
The finding that across the entire sample the therapy dyads all appeared to use a 
similar proportion of metaphors to overall figurative language (Table 4) can be 
interpreted as further evidence that the figurative language used in therapy is primarily 
metaphoric. In addition, it suggests that the phenomenon of using metaphoric figures of 
speech, despite any possible idiosyncratic differences among therapists, clients, and even 
among therapy dyads, does not seem to alter the proportion of metaphors used in 
therapy. Percentage of metaphor to total figures of speech used for any particular therapy 
dyad was similar to the percentage of metaphors to all figures of speech for the entire 
sample. Across the therapy dyads, the proportion of metaphors to overall figures of 
speech ranged from as low as 80 percent for Dr. Strupp’s therapy dyad to as high as 96 
percent for the Roger’s therapy dyad. This finding is congruent with results of past 
research demonstrating that metaphor is not only highly used, but also represents a 
higher proportion of figures of speech used when compared to other figures of speech 
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(Pollio, Barlow, et al., 1977). These results are important because by being similar to 
findings in previous research, they provide evidence for the accuracy of the sampling 
procedures as well as for the representativeness of this study’s data. Additionally, these 
findings also support the conclusion that future studies may be streamlined by primarily 
focusing on the examination of metaphors, or possibly metaphors, similes, and 
hyperboles. 
Therapists. When examining only the therapists, it was found that the majority of 
the type of figure of speech produced by therapists was metaphor, with hyperbole and 
simile being the second and third most frequently used. It was also found that therapists 
did not use two additional types of figures of speech: they did not use oxymoron and 
litotes.  
The first finding, that therapists used metaphor more often can be interpreted as 
further support that the figurative language primarily used in therapy is metaphoric. As 
such, a consequence of this finding is that future research examining figurative language 
in therapy could be streamlined by focusing on metaphors, or possibly metaphors, 
similes, and hyperboles.  
Additionally, another interpretation based on the premise that a new 
understanding is potentially gained when two things are compared is that a byproduct of 
the use of metaphor and simile, both types of figurative language defined as 
comparisons, is therapeutic insight. This interpretation is fundamentally based on the 
definition of metaphor serving the function of helping the speaker or reader to articulate 
a new concept by the comparison of two known concepts or things. On the other hand, 
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hyperbole was defined as an exaggeration to linguistically highlight a point, relationship, 
or characteristic and requires prior knowledge by the hearer or reader in order to 
understand its meaning (Barlow et al, 1970). No references in the literature were made to 
hyperbole in particular, but the process of being able to highlight a known relationship 
was proposed as one positive function for figurative language in therapy (Brooks, 1985; 
Caruth & Ekstein, 1966).  
The second finding, that therapists did not use oxymoron and litotes in their 
speech, also may be interpreted by examining their definitions or the conceptual (Barlow 
et al., 1970) frames in which they are grouped (see Appendix B). According to the 
figurative language manual used in this study (Barlow et al., 1970), an oxymoron is 
made up of two contradictory meanings that are juxtaposed or combined for the effect of 
doing so. Litotes, in contrast, are defined as an understatement of something that the 
reader or hearer is aware of for the purpose of highlighting a point or relationship. These 
figures of speech are not conceptually grouped together according to the manual. In fact, 
according to the manual, oxymoron is a type of comparison and is grouped along with 
metaphor and simile. If some insight is manifested via figurative language, specifically 
through comparisons as with metaphor and simile, then it seems that oxymoron would 
also be found in the language of therapy.  
Clients. With regard to client production of the various types of figures of 
speech, it was also found that clients produced more metaphor than other types of figures 
of speech. In addition to also using a small number of hyperboles and similes, they were 
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found to also use a few examples of metonymy. Clients were also not found to use 
periphrasis and irony. 
The finding that clients used primarily metaphor, but also used hyperbole and 
simile can be interpreted as indicating that language in general, not just language spoken 
by therapists, may be primarily metaphoric and may contain similar proportions of 
figurative language to the ones found in this study’s data. Future research studies should 
be undertaken to determine if that interpretation is accurate.  
The finding that therapists did not use periphrasis and irony also can be 
interpreted by examining their functions. Periphrasis, according to the training manual, 
is a substitution of a proper name for a quality that is often associated with that person or 
thing. Irony, in contrast, is a figure of speech in which opposite words are used in a 
manner that conveys the original meaning. Based on those definitions, neither of these 
functions appears contradictory to the general purpose of client’s spoken language, to 
discuss his or her problems.  
In examining the experts with regard to their respective use of the fourteen types 
of figures of speech, it was found that each therapist mirrored the findings of the sample 
as a whole. That is, they used metaphor to a greater extent and at a higher proportion to 
the other figures of speech. Similarly, this finding was generally found with clients as 
well. Again, both with therapists and clients individually, the second and third most used 
figures of speech were hyperbole and simile, respectively. These findings, taken as a 
whole, suggest that if training therapists to be aware of and purposefully follow 
figurative language in their therapy sessions, then that training should have two goals. 
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First, it should be geared toward helping the therapists in training to recognize the three 
most common types of figures found in therapy sessions and second, to understand both 
metaphor and simile as possible opportunities for initiating or processing new 
understanding and hyperbole as a possible opportunity to focus on and discuss a known 
relationship that is being highlighted.  
The results of this research can be interpreted as supporting the position that 
research may be simplified by only examining the types of figures of speech that more 
commonly occur, such as metaphor, simile, and hyperbole (McMullen, 1985; Cameron, 
1999). It is important to note that streamlining research in this manner would also fit 
with more recent research paradigms for examining the effects of figurative language in 
therapy (Cameron, 1999). One way of streamlining such research would be by 
expanding the operationalized definitions of metaphor, simile, and hyperbole or by 
making research specifically focused on only those types of figures. A broad definition 
would include any of the types of figure of speech examined in this research study and 
would define them all as most likely being “metaphoric.”  
Novel vs. Frozen 
As with the approach taken in answering what types of figure of speech 
therapists use, determining whether those figures are mostly novel or frozen was 
undertaken via calculation of descriptive statistics. The nature of figures of speech, 
because they are both created new and are reused, provides a characteristic that can be 
utilized to describe any specific instance of figurative language or excerpt of language. 
In the past, clinicians and researchers have theorized that this characteristic is 
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meaningful, specifically that novel figures of speech represent instances when the 
speaker or writer is generating a new concept, understanding, or relationship (McMullen, 
1989, 1996). With regard to therapy, this process has been compared to the process of 
developing insight (Angus, 1992; Lenrow, 1966; Voth, 1970; Fine et al., 1973) and has 
been theorized as corresponding to clinically significant moments in therapy (Angus & 
Rennie, 1989; McMullen, 1996). 
Before summing up the findings, it is important to review what factors make a 
figure of speech novel or frozen. In brief, a figure of speech was defined as one that is 
frozen when the hearer or listener, previously knew it, or its premise. On the other hand, 
if a figure of speech was based on a new association, concept, or relationship, and one 
that the coders believed was not in common usage, then it was rated as being novel. The 
following paragraphs will outline the results and possible interpretations for the 
occurrence of novel vs. frozen figures of speech across the entire sample, among the 
therapy dyads, and specifically by the therapists and the clients.  
Entire Sample. In this study, it was found that the majority of figures of speech 
across the entire sample were judged to be frozen figures of speech (Table 5). That is, 
they were figures of speech that the raters were familiar with and consequently judged 
that the majority of English speakers would readily understand, and have most likely 
used and/or heard before. Because novel instances of figurative language were thought 
to be more meaningful (McMullen, 1989, 1996) this discussion will focus on the 
frequency and proportion of those figures judged to be novel.  
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Specifically, it was found that only 4.9 percent of the figures of speech were 
coded as novel instances (Table 5). That finding is similar to approximations found in 
past research studies (Pollio & Barlow, 1975; McMullen & Conway, 1994). As such, 
this study lends support to previous research findings with regard to percent of novel 
figures produced in therapy. This is important because it helps to establish an expected 
base level of production from which to establish that data is most likely accurate and to 
test hypotheses relating to how therapy processes are affected and effect novel figurative 
language production. This is also important from the framework of previous hypotheses 
suggesting that instances of novel figures of speech represent clinical insight or growth 
in therapy by suggesting that if therapy sessions contained greater than five percent of 
novel figurative language, then possibly more clinical insight was gained or at least more 
attempts to gain insight were undertaken during that session.  
Future studies might compare sessions containing high and low levels of novel 
figurative speech with regard to insight. One possible interpretation is that the language 
used in therapy mirrors language in general. If this interpretation is correct, then one 
consequence of this finding would be the establishment of a reason to discontinue the 
historic practice of including this variable in research on figurative language. However, 
just because the frequency of novel figurative language is similar does not mean that 
novel figurative language functions in the same manner in both language in general and 
the therapy session.  
Therapy Dyad. Percent of novel figures of speech uttered by either the therapist 
or client ranged from a high of 11 % to a low of zero percent. Although previous studies 
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have reported rates of novel and frozen figures of speech for specific therapy dyads, this 
study also reported percent comparisons between different therapy dyads. As such, 
interpretation is difficult due to not having any gauge from which to evaluate this data. 
However, if the formerly stated hypothesis regarding novel figures of speech being 
clinically significant moments in therapy is accurate, then the data outlined above would 
suggest that almost 5% of the figures of speech corresponded with clinically significant 
moments. Future researchers can use the percentages found to lend support for their data 
being similar to the data used in this study.  
Dr. Perls’ high number of novel figures (11%) when compared to the other 
therapists’use of novel figures is important because it suggests that there may be 
individual differences in the novelty of figures produced by expert therapists. Clinicians 
such as Siegelman (1990) and researchers (McMullen, 1985, 1989; Pollio & Barlow, 
1975) have suggested, based upon both clinical impressions and research findings, that 
the issue of whether figures of speech are novel is therapeutically important. In short, the 
argument that novelty of figure of speech is important rests on the assumption that new 
associations or a new understanding, something akin to therapeutic insight, is one of the 
requirements for therapeutic change. Given this argument, the findings that Dr. Perls had 
a large percentage of novel figures of speech suggests that he may be providing 
therapeutic insight in the form of a figure of speech, in a sense, offering his 
interpretation in a indirect manner. Future research should be undertaken to examine this 
possibility. This possibility of varied individual differences among therapists seems 
intuitively possible and warrants further investigation.  
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Another interpretation of differences in production of novel figures of speech 
among the therapists is that it corresponds to their theoretical style of therapy. If that 
were the case, then you would expect to find a relationship between theoretical 
framework and subsequent amounts of novel figures of speech produced in therapy. 
Unfortunately, due to the small number of clinicians used in this study (each 
representing a different framework of therapy), an examination of differences between 
therapists might produce misleading results due to the effects of individual differences. 
To examine the possibility of differential production of novel figures of speech due to 
effects of theoretical framework, future research should have a larger sampling of 
therapists representing several different theoretical frameworks. 
The finding from this study that expert therapist dyads can produce such a wide 
range of percentages of novel figures suggests that individual differences may play a 
larger than previously suspected role in determining production of novel figures of 
speech. For example, it is possible that Dr. Perls, having 11% of the novel figures of 
speech found in his therapy excerpts (produced by both he and his clients) (Table 6) and 
13% percent of the novel figures of speech produced by therapists overall (Table 22), 
may have been creating new figures of speech rather than using those figures of speech 
that are already commonly used. If this sample can be generalized with regard to having 
a wide range (0 to 11 percent use of novel figures of speech by therapists), then it may 
also explain the lack of definitive findings relating to this variable and its clinical 
importance. 
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Comparison of Therapists and Clients. The examination of therapist use of novel 
figures of speech revealed that 6.2 percent of therapist uttered figures were judged to be 
novel (Table 21). This percentage is almost twice that of the novel figures of speech 
uttered by clients, which was found to represent only 3.6 percent of client uttered figures 
of speech (Table 23). A Chi square statistic was calculated to test for statistical 
significance of this observed difference and was not found statistically significant, 
indicating that this observed difference might be due to chance.  
Clinical significance is another way of determining if an observed difference 
should be considered meaningful. Even though the Chi square results were not 
statistically significant, is also is important to consider whether the difference is 
meaningful with regard to clinical significance. Generally, a meaningful difference with 
regard to clinical impact is based on anticipated changes/differences born out from 
previous research or, at least, practical application as in grade changes from C to B. With 
respect to whether this observed difference is clinically meaningful, no past research 
findings appear to offer a clear indication. At first glance it may appear that double the 
percentage of use is meaningful. However, without past research findings to use as a 
guide, clinical significance of this finding cannot be ruled out or ruled in.  
It is important to explore possible explanations of this observed difference in 
order to determine if future research efforts should be undertaken to further examine it. 
That is, if it can be easily explained, then it should not be made a priority in future 
investigations. One explanation for the finding of an observed difference between the 
therapist and clients’ use of novel figures of speech is that it is a fluke difference created 
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by the nuances of the sample. This possible explanation should be considered and 
reconsidered prior to conducting future investigations. However, based on the data used 
in the study, there is no indication that this has happened. Another explanation is that 
expert therapists might actually provide their clients with insight-oriented guidance via 
figurative language. This possible explanation appears intuitively sound, as one would 
expect therapists to offer interpretations indirectly as well as directly. However, this 
possible explanation is slightly different to past theoretical hypotheses that have 
suggested that clients might use novel figures due to the fact that they are actively 
processing and searching for new understanding (Barker, 1985; McMullen, 1989, 1996; 
Siegelman, 1990). They proposed that clients, while in the process of therapy, generate 
their own novel figures of speech. Future research efforts focused on examining this 
observation further appear warranted.  
This possible difference is also interesting because it might represent a difference 
between expert therapists and the average therapists per se, from whose therapy has been 
sampled in previous research. Further investigation of this observed difference might be 
an important area of future research because it would examine more of the question of 
“how” experts and non-experts use figurative language.  
Conjunctive vs. Disjunctive. The figurative language judges identified 
conjunctive or disjunctive speech. When a figure of speech was identified as being 
figurative, it was then compared to previously uttered figures of speech and was rated 
either as conjunctive, which meant that it was conceptually similar to other figures of 
speech, or disjunctive, which meant that it was not related or conceptually similar to the 
  141
figures of speech uttered by the other member of the therapy dyad. The comparison of 
conjunctive vs. disjunctive figurative language over the entire sample revealed that 86.7 
percent of the figures were disjunctive (Table 7). Essentially, 86.7 percent of the 
figurative language spoken was not conceptually related to the figurative language 
produced earlier in an excerpt by the other member of the therapy dyad. If 86.7 percent 
was not conceptually related, then it means that the remaining 13.3 percent was related.  
The conjunctive variable was designed to measure linguistic agreement between 
the therapy dyad. Linguistic agreement between the therapy dyad has been theorized to 
be more therapeutic when figures of speech used by the therapist and the client are 
conceptually related or conjunctive (Angus & Rennie, 1988, 1989; McMullen, 1996). 
Given this, 13.3 percent of the figures of speech in this study might have represented 
instances in the session that were clinically noteworthy. No past research findings 
provide a comparison from which to directly analyze this study’s findings with regard to 
percent use of disjunctive and conjunctive figures of speech. That is, until now there has 
not been a research study that has provided overall percent use for conjunctive and 
disjunctive figures of speech in therapy, let alone expert therapy.  
Rating each excerpt, rather than each figure of speech, as being primarily 
conjunctive or disjunctive, provided another level of examining the conjunctive and 
disjunctive nature of the data. If any of the two-minute excerpts consisted of one or more 
instances of conjunctive figures of speech, then the entire excerpt was rated as being 
conjunctive. It was assumed that due to the brief nature of two minutes that the potential 
effect of having conjunctive language present would be strong. When the fifty-six 
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excerpts were recoded as either being conjunctive or disjunctive, 42.9 percent were 
found to be disjunctive (Table 8). Across the fifty-six excerpts derived from therapy 
sessions conducted by the seven experts, Dr. Perls and Dr. Beck’s excerpts appear to 
have a larger proportion of conjunctive to disjunctive figures with the excerpts from the 
other experts appearing relatively balanced with regard to this feature (Table 9).  
The larger proportion of conjunctive to disjunctive figures of speech of Drs. Perls 
and Beck may have multiple implications. A test of the statistical significance of this 
observed difference was not conducted, thus, interpretation should be limited and 
focused on implications for future studies. Future studies could test the possibility that 
some experts, such as Drs. Perls and Beck, generally join with their clients more 
throughout therapy, and thus they might produce more instances of conjunctive figures 
of speech. Further, studies could examine the possibility that the sessions conducted by 
experts such as Drs. Perls and Beck may be due to idiosyncratic differences in their 
respective linguistic styles. It is also possible that their particular therapy styles 
contribute to their higher proportion of conjunctive to disjunctive figures of speech. 
However, because the other five experts were found to have similar proportions, the 
similarity might suggest that expert therapists in general tend to use shared meanings, 
such as in figures of speech coded as conjunctive, at relatively the same frequency. 
Given the exploratory nature of this finding and that no other studies have provided 
findings with which to draw comparisons, interpretation is difficult and should be 
cautioned. 
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With regard to shared figurative discourse in therapy, it was found that across 
this entire sample, the majority of the figures of speech uttered by both the therapists and 
the clients were not conceptually related, or conjunctive (Table 7). Specifically, only 
13.2 percent of the figures were judged to be conceptually related for both therapists and 
clients combined. When examining the percentage of figures uttered by therapists that 
were judged to be conceptually related to figures of speech spoken by their respective 
clients (per two minute excerpt), 20.3 percent (Table 25) of therapist uttered figures of 
speech were judged to be conjunctive. An interesting contrast is that only 6.2 percent of 
client uttered figures of speech were judged to be conjunctive, or share underlying 
meanings with, their respective therapist uttered figures of speech (Table 27). The Chi 
square calculated to test the relationship between the speaker and use of conjunctive 
figures of speech reached statistical significance (See Appendix F).  
This statistically significant difference suggests that therapists and clients are 
doing different things linguistically with regard to figurative language use. One 
explanation for why therapists’ figures of speech may be more conjunctive might be that 
it is an artifact of therapist training, specifically what is referred to as “Verbal Tracking” 
(Meir, 1989). “Verbal Tracking” pertains to therapists being trained to follow and 
explore meaningful themes and issues as clients bring them up in therapy. This finding 
might be best explained by stating that therapists repeat and sometimes clarify the topics 
that their clients have brought to the surface. Intuitively, if therapists are trained to track 
meaningful themes, then it is possible that therapists would use conjunctive figurative 
language along with “conjunctive” literal language.  
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Another interpretation is that this observed difference might be a manifestation of 
the unconscious or conscious efforts to join with their clients; in essence, then, the 
difference is empathy captured or measured by figurative meaning conjunction. Given 
this observation and its possible implications for better understanding therapy process, 
the issue of the proportion of conjunctive language to overall figures of speech used 
should be revisited and examined further. It seems that the difference between the clients 
and therapists with regard to use of conjunctive language signals that the use of 
conjunctive language is a therapeutic process that is not typically used in language. 
Research Question Two 
 
 The second research question posed in this study was stated as: How does using 
figures of speech that share an underlying conceptual meaning relate to subsequent 
ratings of the therapeutic bond and experiencing? To answer this question, a regression 
was performed with excerpt level conjunctive vs. disjunctive ratings used as a predictor 
for Exp peak, Exp mode, and the Bond scale of the WAI.  
 Table 29 reports the results of the regression analysis used to investigate the 
second general research question. The results were not statistically significant (F = 2.1, p 
= .153). Adjusted R squared, a measurement of estimated effect size, was found to be .02 
indicating that approximately 2 percent of variance in the WAI Bond Scale can be 
attributed to variance occurring in the conjunctive vs. disjunctive language variable. This 
effect size is difficult to interpret due to not having past research from which to gauge its 
size. That is, it may be a clinically large effect size or a small one, but without a 
reference point from which to compare or to have predicted, it cannot be interpreted. 
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However, it should be noted that this would be considered a small effect size when no 
comparison or gauge is available. As such, interpretation of the results should rest more 
on statistical significance.  
There are a number of possible explanations for this non-statistically significant 
finding. First of all, the intuitively based hypothesis that conjunctive figurative language 
discourse is related to positive changes in the working alliance or therapeutic 
relationship may be incorrect. In this way, the clinicians that have historically touted the 
influential and dynamic therapeutic effects of shared figurative language on the therapy 
relationship might have been erroneously thinking that the world was flat due to 
observations of the horizon. In other words, they may have been observing some 
phenomenon and believing it to be indicative of a larger relationship when no 
relationship actually exists. 
On the other hand, there may be an actual relationship between shared figurative 
language and subsequent changes in therapeutic bond, but it was not found in the data 
for this study. The risk of a Type II error points to the limitations of this study and its 
design as possibly contributing to decreasing the opportunity to find positive results. For 
example, those limitations may have manifested from such possible sources of bias 
caused by examining only experts, rather than including average or beginner therapists, 
and consequently having a range of scores on all of the variables. The existing data may 
have been influenced by a ceiling effect, thereby creating a restricted range and limited 
variance. This would decrease the chance of finding statistical significance. Future 
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research might examine non-experts in addition to experts for the purpose of alleviating 
this limitation. 
Validity of the Data 
When conducting research, describing the sample via the calculation of 
descriptive statistics is needed for a number of reasons. In general, the rationale for 
describing the sample is that doing so allows the researcher and readers of his or her 
study to identify the targeted population and understand limitations of the study with 
respect to generalization. More specifically, describing the sample allows the researcher 
to better identify particular characteristics of his or her sample that might undermine the 
results either by not allowing for inference to the population or by reducing the strength 
of the statistical calculations performed. Additionally, knowing such detailed 
information about the sample allows researchers to better understand comparisons 
between studies. Furthermore, that information can shed light on findings, at times 
providing an alternative explanation that might not have been otherwise identified if 
such details were not reported. In essence, examination of the data provides evidence as 
to whether or not it should be considered valid.  
Examination of the data used in this study for the purpose of evaluating the 
validity of the data was undertaken by focusing on the characteristics of the excerpts that 
where used in the study. This included finding descriptive characteristics of the experts 
with regard to number of excerpts per session and per therapist. In addition, the number 
of figures of speech found in the data as a whole, across excerpts, and by therapists was 
examined.  
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Excerpts 
 The sample analyzed for this study consisted of the therapy excerpts that were 
assumed to be representative of expert therapy conducted by known clinical experts. It 
was important to be able to describe the therapy excerpts as they were argued to be 
representative of expert therapy conducted by known clinical experts. As such, the 
excerpts were first described by reviewing from what videos they were selected. In brief, 
fifty-six excerpts, taken from examples of therapy performed by seven well-known 
expert therapists were selected for investigation. The average number of excerpts taken 
from each of the therapist’s training videos was eight with 64.3% of the excerpts being 
taken from three therapists and the remaining 35.7% of excerpts coming from the other 
four therapy sessions (Table 1).  
 When examining this distribution further, the therapists whose therapy sessions 
produced the least excerpts were Dr. Perls, Dr. Beck, and Dr. Strupp. These therapists 
used more in-therapy exercises than did the other therapists. This might explain the 
uneven distribution of excerpts that was found, as use of in-therapy exercises and role-
playing appears to have created data that was very different from the majority of data 
used in the study. When in-therapy exercises and role-playing were performed in the 
sessions, the corresponding data had fewer words spoken per two-minute segment. One 
of the guidelines for using the Depth of Experiencing Scale suggested that each unit of 
therapy be similar in length and in word count. Using that guideline, the only criterion 
for not using dialogue taken from the example expert therapy sessions was when a two-
minute excerpt of therapy had a significantly fewer number of words spoken. Using that 
  148
guideline, all of the therapists had some parts of their therapy sessions that were not used 
in the data for this study. However, it appears that some therapists had fewer usable two-
minute excerpts. In hindsight, this criterion for data inclusion may have contributed to 
the uneven distribution of excerpts taken from the expert therapists. It might also 
indicate that the data used in this study, although generally representing expert therapy, 
may more specifically be representative of the four therapists whose therapy sessions 
produced the majority of excerpts. In future studies, efforts in obtaining more of an 
equally distributed data set should be undertaken, such as possibly making a correction 
for the number of excerpts per therapist, to avoid any possible complications. 
Figurative Language Count 
 Figurative language counts were described so that a comparison of this study’s 
sample, with respect to frequency of figurative language use in therapy and excerpts, 
could be made to previously published studies. Early investigations into the possible 
effects of figurative language in therapy tended to focus on the volume of figurative 
language used in therapy (Barlow & Pollio, 1975), suggesting that in more productive or 
successful cases of therapy, more figurative language was used. As methods for 
investigating figurative language have become more sophisticated, allowing for more 
complex questions to be asked, less and less emphasis has been placed on the number of 
figures of speech produced per session. However, examination of this feature of 
figurative language was necessary to aid in arguing that the two-minute long excerpts 
could be used for analysis instead of the full session transcripts.  
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The results (Table 2) indicated that on average there were 10.9 instances of 
figurative language per two-minute excerpt. A random count of words occurring in 
several of the excerpts suggests that the excerpts include approximately 300 words. 
Extrapolation from that finding suggests that there would be on average 3.6 figures per 
100 words. Previous studies (Angus, 1996; Angus & Rennie, 1988, 1989; McMullen, 
1985; Pollio, Barlow, Fine, & Pollio, 1977) have found averages ranging from 4.1 to 4.9 
figures per 100 words. 
Comparing the highest average reported in the literature to the average found in 
this study equates to a difference of one figure per 100 words, or from extrapolation 
almost three figures per two-minute excerpt. Average differences such as one to two 
figures per 100 words might be explained by multiple factors and do not seem 
interpretable. In addition to examining the number of figures of speech used in the 
sample, the frequency of counts per excerpt was calculated and provided in a frequency 
distribution (Table 2). A visual analysis of the frequency distribution indicates that 
number of figures of speech uttered per two-minute approximates a normal curve 
distribution. Based on these findings, it is assumed that the sampling procedures for this 
study resulted in data that is representative of therapy conducted by experts and, 
specifically that two-minute long excerpts are sufficient to represent therapy dialogue 
with regard to figurative language.  
Limitations 
 There are numerous limitations associated with this study. However, as this 
research project was designed primarily to be exploratory, acknowledgment of such 
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limitations could also be thought of as recommendations for future investigations of this 
topic.  
 With respect to general limitations, this study was plagued with many of the 
same difficulties that previous researchers in this area have reported. Primary among 
those difficulties are the limitations of interpretation and causal inference. As reported in 
the review of the literature, there is a substantial history of clinicians touting the 
beneficial influences of figurative language use in therapy. However, unlike the research 
conducted into the effects of a medication on some known physical illness, research 
focusing on the influences of figurative language use in therapy is extremely restricted. 
This is the case because research in this area typically attempts to find out how a 
phenomena that varies in form, meaning, frequency of use, method of delivery, quality 
of delivery, goodness of fit, and even “dosage” subsequently influences a construct such 
as the quality of therapy or the quality of a therapeutic relationship. Simply stated, it is 
difficult to measure, let alone accurately measure, the subtle influence of a varying 
phenomenon in a real life situation, such as the therapy hour. Of course, analog studies 
could be designed to control for many of the factors mentioned above, and once a better 
idea of how figurative language functions, the methodology of analog studies and 
subsequent findings of those studies could be used to design stronger real-world 
investigations.  
Other than the general limitations that plague almost all research designed to 
investigate the influences of figurative language in therapy such as lengthiness and 
difficulty of training and data collection, specific limitations of this study included: 
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possible rater drift, lack of rater training for the WAI scale, difficulties relating to scaling 
of measures, failure of short excerpts to describe possible larger patterns, and lack of 
inferential strength.   
Due to the lengthiness of time needed for coding of the data, one possible 
limitation is rater drift. Rater drift is the phenomenon of raters slowly changing their way 
of coding over time, thereby having ratings at the beginning of the study that are 
quantitatively different then the ratings they made toward the end of data collection. This 
is problematic because is decreases interrater reliability and negatively influences a 
study’s ability to find evidence to support or counter a hypothesis. One way to counter or 
to rule out if rater drift has occurred in a study is by requiring the raters to redo a few 
ratings, effectively taking one of their first ratings and having them redo it at the end to 
see if they drifted. Another way to counter rater drift is more proactive because it 
requires the raters to periodically review their training and practice the same training 
stimuli throughout their data coding. A difficulty with countering rater drift with regard 
to lengthier studies that time might have contributed to the rater drift existing is that 
taking steps to ensure interrater reliability, such as requiring coders to either redo 
previously coded excerpts or to have them retrain periodically throughout data 
collection, creates an even larger commitment of time and people power. This might be 
the reason, for example, that the authors of the figurative language training manual did 
not provide a method to evaluate interrater reliability or to account for rater drift over 
time. Instead, they only provided a simple agreement table to be used during training. 
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 Another possible limitation concerns the lack of a prescribed methodology for 
training raters on the WAI instrument. This may not be as problematic for all studies. 
With studies designed so that each WAI judge rates every data set, individual differences 
among raters, assuming similar rater drift for all raters, are not as influential as when 
raters have different data sets. However, for studies such as this, where the WAI raters 
performed double duty and also coded the Exp scales, giving the entire data set to each 
rater would not have been practical. In hindsight, a solution that would avoid such 
concerns would be to have more raters whose task is to code the entire data set. 
Another possible limitation is that the scales used my not be sensitive enough to 
pick up on meaningful changes. There is no evidence for this, however, due to the nature 
of the potential effects of figurative language, that being smaller when compared to other 
factors influencing therapy process, the more sensitive the scale the better with regard to 
being able to see changes. As with all studies that use instruments to measure some 
intangible construct, scaling issues pose a possible limitation. Scaling, as it relates to 
appropriateness of gradients of measurement, can be a limiting factor if the gradients are 
either too great or too small. With respect to the instruments used in this study, for 
example, issues of scaling might have factored into the WAI ratings. Essentially, it is 
possible that the WAI scales offer a larger gradient than would be required in order to 
observe the subtle changes that figurative language might influence. This issue can be 
more clearly seen when considering the possibility that while the WAI scale is a measure 
of the entire two-minute segment of therapy, rapid fluctuations in the concept of Task, 
Bond, or Goal due to figurative language may be overlooked. On the other hand, some 
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might suggest that the two-minute size of the excerpts did not provide an adequate 
length of time for an accurate rating of those concepts.  
Still another possible limitation of this study is the possibility that the shorter 
excerpts of therapy are not long enough to capture an overarching pattern only 
measurable or recognizable if the entire session were examined; in a way this is also a 
scaling issue. By analogy, this issue is similar to a photographer taking pictures of 
divers, capturing many photos in which divers are not clearly moving upwards or 
downward. Without knowledge that each of the divers originated their dive from a boat, 
dove to the bottom, and eventually resurfaced, the still photos would seemingly indicate 
just that the divers were swimming at various depths. Overarching patterns can be 
missed by data that represents smaller segments of time. The data for this investigation 
has not been used to look for overarching patterns, as that is beyond the scope of this 
study. As such, no evidence suggests that important pictures are being missed by looking 
at a small part. 
Implications for Future Research 
 An important implication for future research is the simplification of the coding of 
figurative language. Considering that almost 95 percent of the figurative language found 
in therapy is metaphor, the distinction of types of figurative language may be too time 
consuming to warrant the rigorous training involved. This recommendation is similar to 
suggestions made by several previous researchers (Cameron & Low, 1999; Gibbs, 1998; 
McMullen, 1985) Similarly, most clinicians that hypothesize some positive influences 
through use of figurative language tend to be only speaking of metaphors (Brooks, 1985; 
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Kopp, 2001; Siegelman, 1990). A revised manual for identification of metaphors could 
be developed that would require less time for training. This might also alleviate some 
time and work constraints that have limited options for researchers when attempting to 
build in tasks to control for rater drift or measure reliability of ratings. It should be noted 
that by making such a change there would not be a guarantee of obtaining higher 
reliability.  
 Although not a focus of this investigation, the observation in this study that there 
are differences among therapists with regard to their use of conjunctive figurative 
language, suggests that either individual therapists tend to share or not share figures with 
their clients, or that possible global differences relating to style of therapy might be 
influential in the degree of conjunctive figurative language used. This observed 
difference is interesting and future research should be undertaken to shed light on 
possible reasons why some therapists might use conjunctive figurative language more 
than others. If the clinicians are on target when suggesting that figurative language, 
specifically shared figurative language, is influential (Angus & Rennie, 1988, 1989; 
Barker, 1985; Kopp, 2001; McMullen, 1989; Siegelman, 1990) then the above-
mentioned observation becomes even more interesting if found in future studies.   
 Another implication of this research pertains to the possible use of smaller 
segments of therapy as a window into larger processes. Although potentially problematic 
as discussed in detail in the following section, reduction in lengthiness of study (the 
amount of a therapy session examined, time needed to code longer segments of therapy, 
etc.) would be a significant benefit for research in figurative language, where studies 
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tend to be more time intensive. Similarly, focusing on metaphor and possibly simile and 
hyperbole would also have that effect.  
Implications for Theory 
 Results from this study lend support to previous clinical theories and research 
findings that indicated figurative language use was common and that figurative language 
production in therapy tends to be primarily metaphoric (e.g., McMullen & Conway, 
1994; Pollio & Barlow, 1975, Pollio et al, 1977). Rather than offering support for the 
past findings (Hill & Regan, 1991; Pollio & Barlow, 1975) that clients tend to use more 
novel figures of speech than do therapists, this finding is the contrary, that therapists 
used a higher percentage of figures of speech judged to be novel. However, that 
observed difference was not found to be statistically significant. With regard to 
proportion of shared vs. non shared figures of speech, this study’s findings suggest that 
therapists are uttering a higher overall percentage of conjunctive figures of speech when 
compared to client utterances. This difference was found to be statistically significant 
and suggests that therapists may be using shared or conjunctive figurative language as a 
way of tracking therapy content or attempts at connecting with their clients. Considering 
this finding, more results are needed before enough evidence can be accumulated to 
positively impact the established theory of how figurative language might be therapeutic. 
The finding that metaphor was by far the majority of the figures of speech used 
by both clinicians and clients in this study suggests that future theory and research 
initiatives can focus on metaphor and possibly simile and hyperbole, rather than 
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attempting to exhaustively predict the influences on therapy by the various kinds of 
figures of speech.  
The statistically significant finding that there was differential use of conjunctive 
figures of speech by the clients and the therapists reopens the theoretical book on the 
purpose or function of figures of speech in a therapy setting. Future research could 
investigate the possibility that there may be differences between expert and non-expert 
therapists as previous research using non-expert therapists did not report finding 
differences between the clients and therapists. In addition, future research could examine 
the possibility that expert therapists are subtly utilizing shared underlying meanings in 
their uttered figures of speech to influence the therapeutic relationship.  
However, statistical significance was not met when examining the relationship 
between conjunctive excerpts and the therapy process measures of the experiencing 
scales and the Bond scale of the WAI. This lack of a statistically significant result 
suggests that shared underlying meanings are not related to those process variables. 
However, the factors discussed in the limitations section may have contributed to this 
result. Given these preliminary and exploratory findings and the volume of clinical 
literature touting a relationship between figurative language use and subsequent positive 
changes in therapy, additional research is needed.  
Summary of Findings 
 This study was undertaken in order to gain more information about what 
figurative language is used in therapy and, to determine if conjunctive figurative 
language use is related to ratings of therapeutic alliance. The results offer additional 
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support to previous studies that have found figurative language to occur frequently in 
therapy. More specifically, it was found that expert therapists use figurative language 
and that approximately 95 % of the time metaphors are the type of figures of speech 
used. Additionally, the majority of figures of speech are frozen and that therapists, as 
well as clients, tend to use disjunctive figurative language in their dialogue.  
Differences between therapists and clients were found with regard to proportion 
of novel figures uttered and proportion of conjunctive figures used. Only the observed 
difference in use of conjunctive or shared figurative language was shown to be 
statistically significant. The observed difference that therapists used more novel figures 
is interesting because past theory of figurative language in therapy has suggested that 
clients would use novel figures more as they are active in the process of exploring and 
defining both their problems and possible solutions. This might suggest that expert 
therapists provide insight via indirect verbalizations such as with figurative language. 
The statistically significant difference found between use of conjunctive figurative 
language for therapists and clients is especially interesting as it might suggest that 
therapists use figurative language to track client content and/or let the client know that 
the therapist is “on the same page.” The majority of figures of speech were found to be 
not conceptual related to previously uttered figures of speech by the other member of the 
dyad. That is, there were more disjunctive than conjunctive figures of speech.  
A regression statistic, calculated for the purpose of determining if there is a 
relationship between conjunctive excerpts and ratings of working alliance and of 
therapeutic language did not reach statistical significance. As such, evidence to support 
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the hypothesis that shared underlying meaning of figures of speech between the therapist 
and the client is related to working alliance was not provided.  
Information about what kind of figurative language is used by experts in therapy 
was gained. Future research studies might benefit from continued investigation of the 
differences of figurative language production and use as well as how figurative language 
might positively influences therapy outcome.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXPERTS, THERAPY STYLES, AND THERAPY VIDEOS 
 
 
Dr. Carl Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 
Three Approaches to Psychotherapy I, Part 1 
 
Dr. Fritz Perls, Gestalt Therapy 
Three Approaches to Psychotherapy I, Part 2 
 
Dr. Albert Ellis, Rational Emotive Therapy, 
Three Approaches to Psychotherapy I, Part 3 
 
Dr. Arnold Lazarus, Multimodal Therapy, 
Three Approaches to Psychotherapy II, Part 2 
 
Dr. Everett Shostrum, Actualizing Therapy, 
Three Approaches to Psychotherapy II, Part 3 
 
Dr. Hans Strupp, Psychodynamic Therapy, 
Three Approaches to Psychotherapy III, Part 1 
 
Dr. Donald Michenbaum, Cognitive Behavior Modification, 
Three Approaches to Psychotherapy III, Part 2 
 
Dr. Aaron Beck, Cognitive Therapy, 
Three Approaches to Psychotherapy III, Part 3 
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FIGURES OF SPEECH 
 
Types Brief Definition Grouping 
Metaphor A direct comparison, such as, “My mind is a 
blank.” 
Simile An explicit comparison often using phrases 
such as “is like” or “as if.” For example, “she is 
like a princess.”  
Oxymoron Two contradictory meanings juxtaposed for 
linguistic effect. 
Personification Inanimate objects given human qualities. 
Apostrophe Personification when object or person is not 
present. For example, speaking to “Death” as if 
it might answer.  
All use comparisons 
Metonymy A substitution in which a part stands for the 
whole. For example, “green” for money. 
Periphrasis A substitution in which a proper name 
associated with a quality is used rather than the 
quality. For example, Carl Lewis for a person 
who fast. 
Both use 
substitutions 
Pun A play on words 
Anthimeria A substitution for one part of speech for 
another such as when new words are created 
from other words.  
Onomatopoeia When the pronunciation of a word sounds 
similar to what the word is describing 
All use “play” on 
word 
Hyperbole An exaggeration to linguistically highlight a 
point, relationship, or characteristic 
Litotes An understatement for the purpose of 
highlighting 
Irony When the opposite words are used to convey 
the original meaning 
Rhetorical 
Question 
Used to indirectly assert or deny a fact 
All require prior 
knowledge of 
information 
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EXAMPLES OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE THEMES 
 
 
Therapists Introduced by Therapist Introduced by Client 
Rogers 
 
“be open with”* “picture myself”* 
Perls 
 
“stage fright” “I’m in the corner” * 
Meichenbaum 
 
“get a handle on things” “let the balloon go” * 
Shrostrum “reach out” “think of myself as a 
flower”* 
Beck “made up of the fabric of 
several conclusions” 
“shell around self” 
Strupp 
 
N/A “we keep drifting apart” 
Lazarus 
 
“putting self last”* “in touch with myself”* 
*Shared themes. 
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AGREEMENT TABLES 
 
 
Agreement and Judgment Table: Passage 1 
Novel Frozen Rating Category 
N % N % 
Accepted     
3+0 5 .71 6 .67 
2+1 2 .29 2 .22 
1+2 0 - 1 .11 
Subtotal 
 
7  9  
Rejected     
2-1 0 - 0 - 
1-2 0 - 0 - 
Subtotal 
 
0 - 0 - 
Total 
 
7/16 44 9/16 56 
Judgments     
% Accepted 100 
% Rejected 0 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement and Judgment Table: Passage 2 by all three raters 
Novel Frozen Rating Category 
N % N % 
Accepted     
3+0 2 100 16 57 
2+1 -  9 32 
1+2 -  3 11 
Subtotal 
 
2  28  
Rejected     
2-1 -  -  
1-2 -  -  
Subtotal 
 
-  -  
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AGREEMENT TABLES  
 
Total 
 
2/30 6 28/30 93 
Judgments     
% Accepted 100 
% Rejected 0 
 
 
Agreement and Judgment Table: Passage 3 by all three raters 
 
Novel Frozen Rating Category 
N % N % 
Accepted     
3+0 4 80 9 69 
2+1 1 20 4 31 
1+2     
Subtotal 
 
5  13  
Rejected     
2-1     
1-2     
Subtotal 
 
5/18 28 13/8 72 
Total 
 
    
Judgments     
% Accepted 100 
% Rejected 0 
 
 
Agreement and Judgment Table: Passage 4 by all three raters 
 
Novel Frozen Rating Category 
N % N % 
Accepted     
3+0 5 83 19 86 
2+1   1 5 
1+2 1 17 2 9 
Subtotal 
 
6  22  
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Rejected     
2-1     
1-2     
Subtotal 
 
    
Total 
 
6/28 21 22/28 79 
Judgments     
% Accepted  
% Rejected  
 
 
 
Agreement and Judgment Table: Passage 5 by all three raters 
 
Novel Frozen Rating Category 
N % N % 
Accepted     
3+0 1 100 6 33 
2+1   6 33 
1+2   6 33 
Subtotal 
 
1  18  
Rejected     
2-1     
1-2     
Subtotal 
 
    
Total 
 
1/19 5 18/19 95 
Judgments     
% Accepted 100 
% Rejected 0 
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AGREEMENT TABLES 
 
Agreement and Judgment Table: Agreements Avg. across Passages and All Raters 
 
Novel Frozen Rating Category 
N % N % 
Accepted     
3+0 17 15 56 50 
2+1 3 3 22 20 
1+2 1 1 12 11 
Subtotal 
 
21  90  
Rejected     
2-1     
1-2     
Subtotal 
 
    
Total 
 
21/111 19 90/111 81 
Judgments     
% Accepted 100 
% Rejected 0 
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MARCUS ET AL’S (1996) AGREEMENT PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS 
 
 
All Six Raters for Training Passage 1 
 
Sum ri  = Totaled Number of Observers for All Moments 
 = (1 x 5) + (4 x 3) + (12 x 6) 
 = 5 + 12 + 72 
 = 89 
 
Sum ri2 = (1 x 52) + (4 x 32) + (12 x 62)  
 = 25 + 36 + 432 
 = 432 
 
Pyes =  [(Sum ri2 - Sum ri )/(n – 1)]/ Sum ri   
 
 [(493 – 89)/(6 – 1)]/89 
 
 .907 
 
All Six Raters for Training Passage 2 
 
Sum ri  = Totaled Number of Observers for All Moments 
 = (2 x 5) + (11 x 3) + (18 x 6) 
 = 10 + 33 + 108 
 = 151 
 
Sum ri2 = (2 x 52) + (11 x 32) + (18 x 62)  
 = (2 x 25) + (11 x 9) + (18 x 36) 
 = 50 + 99 + 648 
 = 797 
 
Pyes =  [(Sum ri2 - Sum ri )/(n – 1)]/ Sum ri   
 
 [(797 – 151)/(6 – 1)]/151 
 
 .855 
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MARCUS ET AL’S (1996) AGREEMENT PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS 
 
 
All Six Raters for Training Passage 3 
 
Sum ri  = Totaled Number of Observers for All Moments 
 = (3 x 3) + (15 x 6) 
 = 9 + 90 
 = 99 
 
Sum ri2 = (3 x 32) + (15 x 62)   
 = (3 x 9) + (15 x 36)  
 = 27 + 540 
 = 567 
 
Pyes =  [(Sum ri2 - Sum ri )/(n – 1)]/ Sum ri   
 
 [(567 – 99)/(6 – 1)]/99 
 
 .945 
 
All Six Raters for Training Passage 4 
 
Sum ri  = Totaled Number of Observers for All Moments 
 = (3 x 14) + (6 x 18) 
 = 42 + 108 
 = 150 
 
Sum ri2 = (14 x 32) + (18 x 62)   
 = (9 x 14) + (36 x 18)   
 = 126 + 648 
 = 774 
 
Pyes =  [(Sum ri2 - Sum ri )/(n – 1)]/ Sum ri   
 
 [(774 – 150)/(6 – 1)]/150 
 
 .832 
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CHI SQUARED RESULTS 
 
 
Chi Square Test of Rates of Novel Figurative Language by Therapists and Clients 
 Value df Two-sided Significance 
Person Chi-Square 
 
Continuity Correction 
 
N of Valid Cases 
20216 
 
1.694 
 
611 
1 
 
1 
.137 
 
.193 
 
 
Chi Square Test of Rates of Conjunctive Figurative Language by Therapists and Clients 
 Value df Two-sided Significance 
Person Chi-Square 
 
Continuity Correction 
 
N of Valid Cases 
26.154 
 
24.948 
 
611 
1 
 
1 
.000 
 
.000 
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